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Abstract 
At first glance, it seems that gifted and talented children have no 
need for advocates, being generously endowed with ability and 
needing only reasonable schooling to translate this into academic 
success, with all the advantages that it brings. However, it is 
simplistic to equate high ability with high achievement. High ability is 
a contentious issue. The highly able are not a homogeneous group; 
many able people have learning problems and disabilities, as well as 
becoming disillusioned and consequently disaffected as a result of 
unchallenging and limiting school provision. 
Because of the complexities of high ability, it is difficult to create a 
definition of the able child. I discuss the gifted education literature 
tackling the nature of high ability and school-based provision. This 
work is predominantly written from psychological perspectives and I 
analyse the underpinning premises, reconsidering them from a 
philosophical angle, allowing for clarification of commonly used but 
rarely examined ideas. 
Having established the nature of highly able children, I make a 
morally defensible argument for supporting them through 
educational provision. Examining ideas of equality, elitism and 
excellence, I show that able children are entitled to educational 
activities that match their abilities and that this is a vital investment in 
personal well-being with potential subsidiary social and economic 
benefits. 
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Typical approaches to provision are evaluated, such as acceleration, 
enrichment and extension, together with an examination of the 
alternative approach of critical thinking skills programmes. In 
particular, philosophy with children is evaluated and found to be a 
useful approach for the highly able. 
Without resorting to elitist or exclusive standpoints, I suggest that 
pupils need resources and tasks aimed more accurately at meeting 
their needs. 
Declaration: 
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is all my own work. 
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Part One: 
Who are the highly able? 
11 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.0 General introduction 
I set out to provide a fresh look at the field of high ability and gifted 
education in this thesis, and this introduction outlines the arguments in 
each chapter. In the main, I draw on the disciplines of psychology and 
philosophy, as well as presenting illustration and insight from my own 
practitioner experience at nursery, primary and secondary school levels, 
and delivering teacher education both to trainees and practising teachers. 
This introduction explains the overall shape of the work, showing how the 
wide-ranging ideas come together to answer the key question: 'How best 
should we provide for the highly able? ' 
Nearly all academic research into high ability falls within the discipline of 
psychology and I completed a Master of Philosophy in high ability, 
cognition, language development and psychology in 1990.1 considered 
embarking on a doctorate at that point, but felt that the issues 
underpinning the psychological constructs and assumptions I would have 
to employ lacked rigorous examination and ignored the complex ethical 
arguments in which gifted education is unwillingly immersed. I was unsure 
how to proceed, but was entirely convinced that I was dissatisfied with the 
theoretical structures in which I would have to work. To this end, I decided 
to work in schools to build up an evidence base to confirm my suspicion 
that research-based viewpoints on high ability were not telling the whole 
story. Questioning wrong-headed assumptions brought me eventually to 
philosophy, which requires careful examination of terms and concepts and 
allowed me to challenge the suppositions underpinning ideas in gifted 
education literature. 
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The thesis as a whole presents a coherent contribution to discussions that 
strike at the very heart of debates on gifted education and tackles head-on 
difficult ideas often side-stepped in research. I could have approached the 
task in a variety of ways, but have chosen to look for solutions to the 
needs of the able within the current structures of the UK education 
system. I have not made suggestions for abandoning the current national 
curriculum or existing schools as such ideas, while exciting and liberating, 
are not relevant to teachers working in schools. The work is divided into 
three parts, each dealing with a different aspect of the main theme, which 
concerns the search for the best response to meeting the needs of the 
able. 
1.1 Breakdown of chapters 
The first part is made up of three chapters: 
Part One 
1 Introduction 
2 High ability 
3 Intelligence 
These sketch the area under discussion and then focus on defining the 
target group. Having established an understanding of high ability with an 
underpinning concept of intelligence, the second part presents an ethical 
argument in favour of provision for the target group. This part of the thesis 
is one chapter long: 
Part Two 
4 What it is fair to do for highly able children 
Once the argument has been made to provide for the able, the final part of 
the thesis examines the nature of such provision. Three chapters move 
from general to more specific concerns, as follows: 
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Part Three 
05 Provision for highly able children 
96 Critical thinking skills programmes 
97 Philosophy with children 
Finally, there is a conclusion in which the main ideas are summarised and 
I reiterate the notion that highly able pupils merit specific provision to keep 
them challenged and engaged in their education, even where this may 
require additional resources. 
1.2 The interdisciplinarV nature of this thesis 
In striving to present argument with clear practical application, I have 
found it necessary to draw on more than one field of study. Deciding what 
to do to help the highly able raises a wide range of questions that cannot 
be addressed through a single discipline. The questions contrast starkly 
and the different disciplines bring their own particular answers that need to 
be evaluated, then synthesised with other aspects, and applied to practical 
contexts. 
Psychology provides a certain amount of hard empirical evidence about 
the nature of ability and the highly able, which must be considered, even if 
it is found that some of the underpinning notions are questionable. Of 
course, psychology is a wide-ranging field in itself and there is 
disagreement between psychologists and their different interpretations of 
empirical evidence. For this thesis, I have focused on key research into 
high ability, and have emphasised the way this is disseminated to 
practitioners. Reducing psychological jargon and making ideas applicable 
to classroom contexts sometimes results in a kind of watering down of 
ideas, and this is reflected in the confusion that arises from over- 
simplification. Criticism then, is less of psychological ideas than of their 
interpretation and presentation in the practical context. This is appropriate 
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because practising teachers are far more likely to have access to 
classroom-based texts than to academic psychological journals. 
Other aspects of psychology, concerning for example, motivation and 
personality studies, have been mentioned, but are not the focus of this 
thesis. This is because I have prioritised more basic aspects; questions 
that teachers repeatedly raise at In-Service sessions and through 
networks generally concerning the nature of high ability. I present some of 
the empirical evidence and psychological understandings, but question 
some of these ideas through conceptual analysis, which is a key tool in 
the discipline of philosophy. 
Like psychology, philosophy covers a wide range of varied ideas and 
concepts of which I harness two areas, philosophy of mind and political 
philosophy. Psychological studies of the way we think are based on 
certain assumptions about the nature of the mind that are called into 
question through philosophy of mind. Philosophy of mind questions the 
starting points for psychological investigations of thinking and is therefore 
useful in providing a clearer idea of what we mean when we talk about 
high ability. Questions raised in philosophy of mind are complex and are 
explored as far as necessary for the purposes of this thesis. 
Similarly, the ethical questions raised in political philosophy highlight 
questions of value, a different aspect of philosophy. These ethical 
questions bring attention to the complexity of the provision for the highly 
able, rather than purporting to present simple solutions to long term 
problems. By clarifying aspects of the political argument, it is possible to 
demonstrate how children are being let down through flawed reasoning 
and to show that the highly able are legitimately deserving of provision. 
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In the thesis, this use of psychology and philosophy is always considered 
in the context of real educational situations, ranging from the micro-level of 
the classroom to national and international policy. I consider it vital to 
emphasise the practice aspect of high ability because of my experience of 
working in the field. Practitioners need practical solutions, not more empty 
rhetoric. In another context, it might have been appropriate to pursue a 
narrower question within a single discipline, such as an empirical study in 
psychology, or a more straightforward conceptual analysis of a single 
aspect of ability. Here, however, I wanted to produce something of 
practical value, rigorously underpinned through careful examination of the 
central tenets of high ability. It has been important to keep a clear focus on 
the ultimate aim of this work, which is to answer the question of what it is 
fair to do for the highly able child. 
So, to summarise, this thesis is interdisciplinary, drawing on ideas from 
psychology, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and pedagogy. I do 
not claim to present an exhaustive account of each area, but instead I use 
these fields to help create a potentially practical answer to the complex 
question of provision for the able child in school. 
1.3 Summaries of chapters 
My task now is to sketch the lines of reasoning of the whole thesis, 
introducing the key ideas and arguments of each chapter. In Chapter 2,1 
consider the complex area of defining the able child. Initially, I review the 
range of definitions of high ability found in the dominant psychological 
literature, exploring whether the profusion of suggestions is useful, or 
whether it results ultimately in an overall lack of meaning (2.1). 1 make use 
of some philosophical ideas in an attempt to clarify the confusing language 
found in the literature and to review common uses of key terms (2.2). In 
section 2.3, the government's interpretation of definitions is reviewed, with 
a note about why this is important. 
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Some general points can be made about different approaches to defining 
the able and these can affect any type of definition. Global perspectives 
demonstrate that while social context influences how we refer to the able, 
some aspects of high ability seem to cross cultures (2.4.1). Mention is 
made of the moral dimension in this discussion, as it concerns pressures 
placed on the able as well as the effects of education on the self-image of 
the highly able and on their behaviour (2.4.2). Questions are also raised 
about the variation in values society places on different abilities and also 
about the origins of abilities (2.4.3 and 2.4.4). 
Having outlined these broad issues, the next section (2.5) is devoted to 
the critical exposition of commonly used definitions of high ability. The 
most important aspect is the long-standing argument about whether 
'giftedness' can be described as a single concept or whether multiple 
dimensions are needed to explain the notion (2.5.1). Other sections 
summarise different ways of looking at high ability, including the concept 
of genius and other related factors such as creativity and motivation. 
Section 2.6 is devoted to 'potential' as this is relevant to so much of this 
discussion. Definitions often rely on children's performance, but 
sometimes this belies actual potential. Here, the underachieving pupil is 
let down by their lack of conventional achievement and I consider it 
necessary to examine how these pupils can be identified and helped 
(2.6.3). How, though, can potential be measured, and which kind of 
definition could take potential into account? These questions, and others, 
are considered, and the section ends with an account of the provision-led 
definition, which allows abilities to flourish, showing some understanding 
of potential and providing flexibility for teachers (2.6.4). 
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I then present my own definition of high ability (2.7.0), in which I focus on 
the intellectual aspects of ability and suggest that the highly able child is 
someone who has significantly greater aptitude for some aspect of 
intellectual learning than would be considered typical for their age and 
background. Aptitude for learning is demonstrated through some form of 
achievement, conventional or unconventional, including notable isolated 
incidences that serve as evidence of special ability but are otherwise 
difficult to categorise. Such a definition of high ability allows 
underachieving pupils to be recognised. 
By the end of the second chapter I will have clearly demonstrated that it is 
simplistic to equate high ability with high achievement and that people with 
learning problems, disabilities and cultural difference have been 
disadvantaged by conventional models of gift and talent based on 
accomplishments alone. Having criticised a variety of different definitions, 
highlighting contradictions and confusions, my own focus on intellectual 
high ability is presented together with some potential criticisms and 
rebuttals (2.7.1). 
In order to support my definition of high ability, I need to explore the 
meanings of 'intelligence' and this is undertaken in Chapter 3. Firstly, I 
consider the everyday uses of the term (3.1) and show that most people 
equate the word with activities of an intellectual nature. I then explore 
aspects of the psychological literature with reference to this concept, 
demonstrating the emotive and controversial aspects of the field (3.2). 
Many ideas surrounding intelligence stem from conceptions brought to the 
fore in the early part of the twentieth century and since harnessed for 
negative purposes. The hangover from this has sometimes eclipsed the 
ideas themselves and I argue that the negative reaction to ideas of 
generalisable aspects of intelligence originate, in part, from the response 
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to strategies such as the divisive 'Eleven-plus' examination and the hi- 
jacking of intelligence testing data for racist purposes. 
Once divested of these factors, it is possible to look more clearly at the 
claims that accompany the concept of intelligence and judge them on their 
true merits. Four claims are examined. In section 3.3, the idea of 
intelligence as a capacity is considered and it is decided that this is 
acceptable in combination with dispositional aspects and that neither 
capacity nor disposition will account for intelligence alone. The second 
claim is that intelligence is both fixed and innate (3.4). These ideas are 
found to be neither verifiable nor falsifiable, and are ultimately irrelevant to 
the definition as it relates to this thesis. Thirdly, the concept of intelligence 
as a singular entity is examined and it is shown that there are 
generalisable aspects to intelligence, but these are not necessarily 
synonymous with the traditional concept of 'g' (3.5). The last claim 
concerns the measurability of intelligence (3.6) and it is concluded that 
even if some elements of intelligence could be quantified, a single 
numerical score (such as IQ) would never be adequate as an explanation, 
or even description, of intelligence. 
I then present a brief stipulative account of intelligence that allows for a 
general notion of intellectual activity, but rejects traditional accounts of 'g'. 
I link these ideas about intelligence to the definition of high ability 
presented in Chapter 2. This marks the end of Part One. 
Part Two consists of only one chapter and this concerns an ethical 
justification of provision for highly able children. I introduce global aspects 
of the debate, as well as more specific UK issues (4.1). Whatever the 
country or social context, there are tensions between educational 
provision for the many and for the few. Since the highly able are likely to 
be a small group, strong arguments have to be made for any additional 
19 
resources. There are many competing forces for educational funding and 
it seems obvious that less able children and those with problems should 
be the first in a line of potential beneficiaries, with the more able at the 
back of the queue. 
I then consider arguments for and against provision for the highly able. 
Common arguments against provision suggest that it is elitist, and so I 
examine the concept of elitism. This exploration reveals that elitism is a 
complex concept and therefore cannot be dismissed as always negative, 
but can also refer just to high quality (4.2.1). The second argument is that 
provision for the able will increase the gap between rich and poor, which I 
accept as possible and a potential negative outcome. This is, however, an 
issue beyond the scope of schooling (4.2.2). The remaining contentions 
are that provision for the able offends against three different types of 
equality (4.2.3 - 4.2.5), but I show that these equality arguments are often 
blurry. Aiming for equality of resources is rejected as impractical, 
considering the range of costs of different subjects. Equality of outcome is 
likely to be inappropriate for the highly able, as it would not be possible to 
assure such equality while still stretching the target group. Equality of 
opportunity is a rather woolly notion with a range of different 
interpretations, making it too complex to support without detailed 
qualification of what is understood by this type of equality. These common 
arguments against provision for the able are therefore unconvincing. 
The five arguments often expressed in favour of provision for the able are 
explored in section 4.3. Firstly, the notion of providing for the able in order 
to pursue excellence because of its intrinsic value is dismissed as being 
elitist in the most negative sense of the concept (4.3.1). Only tenuous 
conclusions can be drawn from the second claim that activities for the 
highly able will result in benefits for society through more and better 
economic and social goods (4.3.2). The third contention is an empirical 
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issue concerning the effect of the able on other pupils, that requires further 
investigation (4.3.3). The next claim, that all pupils are entitled to an 
education beyond the bare minimum, is relevant of course to all pupils, not 
just the able, but it is unclear what should be put in and left out of this 
basic education, making it difficult to decide what counts as extra and 
what should be mandatory (4.3.4). The last of the claims is considered the 
most reasonable, suggesting that pupils are entitled to an education based 
on their needs (4.3.5). It is, however, still rather unclear exactly what that 
could mean as the notion of needs is often disputed, particularly in the 
field of gifted education where high ability can sometimes be considered 
as a special educational need. 
My own contribution to the equality debate is the idea of providing equality 
of quality of learning, or equality of challenge, which is applicable to all 
children. Whilst there is a statutory requirement to attend school, there is a 
moral obligation for schools to ensure that pupils are not wasting their 
time. They need to be engaged in their learning and this can only happen 
when tasks are challenging. For most pupils, the curriculum can satisfy 
this need for challenge, but the able pupil is often left bored and 
unstimulated. Pupils must move at their own intellectual pace, or as near 
to this as is practically possible, regardless of whether that pace is 
'normal' for their age. This can be ensured, or at least we can try to ensure 
this, through careful consideration of the quality of teaching they receive 
and the level of challenge with which they are presented. 
Following some exploration of potential difficulties with my argument, 
present a conclusion to Part Two of the thesis. 
Having established that able pupils are entitled to some form of provision, 
Part Three is concerned with the nature of this provision. It begins with a 
review of what is typically found in schools (Chapter 5), with an emphasis 
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on adopting an inclusive approach providing for able underachievers (5-1). 
The main strategies found in research and practice are forms of 
differentiation, known as acceleration, extension, and enrichment. 
Acceleration (5.2.2), or'grade skipping' through the school is when a pupil 
is allowed to move ahead of peers by a year or more. This should be 
considered carefully, of course, as there are obvious consequences. For 
example, those who miss a year or more at primary school are often 
forced to repeat the process in Year 6, unable to move to secondary 
school until they turn eleven, despite having successfully covered all 
curriculum requirements. Skipping ahead through secondary school can 
result in intellectual readiness for university-level studies, but lack of 
maturity for coping with social aspects. 
The second common approach is enrichment (5.2.3). This can include the 
introduction of wider applications for ordinary areas of study, such as 
allowing able mathematicians and physicists to explore ideas in astronomy 
(which is not normally taught in school) or giving excellent historians the 
opportunity to undertake their own project in the community. Enrichment 
can also be the introduction of ideas and subject areas that fall completely 
outside of the National Curriculum, such as an introduction to medical 
ethics, or unusual languages like Sanskrit. This has the advantage of not 
interfering with the curriculum to be covered in later years and of 
broadening the child's experience and learning. It can, however, breed 
resentment if apparently exciting activities are restricted to a small number 
of the school population. The school community must decide how to 
handle any distinction made between specific tasks for the highly able and 
extra-curricular clubs and activities open to all. 
Extension (5.2.4) is when able pupils are given significantly more complex 
tasks than their peers, when pupils can be completing work usually 
covered by children perhaps several years older. In acceleration, the pupil 
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covers all subjects, attending all classes together with pupils from a higher 
year group, but in extension, pupils will stay with their age group for most 
classes and mix with older pupils in very few topic areas, or in only one 
subject. Where enrichment focuses on breadth of learning, extension aims 
for depth in a single subject. Being pushed ahead in the curriculum can 
provide problems in terms of materials and schemes of work, not just for 
the current teacher coping with pupils at different stages of work, but also 
for the next teacher, who finds that pupils have completed all published 
materials for the year, requiring time-consuming individually designed 
tasks. Schools need a flexible approach to avoid pupils repeating material 
or teachers having to undertake excessive individual work planning. 
However, the problem of uneven development is more easily dealt with by 
this approach than by acceleration, and allowing for movement between 
sets (even across year groups) can really help to ensure pupils are 
appropriately challenged. 
In summarising the strategies (5.3), it is concluded that highly able pupils 
benefit from spending time both with age peers as well as with pupils who 
are their intellectual equals, reinforcing the case for diversity and different 
activities within schooling, rather than completely segregated provision. 
Self-contained activities run as clubs or as part of ordinary classes would 
be a helpful tool in provision for the able, particularly where they serve as 
effective enrichment activities. Since programmes of critical thinking skills 
could possibly fill this requirement they are examined in the following 
chapter, as a potential practical solution to the needs of the able. 
Chapter 6 provides an examination of the teaching of critical thinking skills 
through specifically designed programmes, such as Reuven Feuerstein Is 
'Instrumental Enrichment' and Edward de Bono's 'Cognitive Research 
Trust'. I introduce the concept of critical thinking skills as a potential 
solution in meeting the needs of the highly able (6.1). The programmes 
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are then contextualised through a consideration of current trends in the 
thinking skills 'movement', with particular reference to the 1999 
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) report'From thinking 
skills to thinking classrooms' in which programmes were reviewed (6.2). 
Unpicking the range of programmes demonstrates the variety of different 
approaches and shows how some are based on rather shaky theoretical 
foundations. 
There is some confusion over the concept of thinking as a skill and in 
section 6.3 1 consider these difficulties, moving in 6.4, to specific claims 
made about the development of thinking being like other forms of skill 
learning. The first of these suggests that thinking is made up of 
components (6.4.0). 1 consider this to have some value, although it is 
insufficient to explain all aspects of thinking. In 6.4.1,1 examine the idea of 
thinking being developed like other forms of skill learning, through 
observation and modelling, with practice and feedback. Whilst noting that 
these methods of learning are not the most obvious when linked to 
thinking and improving thinking, I do consider that they can have some 
use. Section 6.4.2 deals with the suggestion that there is transfer of 
learning, which is perhaps the most contentious of the claims. I reject the 
dichotomy between either general skills or subject-based knowledge and 
suggest a thin notion of transferability in which related subjects are shown 
to have shared intellectual aspects. 
I then consider some of the thinking skills programmes, to illustrate points 
already made. Using the distinctions made in the WEE report, I critically 
consider examples of the different approaches to teaching thinking: 
general, subject specific and infusion, which respectively provide stand- 
alone skills packages, subject-based tasks and cross curricular activities 
(6.5.0-6.5.3). In these discussions, I touch upon ideas presented by 
Edward de Bono, Reuven Feuerstein, Philip Adey and Matthew Lipman. I 
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consider the pros and cons of different approaches, but also note that it 
can sometimes be difficult to classify the programmes with any clarity. 
There are also some new programmes, such as World Class Tests and 
Accelerated Learning, published or made popular since the publication of 
the DfEE report. These are briefly considered in section 6.5.4. 
In conclusion (6.6), 1 suggest that the most promising programme for the 
highly able child is likely to be Philosophy with Children (PwC) and so this 
is the focus of Chapter 7. The first task in this chapter is to explain how 
Philosophy with Children has developed and this requires an introduction 
to the work of Lipman. His series of philosophical novels for children and 
his establishment of international training programmes for teachers started 
a worldwide movement (7.1). As his ideas and influence have grown, 
critical objections have been raised to the concept of children studying 
philosophy. I review the major objections and show that, even if they may 
be accurate depictions of problems with philosophy for most children, they 
are not relevant objections for the highly able. 
In section 7.2,1 show how the common view that PwC is no more than 
standard classroom discussion work is an inaccurate assessment, 
showing a lack of understanding of the key aspect of building a community 
of enquiry in the classroom, through which children work together on 
themes of their own carefully considered choice. The second objection 
(7.3) concerns the notion that children cannot cope with abstraction. 
Whilst this could be true for many children, I have shown this to be false 
for highly able children, through earlier arguments about high ability in 
which I am actually defining the highly able through their sophisticated 
intellectual processes. 
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In section 7.4,1 concede that the empirical evidence to support PwC is 
inadequate, but make suggestions for further research and also point out 
that lack of evidence is not the same as lack of efficacy. It is frequently 
claimed that PwC is not'real philosophy' (7.5), but this seems merely to 
be an issue of naming and labelling of activities. Even within the field of 
professional philosophy there are disagreements about what exactly 
constitutes the discipline, with some people refusing to accept applied or 
practical aspects as equal in status to more 'pure' forms. I suggest that 
PwC is more like philosophy than any other recognisable discipline, but 
wonder whether it is really of much importance whether the children's 
work bears significant resemblance to the adult equivalent. 
The last objection is that children lack the concentration and focus 
necessary for philosophy and are not sufficiently interested in the research 
and enquiry needed to pursue philosophical questions (7.6). This is clearly 
not the case for the highly able, except for some underachievers, who 
have only shown their focus in erratic and sometimes unconvincing ways. 
For highly able underachievers, teachers are recommended to give them 
the benefit of the doubt, rather than writing off the potentially interested 
student. 
I devote a section to the particular case of philosophy and highly able 
children (7.7). 1 do not, however, present PwC as a panacea, or as the 
only appropriate provision for the able child, but I do consider it a viable 
option with enough flexibility and challenge to meet many of the 
requirements for a workable, practical response to the issue of provision 
for the able. 
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My overall conclusion summarises the main points made in each part of 
the thesis. In Part One I will have shown what I understand by high ability 
and supported this by an exploration of the notion of intelligence. Part Two 
deals with ethical issues supporting provision for the able, and Part Three 
explores the practical considerations associated with high ability. I 
conclude that it is indeed necessary to provide appropriately for the able 
pupil, even if this will require extra resources. 
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Chapte 2 Hiah Abilit 
2.0 Introduction 
Appendix I paints a picture of the pupils with which this thesis is 
concerned and is of use in bringing to life the ideas of the thesis. This 
chapter explores the landscape of high ability, which is both controversial 
and complex. Practitioners and policy makers use a wide range of 
different definitions of high ability. In order to guide practice effectively, we 
need a unified account of high ability, or at least more clarity in the debate. 
In this chapter I will survey the definitions most commonly found in 
literature and policy documents, showing where they are problematic. I will 
also present my own understanding of high ability. A fuller account of this 
depends on examining the notions of intelligence which I do in Chapter 3, 
having clearly established the nature of high ability. Meanwhile, in the 
current chapter, the word 'intelligence' is used in the dictionary definition 
sense: 'the capacity for understanding, ability to perceive and comprehend 
meaning' (Collins Dictionary, p798). 
I am not engaging here with technical aspects of psychological testing; IQ 
and other tests are considered in the following chapter. Many of the ideas 
in this chapter come from psychological sources that dominate the field of 
gifted education, but are also commonly harnessed by teachers and 
coordinators of provision. This chapter explains why I have adopted the 
term 'high ability' and presents more detailed information on 
characteristics used for identification. As this is an interdisciplinary thesis, I 
have focused on the definitions most likely to be accessed and used by 
teachers, rather than more strictly psychological and technical information. 
How we talk about children does matter. Obviously, how we treat them is 
more important, but there is a relationship between these two aspects of 
education. The aim of this chapter is to explore the way in which highly 
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able children are categorised, identified and discussed. This is shown to 
be problematic, with little consensus in the material written for practitioners 
and some disagreement in key areas amongst researchers. 
It might (even) be said that, as in other fields, the more that 
is known, the more issues are raised and controversies are 
fuelled. [ ... ] Many different decisions regarding identification, 
education and counselling, for example, depend on the often 
only implicit conception and definition of giftedness. 
Therefore clarification of underlying constructs is essential 
for both program and research design. 
Monks et al, 2000: 839 and 843 
Relevant literature is largely concerned with children, although significant 
longitudinal surveys have yielded interesting results, and there is a 
growing number of studies about young people' and adults with 'genius' 
status, some whom are autistic savants and similar. (See a later section - 
p. 62 - on 'after the fact definitions' for reasons why the focus is 
sometimes on adults. ) Although genius may seem removed from 
classroom issues, interesting studies could inform general pedagogic 
practice and shed light on whether some children learn in ways so 
removed from the average child that separate provision is unavoidable. 
The first task is to review the enormous range of definitions in the 
literature. 
2.1 Definitions 
Practitioners need a clear definition of high ability to cater effectively for 
individual needs, but the area is a minefield, with disagreement, and 
countless different labels, titles and definitions to be evaluated. Ultimately, 
it may be impossible to find a definitive way of describing the able. Most 
writers develop a working definition, skating over underlying issues. This is 
a reasonable, practical approach when the audience consists of parents 
29 
and/or teachers anxious for advice and tips for coping with demanding 
able children. A more rigorous theoretical approach is needed for 
research, however. 
The myriad of definitions is alarming. David George finds that the 
heterogeneity of high ability means that 'vagueness is a logical necessity 
identifying 213 different definitions (1993: 9). Joan Freeman identifies 
'more than 100', even within the relatively narrow foci of psychological 
constructs and academic success. Including further areas such as 'social 
talents and potential business acumen'would create a more complete 
picture thereby increasing the number of definitions (1995: 4). Broader 
definitions have since appeared in UK accounts, and the search continues 
for yet more categories. A more inclusive definition is to be welcomed if it 
increases access to good provision for more children, but this is not 
guaranteed. Confusion arising from a proliferation of descriptions may well 
be counter-productive. 
Examining definitions is useful as a clarification exercise in understanding 
bias and subjectivity. Values are betrayed by the language used. Porter 
identifies: 
... a startling array of 
definitions of what otherwise might 
have seemed a common-sense concept. This diversity of 
definitions arises from differences in the ideology and 
assumptions of their proponents. 
1999: 32 
Most researchers in this field agree that conceptual difficulties are 
inevitable (e. g. Freeman, George, ibid and McAlpine in Porter op cit: 14) 
and empirical research presents problems as it can be controversial, 
contradictory and confusing. For example, inconclusive studies on sleep 
patterns of the highly able suggest that the able could need either more or 
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less sleep than average. Teachers, therefore, tend to rely on intuitive 
identification, such as recognising 'a spark in the eye', 'that switched-on 
look' or'a face lighting up ), all of which have been offered to me as part of 
the teacher's battery of identification tactics. 
In recent years, a profusion of relevant books has been published. Most 
nod in recognition to the difficulty of defining the able, but do not engage 
effectively with the issue. Sometimes there is a tacit acceptance that the 
readership will know exactly what is meant by the terms, without any need 
for explanation. Definitions usually fall into the categories identified below 
(Porter, 1999: 13-34) together with my additional categories (in italics). 
References in brackets are for the relevant sections in this chapter. 
a single capacity (2.5.1) 
multiple capacities (2.5.1) 
information processing theory (rarely mentioned in 
literature now) 
qualitative differences (2.5.3) 
creativity definitions (2.5.3) 
after-the-fact definitions (2.6) 
giftedness versus talent (2.2) 
other cultural views (2.4.1) 
achievementlunderachievement (2.6.2 and 2.6.3) 
provision-led definitions (2.6.4) 
Within all of these models, some kind of definition of intelligence is usually 
implied. For example: 
... intelligence as a construct - that 
is, an abstract idea that 
has been invented to explain outward behaviours - whose 
definition will differ across cultures and which is not so much 
a characteristic of the individual as a result of experience or 
learning. 
Porter, op cit: 16, partly citing Khatena, 1992 
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This definition does not really give us a clear idea of what is meant by 
intelligence at all. There could be a number of notions that could replace 
the word 'intelligence' in the above definition; try'anger', 'compassion', 
'disgust' or'humour'. In the next chapter I will engage with questions on 
the nature of intelligence and mention this here to highlight its importance. 
With so many definitions and such confusion within definitions, perhaps it 
would be preferable to do without any kind of definition. Theorists have 
suggested that giftedness is a dynamic concept and as such cannot be 
defined without taking account of its development and growth. It could be 
viewed as 'relationships' and 'communication and expression of feeling' 
(Leyden, 1998: 3). 
Freeman (11998) supports this Vygotskian perspective in her Dynamic 
Theory of Giftedness (DTG) encouraging children to operate in their Zone 
of Proximal Development, recognising individual starting points and 
overcoming difficulties to go on to success. " These theories, or'Dynamic 
Assessment Procedures', measure changing abilities in place of a 
snapshot, one-off IQ score. 
In sum, 
Arguments about precise definitions and the identification of 
such children have been active for nearly a century, and will 
doubtless continue. Research shows that the able are not a 
homogeneous group, whether in terms of learning style, 
creativity, speed of development, personality or social 
behaviour. 
1998: 1 and 2 
[Thus] the gifted are clearly a very heterogeneous set of 
persons and it is this multidimensional heterogeneity which 
may preclude a comprehensive theory. The absence of such 
a theory, however, does not prevent us from deepening our 
insights and understandings of the phenomena nor 
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intensifying efforts to identify talent potential and nurture 
talented performance. 
Monks et al, 2000: 841-2 
Definitions of high ability are nebulous and disparate. Questions at the end 
of Porter's chapter exhort the reader to create their own definition 
reflecting their personal view and context and this raises questions 
concerning the existence of giftedness, the usefulness of definitions, and 
consequently how to ensure fair provision. Discussion is difficult without 
widely agreed terms of reference. We therefore do need to find ways of 
talking about the able. But which words should we use? 
2.2 The meaninq of words 
It is not just philosophically important to be clear about the meanings of 
words. As noted in the previous chapter, teachers affect how children think 
about their strengths and weaknesses, partly through the labels they 
assign. Labels can be 'accurate or misleading, negative or positive, a 
burden or welcome recognition (Fisher, 1981: 49). Interestingly, many of 
the terms describing the highly able are insulting rather than flattering. 
Who wants to be a boffin, nerd, geek, egg-head, swot or brain box? 
Perhaps this is indicative of our culture's view of the more able person in 
general. Some of the terms, such as 'precocious', are really quite 
innocuous, but have been loaded with unwelcome and undesirable 
meaning. Dictionaries define precocious as'being ahead in development' 
(Collins), but teachers describe dreadful performing children, thrust 
forward by pushy parents, for dinner party turns or showing off 
encyclopaedic knowledge. This also holds true for'prodigy . 
Then there are 'the ables'. Researchers use preceding words to create 
subtle distinctions such as 'more', 'very', 'severely' and 'profoundly', but it 
is not clear whether these are objective or even useful. More contentious 
is'gifted', adopted by UK policy makers and so commonly used'it would 
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be verging on the deviant to avoid it' (Freeman, 1998: 1). 'v The field is 
generally known as'gifted education', but common words 'gifted' and 
'talented' are understood in a variety of ways. Often, one of the words 
refers to a specific ability in one area (generally music, drama, art or sport) 
and the other word for all-round general abilities. Teachers rarely agree on 
which is which and even research fails to provide a definitive answer. 
Some definitions consider'gift' to be raw ability, with 'talent' the developed 
power, while others suggest the reverse. Here are just a few of the 
differences found in the literature: 
" Talent is seen to reflect a remarkable ability which, however, falls 
short of the superlative level characterised by true giftedness. 
Braggett, 1998 and Morelock, 1996, in Porter, 1999: 31-33; 
" Giftedness - innate capacities or advanced development potential, 
and talent - developed abilities or performances. The term can only 
be applied to behaviours, not to people. 
Gagn6,1991; 
" The words are synonymous, and can be used interchangeably. 
Tannenbaum, 1983; 
" Giftedness: exceptional competence in one or more domains of 
ability; talent: exceptional performance in one or more domains of 
human activity. Genetically determined gifts form the infrastructure 
for talent development, while personal factors ... environmental 
constituents ... and systematic learning and training serve as 
catalysts for the expression of talent. 
Gagn6 1985,1993 in Schoon, 2000: 214; 
" Giftedness and talent are terms which have been variously 
defined over the years and a variety of conceptions have 
emerged related to these diverse definitions. 
Monks et al, 2000: 842; 
Giftedness is a 'fuzzy concept'. 
Eysenck and Barrett, 1993; 
The precise definition of giftedness remains a question with 
no universally accepted answer. 
Renzulli, 1982. 
Language also reveals the values held by society. For example, the 
German and French words for gifted, associate the concept with elitism. 
This 'belief that gifted education is elitist, ... has been a 'limiting factor in 
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developing gifted / talented programs' in Germany, whilst in France no 
state support is offered for the same reasons (Williams and Mitchell, 
1989: 129-130). ' 
In this thesis, I have favoured the use of the term 'highly able' for the 
majority of able pupils and 'exceptionally able' for the particularly 
outstanding pupil. When using 'gifted and talented' I am referring to the 
government strategy, or to specific aspects of literature. 
2.3 The DepartMent for Education and Skills (DfES) and the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) 
The Excellence in Cities (EiC) project is funded by the DfES and 
encompasses a Gifted and Talented strategy. " Along with the QCA, the 
DfES is a government department with influence and substantial funding, 
so surely they will be clear about defining targeted pupils. In guidance on 
identifying the 'gifted and talented', the word 'able' is used without any 
prior explanation. There is no use at all of the word 'gifted, despite it being 
part of the title of the strategy. 
Schools can determine the proportion within the cohort of pupils 
with academic ability (defined as ability in one or more subjects in 
the statutory school curriculum other than art, music and PE), 
pupils with talent (defined as those with ability in art, music, PE, or 
in any sport or creative art) and 'all-rounders'. However, those with 
academic ability, including 'all-rounders', should form at least two- 
thirds of the cohort in each year group. 
WES, March 2003 
The document continues in a similar vein, with practical advice, but no 
clear definitions, underpinning theory, or reasoning. Current policy 
suggests that the top five to ten per cent of pupils should be classified as 
'gifted and talented', but at termly Standing DfES conferences, this is 
always hotly contested, with useful debate arising, although seldom any 
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happily agreed conclusions. "' Ofsted reports echo the concern over 
identifying the able, noting: 
The identification of gifted and talented pupils has presented 
difficulties for schools. To date, he methods of identification 
have been rudimentary and have not yet solved the problem 
of recognising latent high ability, particularly among pupils 
who are underachieving generally. 
Ofsted, 2001: 3 
The first'issue of attention' on the Ofsted list is to 'improve methods for 
identifying gifted and talented pupils', but no strategies for improving 
teacher understanding are presented and confusion seems set to 
continue. 
For example, one of the projects designed to meet the needs of the able is 
the development of QCA sponsored materials for the able (World Class 
Tests). Even with targeted material, there is confusion over who the 
activities are for and at a review meeting (2002, at the QCA offices, 
London), no conclusion could be reached about whether the materials 
were for already identified gifted mathematicians, or for informal 
assessment of children potentially appropriate for the gifted and talented 
strategy. 
The UK strategy has been named 'gifted and talented' without any good 
reason and even to avoid debate. It would help practitioners to have 
access to an objective review of the literature and theory to support the 
use of language and labels advocated by government departments 
responsible for making policy and building strategy. 
2.4.0 General aspects of definitions 
Having highlighted the proliferation of definitions of high ability (2.1), 1 
need to order the different conceptions and explain which are most 
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appropriate and why. Here, in sections 2.4.0-2.4-4,1 introduce a range of 
general factors and commonly raised complexities that impact on all 
definitions, encompassing key issues that exercise theorists. In the 
following section, 2.5,1 present some different ways of conceiving high 
ability, exploring factors widespread in gifted education literature. The four 
general aspects explored in this section are 'global issues', 'the moral 
dimension 
, values' and 'the origins of ability. 
2.4.1 Global perspectives 
The responsibility to make use of gifts to help others is built into the notion 
of high ability in some cultures, contrasting with others that focus on an 
individualistic, personal interpretation, where abilities are used to further 
careers, increasing status and personal wealth. "" Some societies such as 
Sweden and some Australian states are strongly egalitarian, countries 
such as Africa and some Arab states have fundamental equality issues to 
tackle, whilst, for example the UK and the USA are competitive and 
individualistic. Clearly, these political aspects affect the way in which talent 
is perceived, understood and harnessed. (Differences between countries 
are explored further in Chapter 5, demonstrating the effect of value 
systems and underpinning political and social contexts on provision. ) 
Global literature about highly able pupils is shared through books, 
journals, conferences and the internet and so it is important to understand 
exactly which pupils are being discussed. By looking at similarities and 
differences across cultures, we can learn about alternatives that help 
improve current practice. Rudnitski observes this existence of multiple 
perspectives and wonders about cohesion of policy: 
What is socially valued varies from culture to culture, so 
even if it were possible to have homogeneous societies, the 
definitions of giftedness would have to be fluid to change 
over time. [ ... ] New models that reflect 
the needs of a global, 
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information society and economy are needed. 
2000: 674 and 678 
In reviewing the UK strategy on Gifted and Talented Pupils, it is 
disappointing to note a lack of reference to international research. The 
global literature may not have all the answers, but we could avoid making 
mistakes by reviewing ideas already carefully considered in other, similar 
societies. 
Social construction obviously affects understanding of high ability, as 
reflected in the different conceptions. 
2.4.2 The moral dimension 
A definition of high ability in itself does not need a moral dimension to be 
coherent. However, since education does not take place in a value-less 
vacuum, the context of family, schools and society must be taken into 
account, together with implications for the moral dimension of high ability. 
Commonly used words 'gift' and 'gifted' remain imbued with religious 
connotations: 
Exceptional performances have always fascinated mankind, 
but it was only when the theoretical concepts which resulted 
from empirical psychological investigation were available, 
that one could replace the theological and metaphysical 
explanations which have been hitherto pressed into service. 
Ziegler and Heller, 2000: 319 
Overtones of 'God-given endowments' flavour the language of 'gift', with 
its implication of 'goodness', a sense of responsibility and even purpose or 
vocation. " People in general and children in particular can be repeatedly 
reminded how lucky they are to have a 'gift' and told and of their duty to 
make full use of this special potential. Grave disappointment and 
frustration can also result, as 'gift' is often accompanied by unbearable 
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pressure. A non-religious interpretation of the word 'gift' is that of a special 
innate ability, but even without the religious sense, there is feeling of 
responsibility that comes along with the ability. 
Teachers have views on pupils' levels of desert and merit, based on their 
efforts to realise given potential and maximise their'gifts'. I have heard 
teachers describing children as 'undeserving' because their performance- 
potential gap was wide, assumed to be an indication of laziness, when it 
was often due to a learning difficulty. It is a misconception that all able 
pupils will manage effectively without help, encouragement or support. 
Highly able pupils concerned about impending examinations are often told 
not to worry, as they are lucky enough to be gifted, implying that that they 
effortlessly cruise through school-work. This is unfair. Worse still, some 
pupils' hard earned results are dismissed with an off-hand response -'We 
wouldn't expect any less from a gifted pupil like you. When students make 
tasks seem easy, teachers can forget how much work is needed for a 
successful outcome. There must be a delicate balance between 
appreciation, encouragement, constructive criticism and praise. 
I do not know how many teachers in the UK hold strong religious beliefs or 
the extent to which this affects their concept of giftedness, but when 
working in a school with a religious foundation I found the concept of 
potential fulfilment unambiguously linked with notions of God, who guides 
choice and sets expectation of achievement linked to gifts. God's 
endowments were recognised in the mission statement and pupils were 
reminded of God's expectations at least daily in assembly, and more 
frequently through the class teacher and parents. 
Even where overt religious belief does not guide pedagogy and 
expectation, there is a palpable sense of duty and responsibility 
accompanying the perception of given or innate talent. A wide range of 
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career choices is available to pupils with the corresponding breadth of 
abilities who are expected to make a socially responsible choice. The able 
young person who pursues a career in theatre rather than become a 
medical professional is often fighting against the wishes of their family (of 
course this can work in reverse, but this is far less common). There are 
many who choose to reject relative stability in order to continue to 
stimulate themselves with the challenge they yearn for, after years of a 
relatively unstimulating school career. Cases also exist where family 
background is disadvantageous in terms of children's career choice. x The 
onus is on parents and other adults to help pupils make well-considered 
choices. While they may legitimately persuade children away from the 
obvious difficulties of competitive and insecure career paths, they should 
not ignore children's interests and abilities (Freeman, 2001). 
Even within school, pupils with high abilities are expected to be selfless in 
using skills to represent their alma mater. Significant pressure is applied to 
children whose footballing or singing abilities may help swell the trophy 
cabinet. In these days of prospectuses and local newspaper features, the 
all-round able pupil may find themselves on websites, display boards and 
a regular feature of the newsletter, especially if they are conventionally 
physically attractive, or fulfil the required ethnic minority quota. 
What about gifted people who will not respond to the moral obligations of 
their gift? At school this can mean general disruption or just withdrawal, 
which may or may not lead to long-term underachievement and 
disaffection. Wider problems result from children choosing to isolate 
themselves from society. Researchers are at pains to explain that, despite 
popular belief, the emotional state of highly able people is no different 
from the population in general (Freeman, 1991; Leyden, 1998; Eyre, 
1997). However, some people choose to live outside the law or to defy 
convention in ways that can be either harmful or harmless. x' Extreme 
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examples of this can be seen through able people in history. When asked 
to name a gifted leader, with charisma and strength, most are happy to 
agree with suggestions such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, 
but balk at the inclusion of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Although in 
discussion they may agree that such leaders managed to inspire citizens 
of their countries, the consensus is that their gifts are diminished through 
abhorrence of their morally reprehensible acts. Complex issues of politics, 
economics, culture and belief systems are implied in these examples, but 
the basic issue remains, that for many people, giftedness must be to do 
with goodness. 
In a fascinating chapter entitled 'Giftedness: The Ultimate Instrument for 
Good and Evil', Tannenbaum explores the relationship between giftedness 
and morality. He reviews the impact of 'a rogues' gallery of great minds' 
such as Joseph Mengele and Joseph Stalin and more controversially 
considers the effect of T. S. Eliot's anti-Semitism and Pablo Picasso's 
misogyny on their legacies. He concludes with: 
... a sincere plea to persist with dedication and 
imagination in 
making moral education an integral part of enrichment for 
the gifted in the hope that it will enhance their learning 
experiences and encourage them to serve society with 
guidance from its highest ideas. 
2000: 463 
Teachers have a role to play in pointing out potential consequences of 
deviant behaviour for pupils not following expected and accepted routes in 
their journey toward taking their place as an adult in society. There is 
however, a limit to teachers' influences and they have to accept pupils' 
choices, even if they do not fulfil their own hopes. Pupils must be allowed 
to exercise their autonomy, but teachers may find it hard to 'let go' if they 
feel pupils are squandering special, rare talents. 
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Research has shown that able pupils have a well-developed moral sense, 
making a wider than average gap between understanding and action hard 
to explain and accept (Andreani and Paganin, 1992). Reasons for such 
behaviour could include children wilfully disregarding the wishes and 
expectations of parents, siblings, friends and society, through 
disappointment at having been somehow let down. The education system 
is one area frequently cited by able pupils as being a grave 
disappointment (Freeman, 2001). Years of dull tasks and time spent 
waiting for peers to catch up eventually take their toll. Children can feel 
misunderstood and some use their abilities to 'repay' the system. For 
others, the move away from convention is far less deliberate. Frustration 
and boredom in school can lead to a search for stimulation outside the 
rules and structures, often resulting in absence and the formation of bad 
habits. Able disaffected pupils may fall behind with schoolwork through 
missed lessons and incomplete tasks, eventually finding themselves 
outside the structures that should be able to help them. 
In the UK, 'Personal, Social and Health Education' programmes have 
been bolstered by the inclusion of 'Citizenship Studies' in the National 
Curriculum in which pupils' contributions to their local, national and global 
contexts are emphasised. Since able pupils may have a lot to contribute, 
yet more may be expected of them. An example is Celia, just completing 
her first term of Year 11 and complaining of missing lessons due to her 
other commitments. As an able singer, she was involved in school and 
community carol services as well as collecting presents for hospital 
children, and organising the soup run rota. She was in the pantomime and 
running a chess club with the local feeder primary school and had taken 
over a charity baking marathon when a friend fell ill. Teachers felt she 
could comfortably miss classes as she was ahead of her peers, but she 
said the pressure was too much. This is not unusual for the able; guilt has 
been widely documented as a problem (McAdams, cited in Pasupathi and 
42 
Staudinger, op cit: 263; Freeman, 1998,2001). Normally obliging, polite 
and calm, Celia had become frustrated and angry: 
You tell me what I should give up. Apparently homeless 
people, the elderly, sick children and Mencap are all 
dependent on me at the moment. What about my GCSEs? 
What about my social life? You tell me, who should I let 
down? 
Taped counselling session, Dec 1999 
There is a disparity between moral cognitive understanding and moral 
behaviour in the highly able child who may have an advanced 
understanding of aspects of a situation, but lack general maturity (Pagnin 
and Andreani, 2000). x" This can be helped through a combination of 
rational moral reasoning alongside helping pupils with their social and 
emotional maturity. 
Group discussion focuses on rational justification of 
values. [ ... ] Intellectually gifted children and adolescents are 
mainly open to this kind of intervention, as they can better 
recognise the value of a good reasoning context. 
Nevertheless, social and emotional aspects also have to be 
considered: developing good basic relationships, identifying 
with adult role models, being exposed to language, 
discourses and values giving meaning to life. 
ibid: 481 
Issues of high ability should not be considered in a vacuum. The moral 
dimension is important in terms of identifying the able and planning 
appropriate provision. 
2.4.3 The value of different abilities 
If an aptitude is trivial this does not stop it being an aptitude, it just makes 
it less valuable or socially useful. For example, in many scenarios, it is 
more valuable to have high ability in writing instructions than to have high 
ability in whistling. Of course there are occasions when having high 
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whistling ability is useful; signalling to someone in the dark without calling 
out, entertaining friends, practising embouchure for flute playing or 
registering crowd displeasure at a rally or rock concert. Nevertheless, 
these examples do not make the ability to whistle a generally more 
valuable attribute or skill, than the ability to write fluently. Moreover, it 
would be (practically) impossible to function in schools if we accepted 
every skill as equal in importance. 
Traditional hierarchies of academic subjects suggest that some are more 
important than others. In school, this usually means that theoretical 
abilities are viewed as more valuable than practical skills, with this 
theoretical-practical dichotomy also seen in the contrast of status between 
vocational and grammar-style education. Such ideas have been 
challenged in recent years, with multiple intelligence theories changing 
how curriculum subjects are viewed and by a growing emphasis on 
valuing all pupils for what they can achieve. The value of an ability is 
framed in part by the social context and also through the complexity of the 
task. According to some, if only a few people are capable of a task, it 
becomes more valuable, although this can only be a reflection of the task 
when equal opportunity to pursue its accomplishment is allowed. 
In this thesis, I am considering intellectual high ability in particular, not 
because this is more important than ability in other areas such as music, 
art, drama and sport. These other subjects are, of course, vital, but are not 
the focus here. Reasons for my choice are explored later in section 2.7.0. 
2.4.4 The origins of abilities 
It is a struggle to write about high ability without recourse to words and 
phrases such as 'natural aptitude', ' genetic endowment' and 'real ability 
because intuitively we tend to consider ability as an innate characteristic. I 
will consider this in more detail in the next chapter (3), but state here that I 
44 
am remaining agnostic about the origins of abilities, as it is largely 
irrelevant to the way we deal with children in education. 
It might be that teachers consider certain standards unattainable for those 
without a particular 'innate aptitude'. These lower expectations could 
prevent people from achieving their potential, even when this is a lower 
standard than their peers. Alternatively, it might be that the origin of the 
aptitude is environmental. It is by no means certain that education would 
be improved by the attitude that every single child could have every 
aptitude inculcated through a shift in pedagogy, nor is it evident that limits 
should be 'discovered' and resulting restrictions applied. The impossibility 
of ensuring appropriate support and provision would render the majority of 
children failures in terms of achieving their potential of excellence in every 
subject. Choices would still have to be made about who should focus on 
what and how resources could be allocated to serve both the individual 
and society for the best. 
It is entirely possible to raise expectations and standards, with an 
interpretation of high ability either as innate or as environmentally created. 
Even if entirely environmental, the opportunity for developing aptitudes 
would be affected by the age at which the skills and ideas were first 
introduced and how they were nurtured. Such early childhood influences 
would be beyond the control of education, unless drastic changes were 
made in children's upbringing and broader societal structures. 
The role of schools and teachers is to help each pupil, regardless of the 
source of abilities. Pupils with greater aptitudes still need support in order 
to flourish. Whether or not they have above average aptitudes in one area, 
all pupils should be helped to see how they fare in a range of fields. What 
education can do is allow the development and expression of aptitudes, 
inculcate dispositions and encourage positive propensities. In this regard, 
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motivation and opportunity are also vital. 
Naturally, questions about the origins of ability are important and merit 
research, but they are not the subject of this enquiry. It is potentially 
impossible to determine definite answers about the nature-nurture debate, 
but how best to support the development of aptitudes can usefully be 
investigated. 
2.5.0 Different definitions of hiqh abilitv 
There are myriad ways of organising the many definitions of high ability 
already identified (in section 2.1). McAlpine (1996), for example, suggests 
definitions are either conservative or liberal, concerned with multiple or 
single abilities, and focused on potential or performance. Certainly, 
debates about the nature of high ability swing from one extreme to 
another, something like the range presented in this overview: 
single capacity 
performance based 
originating from nature 
traditional 
selective 
multiple capacities 
based on potential 
originating from nurture 
progressive 
inclusive 
In wanting to cover all these variations and separate the descriptive from 
the explanatory, I have structured the following sections (2.5.1 to 2.5.4) in 
a loosely chronological fashion, in order to demonstrate something of the 
journey to current thinking, along with the overview of the different 
definitions. I therefore begin by reviewing concepts of genius (2.5.1) and 
then review multiple and single abilities (2.5.2). 1 also briefly consider non- 
intellective qualities (2.5.3) and present a short summary of these three 
sections (2.5-4). 
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I have devoted a separate section to the complexities of the potential- 
performance question (2.6.0 to 2-6.4) as this encompasses the issues 
raised by able underachievers and is both a current and controversial 
debate. I put forward my own account of high ability in section 2.7. Whilst I 
cannot claim to deal exhaustively with all the arguments in the field, the 
following sections (2.5 - 2.7) provide a comprehensive coverage of key 
ideas and concepts as they are presented to practitioners and policy 
makers. 
2.5.1 Genius and prodigy -a race apart? 
This section considers the possible qualitative difference between the 
ordinarily able and the highly able. Even though studies of genius 
apparently only concern a narrow band of people, it is possible that 
resulting concepts could be relevant to developing an understanding of the 
broader population of high ability. In-depth studies of the most able 
address issues such as how we learn, the relationship between potential 
and performance and the kind of challenge that inspires and fulfils 
children. Perhaps the highly able can be shown to be significantly different 
from their peers, or perhaps they are just the same in the way they learn 
and think. Either conclusion will affect educational provision and an 
evaluation of research should demonstrate its application. 
Research into 'genius' is limited, the most widely known being Terman's 
seminal work'Genetic Studies of Genius' (published over a 70-year period 
from 1925 by a range of researchers within Terman's group) in which the 
critical topics of intellect, disposition and development were introduced. 
Implicit in Terman's work is an assumption that intelligence is a single, 
homogenous construct. Issues surrounding IQ testing are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, but the table below is typical of those found in gifted 
education literature discussing the spectrum of high ability: 
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Level IQ ranqe 
Mildly gifted 115- 129 
Moderately gifted 130- 144 
Highly gifted 145- 159 
Exceptionally gifted 160- 179 
Profoundly gifted 180+ 
Gross: 179 
Prevalence 
1: - 1: 40 
1: 40 - 1: 1000 
1: 1000 - 1: 10,000 
1: 10,000 - 1: 1 million 
Fewer than 1: 1 million 
Cut-off points for defining genius and other'grades' of ability are variable 
depending on the nature and purpose of the test. 
... an IQ of 132 allows someone to join Mensa, and an IQ of 164 is the entrance criterion for the Four Sigma Society, and 
an IQ of 228 puts someone in the Guinness Book of Records 
as the world's brightest person. 
Simonton, op cit: 113 
Obviously, case study research into genius is scarce and cannot be 
replicated or validated in the usual way, due to the small population 
Gross attributes the lack of interest in researching genius to the 
egalitarianism of recent decades, -acknowledging that definitions are now 
generally broader. 
Genius is a word used rather lightly in common parlance. When applied 
with consideration though, it is the highest accolade. It should denote 
eminence and excellence in a significant field of endeavour, but is 
nowadays used liberally to apply to someone who is a top performer in 
their domain. x'v Of course the notion of genius is exciting and case studies 
are thrilling to read with their tales of twelve-year-olds translating texts into 
Latin for fun (Gross, op cit: 187), eight-month-old babies able to read single 
words (p173) and seven-year-old pianists playing complex Beethoven 
sonatas faultlessly by heart (Winner and Martino, 2000: 103). By definition, 
most studies of genius need to focus on achievement, which causes 
difficulties when reviewing the accomplishments of some children. 
Significant changes to a field or domain are often used to define genius 
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and these are unlikely to be accomplished by children, even the 
exceptionally able. In these cases, accelerated development or unusual 
ways of learning are taken into account, with predicted eminence in 
adulthood. It is quite feasible, of course, to be highly able but to fail to 
achieve excellence. There are also people whose area of high ability goes 
without public acknowledgement due to their field of study, some 
controversy, or achievements that are remarkable, but fall just short of 
incredible. 
With genius in particular, and high ability to a lesser extent, it is sometimes 
considered that qualitative and developmental differences exist. Perhaps if 
the exceptionally able are so different from the rest of us they should be 
taught completely separately. 
... the qualitative definition regards giftedness as a difference in how gifted individuals function neurologically. Some 
authors highlight the information processing differences, 
while others suggest gifted individuals differ emotionally. 
Porter, op cit: 25 
In this vein, some research even investigates optimum conditions for 
gestation, with programmes that prospective parents can follow for up to a 
year before conception, normally involving physical measures to reduce 
stress and strengthen the immune system. Research following 'bright 
babies' highlights characteristics of high ability, extrapolating instructions 
and recommendations in order to foster skills of memory, attention and 
discrimination (e. g. Leyden, 1998). These factors all correlate favourably 
with preschool success, demonstrating how music, deliberately controlled 
sounds, diet and physical exercise can affect the foetus, resulting in 
unusually high levels of concentration in the baby. Differences observed 
between babies have been interpreted as proof that gifted people learn in 
a different way from 'ordinary' learners, being able to cope with more 
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LONDII, 
stimuli, making connections in complex ways and demonstrating 
uncommonly advanced levels of determination (Freeman, 1995). 
This view suggests that people are born with differing abilities and thinking 
styles; that they are qualititatively different. Biological studies demonstrate 
high levels of cortical arousal in gifted children's brains and physical 
differences in thought processes, with much faster information 
processing. " Cognitive difference would, in this case, lead to such deep 
or broad learning from an early age that others would never really be able 
to 'catch up'. Porter reinforces the idea of a 'race apart': 
In terms of their intellectual skills, it is clear that advanced 
learners [ ... ] can manipulate and juxtapose ideas in such 
sophisticated ways that it is probably safe to conclude that 
their thinking is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
distinguishable from that of average learners. 
1999: 27 
Statements of this type are often supported by studies of young children's 
personalities, suggesting unusual intensity that correlates with studies of 
the highly able, as emotional and sensory experiences are often 
powerfully felt by able people. Particular alertness in babies, together with 
extreme distress displayed on hearing loud sounds or seeing bright lights, 
indicates high ability according to the Over Excitability (OE) scale. 
Dabrowski's 1967 OE scale encompasses intellectual, emotional, 
imagination, psychornotor and sensual dimensions, with highly able 
children often measured as 'intense' in these areas (Tucker and 
Hafenstein, 1997). These super-sensitivities can be wrongly interpreted as 
an emotional disorder (Coleman and Cross, 2000). xv' Similarly, 
Csikszentmihalyi presents the notion of 'flow', 'a period of intense and 
single-minded attention to a particular problem or project', also highlighting 
aspects of intensity (Gallagher, 2000). xv" There is also a correlation 
between extremely high ability and psychopathology, with emotional and 
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mental disorders more prevalent among the population of people with very 
high IQ measures (Simonton, op cit: 1 15). 
The idea of the gifted being some kind of 'race apart' is fuelled by media 
image and popular conceptions, as traditionally and in the public 
imagination able people are somewhat removed from society and anti- 
social. As noted, popular stereotypes of the highly able generally entail the 
serniotics of social ineptitude with easily recognisable physical 
characteristics such as a monotonous voice, a gawky body and 
unfashionable clothes. 
Research tells a different story. When primary age children are asked to 
choose classmates as work partners, able children are most commonly 
selected. They are consistently rated as attractive, friendly, and popular by 
their peers (Freeman, 1990), and tend to be socially accepted, sometimes 
'because they have prestigious skills or are useful academically' (Austin 
and Draper, 1981; Cohen et al, 1994). 
When possible, the highly able form strong bonds with other highly able 
pupils (Cohen et al, 1994) and where social difficulties do exist these 
'usually diminish when they find a true peer group' (Morelock and 
Morrison, 1996). Someone with a very narrow range of interests and no 
apparent need for company is likely to be isolated, but these cases are 
usually indicative of another difficulty or problem. Children with Asperger's 
Syndrome, for example, are often very able, but when integrated into the 
mainstream classroom, their autistic-type problems of relating to people 
become apparent and problematic. Resulting isolation is usually due not to 
their high ability, but rather to their Asperger's Syndrome. Contrary to 
popular belief, 'the incidence of emotional disturbance in gifted individuals 
is probably the same as for the rest of the population' (Porter 1999: 116), a 
view consistently reinforced by other researchers, notably Freeman 
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(1996). 
Checklists for high ability invariably include characteristics such as 
determination, resilience and enthusiasm, by no means confined to the 
highly able, but possibly demonstrating the single-minded nature high 
achievers need to cultivate in order to do well. Such children may have 
unusual drive to complete certain projects. Theorists emphasise 
dispositional aspects such as 'task commitment' (Renzulli, 1986) and 'non- 
intellective' qualities (Tannenbaum, 1986), which can be nurtured and 
developed through education, but are often wrongly assumed to be 
unteachable. xv"' 
Confining the concept of high ability to a small group of very unusual 
individuals is an unhelpful methodology in educational terms; too many 
children are excluded (McAlpine, 1996, would label this'a conservative 
approach' to identification). It is unhelpful to see the able as a group to be 
set apart, but rather as individuals who like everyone else, should be 
helped to do the best they can. Researchers (e. g. Terman and later 
Simonton) consider factors such as birth order, traumatic events (typically 
parental loss) and education and training to be part of the developmental 
process (Simonton op cit). 
Genius is not just born; it is also made - by the 
environmental circumstances in which the youth develops 
his or her talent. Genetic endowment solely provides the raw 
materials from which environmental events and conditions 
can configure talent growth. 
Simonton, op cit: 1 15 
Acknowledging that differences are not just qualitative and innate, but also 
affected by background brings a responsibility to compensate children 
who are disadvantaged by their background. For example, workshops 
funded by educational charities are available for children who lack 
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opportunities to exercise their unusual talent. Because their background 
has prevented them from high achievement, provision must be for a broad 
group, defined'not by what they have achieved, but for their potentially 
high achievement. 
Freeman considers the interaction between the individual and their 
environment, making suggestions for how parents can help (2000: 582-3) 
and noting: 
The problem for research is how to establish what results in 
what. A highly verbal and demanding child, for example, can 
affect parents' behaviour by stimulating them to have more 
conversation and read more stories aloud. On the other 
hand, parents who talk to children a lot are more verbal 
people. 
Op cit: 576 
An explanation for disparities in ability could be that pupils are very quick 
at picking up ideas, setting them off on the standard developmental trail 
rather early. x'x This would explain why children are described as gifted 
more often than adults. High ability is viewed like a head start in a race, 
rather than being on an entirely different track - almost everyone gets 
there, the highly able just need to wait for the rest to catch up. (This is not 
the same as qualitative difference, where the able are set apart as both 
children and adults. ) Adopting the developmental view allows for high 
ability to be explained as accelerated development. This will result in there 
being more children advanced of their peers than adults, as achievements 
even out. 
... there 
is simply not enough room at the top for all 
prodigies to become creators; and so there is an inevitable 
weeding out. Any domain would be in chaos if there were as 
many creative adult innovators as there are child prodigies. 
Winner and Martino, 2000: 107 
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This allows for all to have the same potential for development, with the 
able being different only because they initially develop at a faster rate 
(Keating, 1975) which has been shown to be advantageous in the school 
setting (Webb, 1974). 
Gross reports: 
A substantial amount of research support exists for the 
proposal that gifted learners differ from their age peers of 
average ability at the age, and pace, at which they traverse 
the Piagetian stages of cognitive development: specifically 
that while all children experience the stages of cognitive 
development in the same order, the gifted progress through 
the stages at significantly accelerated rates, thus reaching 
the formal operational stage at much earlier ages. 
ibid: 182 
This may be useful evidence for considering school-based achievement; 
perhaps even providing an argument for restructuring classes, grouping 
children by ability rather than chronologically. xx Recent UK initiatives to 
widen participation in high-level study and encourage lifelong learning will 
allow more people to 'catch up'. 
Despite empirical research, respected psychological snapshot studies and 
longitudinal reviews, there are still some rather unusual aspects to gifted 
research, which do not serve to help develop a balanced dialogue about 
pertinent issues. Many of the papers concerning extreme ability have a 
sense of wonder throughout and conclusions such as the one below 
contrast with earlier scientific presentation: 
There are some, [though], especially in the arts, who seem 
to have a built in impetus -a spark which can light up the 
world, bringing them great inspiration and success. 
Gross, op cit: 583 
This serves as another example of some indistinct work in this field, 
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unfortunately doing little to help unpack deeper ideas of human 
potential, or explaining why some race ahead of peers, why others 
catch up and then stop progressing and why others never seem to 
catch up at all. 
To conclude, some research suggests that the highly able are 
significantly different from peers in a variety of ways, while other 
findings imply that the highly able are developmentally the same, 
merely moving through their development at a faster pace. In 
general it seems unhelpful to consider only the 'genius' in research, 
as generalisations cannot be made due to sample size. Research 
seems to show that children with exceptional abilities benefit from 
the same provision as the highly able; that is, some time spent with 
age peers and some spent with ability peers, allowing for balanced 
development. 
2.5.2 Sin-qle or multiple capacities? 
A broader exploration of single and multiple capacities is presented in 
Chapter 3, on 'intelligence', together with arguments about the 
controversial notion of IQ. The single capacity definition of high ability is 
mostly viewed as synonymous with general intelligence, commonly 
referred to as 'g' and often accompanied by assumptions of fixed and 
clear limits. However, even early notions of 'g' were not as straightforward 
as sometimes portrayed. Spearman originally proposed a two-factor 
theory of 'g' and 's' (general and specific abilities, 1904,1927) in which 'g' 
was considered insufficient as a total explanation of high ability. 
Considering the complexity of his original theory shows the stark 
dichotomy between single and multiple concepts to be both false and 
simplistic. 
The polymorphous view, now familiar as Howard Gardner's 'Multiple 
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Intelligences' theory (MI), gained popularity in the 1980s, and has even 
been adopted as the basis of some schools and their curricula. As noted 
above, research literature tends to focus on either multiple or single 
capacity models. Currently, research reflects only a minority of support for 
the more old-fashioned single capacity viewpoint. However, rather 
confusingly, many teachers still cling to the notion of 'g' while 
simultaneously embracing multiple theories. 
The argument is summarised by Tannenbaum: 
Another seemingly perpetual debate that promises to 
continue well into the twenty-first century is between 
believers in general ability ('g') as the main source of mental 
functioning and those who point to separable aptitudes as 
the origins. Here [again], socio-political differences, more 
than research evidence, may account for the rivalry. Those 
who emphasise the importance of g concentrate on human 
differences in the abilities that relate most strongly to g and 
are at the heart of every curriculum in sciences and letters. 
Discreditors of g focus mainly on diversity rather than 
difference and prefer to show that more people can 
demonstrate excellence in at least one of a variety of 
aptitudes than in the restricted range of competencies 
subsumed under g. One side of the debate prides itself in 
being primarily selective in defining who qualifies as gifted, 
while the opposition seeks to be more inclusive and hence 
more egalitarian or expansive in formulating qualifications. 
lbid: 50 
Teachers interpret multiple capacities as an add-on theory rather than a 
replacement for IQ, or'g ), requesting intelligence tests to support 'pupils 
who have multiple intelligences'. This is demonstrated through the 
networks on the internet where teachers often request details of reputable 
psychologists and is also a contention supported by both the British 
Psychological Society and the National Association of Gifted Children, 
who note that the volume of requests for IQ tests has not diminished in 
recent years. "' 
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In my experience most people, both teachers and the 
general public, still hold the view of a single general 
intelligence (IQ) which children have to a lesser or greater 
extent and which can be accurately measured on an 
intelligence test; hence the request from many primary 
school teachers and parents for an intelligence test to 
confirm the ability of a child. 
Eyre 1997: 2 
Whilst not posing a practical problem in itself, conceptual confusion is 
demonstrated. It may ultimately be useful for theorists and practitioners to 
absorb aspects of both conceptions, rather than having to 'pick sides', but 
this should be done soundly, not as the result of a misunderstanding. 
Gardner hypothesises Multiple Intelligences as sets of unevenly 
distributed talents. He currently uses the word 'intelligence' in his 
explanations and this is criticised by'high ability' writers who have leapt 
upon the instances in which he has preferred to use the term 'talent'. 
Feldhusen notes that 'Gardner's own later use of the term 'talent' certainly 
suggests little devotion to the basic definition of intelligence. ' (2000: 124). 
Despite echoing this censure, Porter (op cit: 22), among others, notes that 
MI has truly helped teachers in improving provision for able children and 
meeting their wider needs, through understanding high ability, embracing 
a broad range of human achievement, and by presenting educators with a 
comfortable view of ability, more in tune with the aims of an egalitarian 
society. The original concept of multiple conceptions of high ability was 
first presented with force by Thurstone in the 1930s and 1940s. He 
challenged the concept of 'g, identifying instead, seven primary mental 
abilities: 
verbal comprehension; word fluency; numerical fluency; 
spatial visualisation; associative memory; 
perceptual speed; and reasoning. 
Gardner, 1983: 17 
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However, he later conceded that there was still the likelihood of a general 
underlying ability (Porter, op cit: 20) and that the separation of aspects of 
intelligence was more due to his choice of statistical analysis than any 
other factor, much like Spearman's use of 'g' and 's'. Other theorists have 
also adopted a 'multiple' model, some focusing on domains and others on 
processes. xx" Sternberg (1985), for example, presents a triarchic model of 
giftedness in which all aspects are underpinned by processing skills. 
Sternberg's three aspects of high ability are: 
analytic, 
synthetic (unconventional, independent thinking), 
and practical skills. 
1997: 44 
Earlier, Guilford (1959) had postulated a similar three-dimensional 
structure-of-intellect model, in which intellectual operations, product and 
content are separated and in which a total of 120 different capacities were 
identified. Yet this separation of elements has been criticised as pointless, 
yielding little in the way of practical help or explanation for the nature of 
high ability (e. g. McNemar, 1964). As with Thurstone's model, the areas 
identified are similar to components of the IQ test, suggesting that these 
theorists have succeeded in breaking down components of ability rather 
than redefining it. The notion of 'g' cannot be so easily dismissed. 
When the concept of different types of ability is taken to its extreme, there 
are so many different definitions that it becomes impossible to see 
connections between the disparate types of ability. In a sense, this defeats 
the object of making a connection between all people of high ability as the 
broader the categories become, the more difficult it is to see links. 
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Perhaps this is a wrong-headed notion from which to attempt to explain 
ability. It could be accepted that there are many different types of high 
ability, but that the characteristics underlying the ability are in fact linked to 
the area of expertise itself. If so, there would not necessarily be a 
connecting factor, as in Gardner's theory. But despite the support for 
multiple capacity models dissenting voices say: 
Models of intelligence which propose a number of specific, 
quasi-autonomous factors, abilities or aptitudesj ... ] require greater empirical support if they are to become the 
foundation for broad-based educational usage. More recent 
support has lent substantial support to Spearman's (1904) 
conception of a general mental ability factor g. 
Gross, op cit: 187 
Ziegler (with Raul, 2000 and with Heller, 2000: 6) recognises that newer 
theories are more in favour of multi-dimensional models of high ability, 
criticising them for possibly being wide-ranging, encompassing too many 
different notions of what MI consists of to be clear and useful. 
As concepts of ability have opened up to include a broader set of 
characteristics, personality factors have been increasingly incorporated, 
as well as notions of creativity and motivation. 
2.5.3 Creativity and non-intellective factors 
The relationship of creativity to high ability is unclear, but it merits 
attention, emerging as a factor in many polymorphous definitions, as do 
non-intellective personality traits. Creativity is presented as a dimension of 
high ability in Renzulli's 1970s influential three-ring model in which the 
elements are: 'creativity; above average ability; and task commitment', 
which is understood as some kind of character trait, or disposition. xx"' 
Similarly, and without any rationale for why creativity is important, 
Freeman presents a list with pre-requisite personal characteristics and 
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conditions necessary for creativity to thrive: 
Motivation 
Knowledge 
Opportunity 
Creative teaching style 
Encouragement to be creative 
Acceptance of one's own personality 
The courage to be different 
Freeman, 1998: 48 
Tannenbaum's star definition (1983) also incorporates factors 
beyond ability as being necessary, yet singularly insufficient, for 
achievement. His five areas are: general ability ('g'); special ability 
(subject area); non-intellective factors; environmental factors and 
chance factors. He notes that a deficiency in any one area cannot 
be negated by excess in another area. All conditions must be 
satisfied, but the importance of different factors will vary across 
fields of endeavour. 
Perhaps some personality or other factors could transcend different 
disciplines suggesting that high ability could perhaps be predicted and 
nurtured more effectively (see, for example the Nebraska Starry Night 
referred to in Appendix 11). For example, a sense of determination, 
resilience, strong work ethic and high levels of motivation are 
requirements of high achievement in chess, ballet, surgery and painting 
despite the difference in activities. These dispositional factors and 
personality traits could be described as general, since they are 
consistently found among high achievers and perhaps this could help 
explain high ability better than a model of 'g' or MI. Underachievers 
though, would not necessarily be identified with such a definition. A 
personal ity-based model could imply a psychological profile of high ability, 
but as noted earlier and repeatedly, empirical research is contradictory. All 
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that can be safely concluded is that it is impossible to present a clear 
definition. This complexity is summarised by Ziegler and Heller 
In exercising self-criticism, the field of giftedness research 
must admit that it has not yet been able to attain the level of 
scientific advancement which allows for a common definition 
of its research object in favour of a psychologically based 
construct. 
2000: 11 
It seems likely that pupils would benefit from tasks that incorporate 
measures to foster creativity and strengthen non-intellective factors, but 
more research is needed to show exactly how these factors relate to high 
ability. 
2.5.4 Conclusion concerninq definitions 
All ideas in section 2.5 are informed by the general issues raised in the 
previous section (2.4). They only constitute a fraction of the literature, but 
do represent the main themes. I expand discussion on the key factor of 
multiple and single abilities in the following chapter (3) but will briefly state 
my view here. The contemporary favour given to 'multiple' models of 
ability is useful and has helped the field to develop in a way that allows for 
the disadvantaged to gain important recognition. Simultaneously, 
however, there has been a backlash against the concept of a single, 
generalisable aspect central to high ability, which has resulted in a 
proliferation of definitions, some of which are so scattered that they are 
contradictory, which is unhelpful to practitioners. Some theorists have kept 
the idea of general intelligence as part of their understanding of high ability 
and these definitions are flexible, thorough and useful. 
Consideration of genius and prodigy brings to the fore the possibility that 
the highly able are a race apart. I do not believe this to be the case, but I 
do accept there are individual differences that impact on levels of ability. 
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Such differences encompass some kind of capacity for intellectual and 
physical ability, but this is so strongly intertwined with personality traits, 
habits and environmental influences that it is vital that we do not let the 
capacity aspect dominate discussion or be used alone to determine 
provision or allocation of resources. Dispositional elements are vital, as is 
a discussion of non-intellective aspects and an understanding of how 
personal characteristics interact with performance. All of this helps provide 
a basis for supporting the able. Reviewing others' definitions is useful in 
demonstrating the obvious conclusion that there are both similarities and 
differences between children and both should be taken into account when 
planning provision. 
I now consider the concept of potential (2.6) that seems to surface in 
every type of definition, and then go on to present my own positive 
account (2.7) of high ability. 
2.6.0 Performance and potential 
This section considers the traditional notion of high ability as high 
performance and more contemporary understandings of high ability as 
high potential. The performance model of high ability can be traced back 
to the compelling work of Terman who 'considered achievement to be the 
observable output of giftedness' (Monks and Mason, 2000: 146). At this 
time, highly able pupils were considered 'mutants who possess some kind 
of freakish powers bestowed upon them by some kind of biological 
accident' and that catering for their abilities would fulfil a prediction of 
'early ripe, early rot' (Tannenbaum, 2000: 34). Terman needed to show 
what highly able children were capable of achieving and so used 
exceptional performance as a defining factor. It is rare to find purely 
achievement-oriented models of ability in contemporary research, 
however, as the plight of underachieving minorities has been highlighted 
to such an extent that it is unacceptable to use an achievement model, or 
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any kind of retrospective model focusing on renowned people and their 
achievements. Indeed, the notion is met with disdain and even anger by 
many authors: 
As these definitions do nothing to identify in advance 
potentially talented children who could need special 
educational provisions, they are not useful in educational 
terms. More than this, they can be positively harmful at a 
wider level, the after-the-fact definitions have done a 
disservice, in my view, to the literature about gifted people; 
claims must be read with extreme caution. 
Porter, 1999: 30 
Retrospective definitions have led to some false understandings of the 
nature of ability and the role of the environment in forming genius. 
Through the vagaries of interpretation and lack of understanding of 
achievement within different historical and cultural contexts, it is difficult to 
make clear links with present-day situations. 'After-the-fact' definitions 
have only limited use and should be viewed with caution. The aim, though, 
is to find patterns that could help with provision. 
If we could understand the developmental foundations for 
both the nipped bud and the late bloomer, we would have a 
much more firm idea about how best to intervene in the 
growth of talent - especially within our educational systems. 
Simonton, op cit: 118 
Questions about the realisation of potential and the late emergence of 
talent are seen in Cox's retrospective study of 301 famous adults, 
reviewing their biographies in search of early signs of giftedness as part of 
Terman's project (Volume 2, published in 1926). The enduring positive 
finding she noted is that children are unlikely to accomplish world- 
changing feats, but this does not mean their achievements or promise are 
insignificant. 
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Children's achievements are also limited by the fields in which they 
perform. A teenager can reach a peak of fitness and ability in sports such 
as tennis and gymnastics, but there have been no equivalent ground- 
breakers in Poetry or Nuclear Science. Some fields, such as Medicine and 
Law, are not open to children, which is fair and right, considering their lack 
of life experience. Others, such as Mathematics and Music have been 
characterised by young people's achievement, sometimes with 
accompanying burn-out, rather than development into a mature power. As 
such, there must be different definitions of giftedness for adults and 
children. 
School achievement is the result of hard work in a wide 
range of differing areas of the curriculum where the level of 
study is fairly superficial and the problems that need to be 
solved are normally quite easily defined. On the other hand, 
adult creative achievement is usually the result of single- 
minded dedication, often extending over many years, to the 
resolution of problems that are usually vague and undefined. 
George 1992: 28 
(Sometimes children do manage to demonstrate success as framed within 
adult terms, though. xx) In a similar vein, there could be specific definitions 
of excellence particular to fields of endeavour, requiring yet more 
distinctions and checklists. Record-breaking swimming achievement has 
certain pre-requisites that are not applicable in painting, golf or Physics. It 
would seem that eminence must be placed in a clear context and that this 
cannot be decided upon until some time after the long-term effects of the 
contribution can be evaluated. Alan Turing's developments in 
Mathematics, for example, could not be assessed until a clearer image of 
the role of computers could be established, reminding us that we should 
sometimes reserve judgement. It is impossible to see how we could ever 
assess the full influence of the eminent objectively. 
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These difficulties, along with the barriers to achievement highlighted 
through examination of minority group experiences, have led to the re- 
definition of high ability along the lines of potential, more than performance 
(Simonton, 2000: 118). In a list of (seven) key points for schools, Eyre 
warns that'some abilities may not be recognised until later in a pupil's 
schooling' and that 'ability and achievement are not the same thing' 
(1997: 36). Acknowledging the gap between possible and actual 
achievement brings into play the complex concept of potential. In order to 
help people achieve their potential it is necessary to be able to see when it 
has not been realised, what is preventing its realisation and how to rectify 
any associated problems. This sounds simple, but is often incredibly 
complex. 
The concept of potential is frequently used in this field, but infrequently 
defined. It is easy to assume that children who fail at school have not 
fulfilled their potential, but there is no evidence to support the underlying 
idea that potential matches to subjects taught at school. Many renowned 
business tycoons and public figures delight in telling stories of how they 
were expelled, forced to retake examinations or labelled unintelligent, 
having since gone on to exert great political, financial or other influence on 
their detractors. Weak pupils are often cited in books about the gifted 
(George, 1992) with, for example, Roald Dahl as illiterate, Einstein 
mentally slow and Churchill as academically limited. These people were 
all outstanding achievers and it would be difficult to argue that they were 
not gifted, but would it ever have been appropriate to expect them to do 
well at school? This is not the forum in which to explore the curricula with 
which they were presented, but of the three examples, only Dahl has 
achieved what could be related clearly to school-based skills and even 
then his novels and poems are renowned for treating his child readers 
very differently from previous and even contemporary writers - exactly the 
kind of approach that could be considered facetious by a teacher. 
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Einstein's thinking had to be outside of the expected, not always favoured 
by school requirements. Churchill's brand of leadership mixed with 
stubborn tenacity and risk-taking could certainly have landed him in 
trouble. 
Such examples only reinforce the narrowness of the school experience in 
terms of all possible fields of human endeavour. What individuals could 
achieve, their potential, must be considered in a much broader context. 
Motivation and desire to succeed should be incorporated into a view of 
high ability, as well as the effects of family and schooling. Studies 
continually reinforce the notion of a considerable number of important 
factors contributing to success. 
... most studies have shown that non-cognitive 
factors such 
as motivation, concentration and endurance as well as 
parental and school support systems seem mainly 
responsible for exceptional performances in later life. 
Schneider, 2000: 167 
Clearly there is more to potential than a high IQ score, or a particularly 
good one-off performance. But what do teachers and researchers mean 
by potential? 
2.6.1 Potential 
The term 'potential' is often used as if it were a concept with universally 
agreed meaning, but it is a complicated notion. Peppered throughout 
research is advice for practitioners to facilitate the development of 
children's potential without defining what it could be, or acknowledging 
that it is, presumably, the potential to achieve in morally and socially 
acceptable fields being encouraged. It is impossible to measure potential 
and difficult even just to assess discrepancies between potential and 
performance (Porter, 1999: 233). In some cases, diagnostic IQ tests 
have 
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been able to identify people with problems who have, as a result, received 
appropriate help and useful teaching, and enhancing school grades. More 
often though, such measures are far too narrow, or inappropriate in 
another way and so do not provide much information in identifying 
potential. 
Using potential as a part of a definition of high ability could be problematic. 
However, an influential official definition from the US government (1972, 
Marland Report) highlighted both 'mature powers' and 'developing 
abilities', recognising the value of 'high potential ability' in a range of areas 
(cited in Rudnitski, 2000: 676). Despite subsequent criticisms of the 
definition, it was a ground-breaking change, shaping the field of gifted 
education by placing 'potential' at its centre. It was the first definition to 
suggest that an achievement model of giftedness may not be telling the 
whole story. 
With little attention paid to the meaning of 'potential' by psychologists and 
education researchers, it is necessary to turn to philosophy. Scheffler 
considers the notion in his 1985 essay'On Human Potential'. He identifies 
three conceptualisations: 'a capacity notion, a propensity notion and a 
capability notion' (p45) designed to reconstruct the concept of potential 
and clarify it for practical use in educational contexts. These three 
conceptions are usefully outlined by John White: 
1. To possess a potential can mean possessing the capacity to 
become something. A potential pianist in this sense is someone 
who is not prevented by some unspecified obstacle (which could be 
physical like having no hands, or cultural, to do with, say, being 
brought up in a belief system that has no place for art) from 
acquiring the ability to play the piano. 
2. A potential may also be the propensity to become something. A 
person, described as a 'potential heart attack victim' has the 
propensity to become one. This is to say that if certain conditions 
are fulfilled (e. g. he continues to eat a lot, take no exercise, etc. ) he 
will have, or is likely to have, a heart attack. 
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3. A potential can be the capability of becoming something. By'a 
potential pianist' we may mean something different from the 
account given in (1) above. We may mean a person who is capable 
of becoming one in the sense that'he can be predicted to become 
one if he makes the effort to' (p6l). 
1986: 136 
Educators of the highly able generally have in mind a combination of all 
three definitions when talking about children in their care. The third, 
capability notion, is the strongest in this context, as this describes the able 
pupil as more likely to succeed than other students who may only meet 
the first, capacity notion, merely by being unhindered. Although I can see 
White's point that attributing capability when someone has the relevant 
pre-requisites could be no more than a truism (139-40), 1 think that 
teachers do use this capability notion to describe some kind of latent 
ability. This is mentioned by White in his discussion of the common 
language usage of potential: 
... so far as people do speak of individuals as potential 
pianists, they do often tend to see them as possessing some 
inner talent which will flower if natural processes [ ... ] are not interfered with. (Note, here, too, that when people talk in this 
way, they don't pace Scheffler, tend to mean merely that the 
individual will learn the piano if but that he will become a 
talented player of it. ) 
op cit: 138 
The second, propensity notion, is harder to apply to circumstances of 
education than natural laws, as identified by White (pp137-8). However, 
some researchers of gifted education imply that individuals have no choice 
but to pursue a certain skill or career as they are compelled by their talent, 
pushed in a certain direction by 'inner forces'. Perhaps this is only 
applicable to research that relates to the exceptionally able often 
described as driven, focused and single minded (e. g. Freeman, 2001; 
Gross, 2000; Schneider, 2000). 
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For the field of gifted education, the message gleaned from investigating 
Scheffler's essay and White's response is that the issues raised could be 
more plainly expressed 'using the more familiar language of capacities, 
preventing factors, capabilities and pre-requisites to which the 
reconstructed language of potentials [ ... ] reduces' (op cit: 141). It is yet 
another area of confusion in the literature. 
2.6.2 Fulfillinq qreat potential 
Difficulties arise for the very able in that they have many options for 
success (recall the accomplished girl described at 2.4.2). For such pupils, 
the range of options should be as wide as possible and guidance must be 
made available. 
One can never be all that one has the potential to become, 
because life is too short and developing expertise requires 
much time. But people do possess wide variation for how 
readily expertise development is likely to take. [ ... ] The important life decision is not what you can be as much as it 
is choosing what you would like to become from an array of 
possibilities. 
Lubinski, Benbow and Morelock, 2000: 645 
Personal fulfilment can come in a range of guises, not restricted to 
academic or career aspects of development. It is more about balance than 
exceptional accomplishment in any one area (Delisle, 1994). 
2.6.3 Underachievement 
As noted in Chapter 1, catering for the underachiever would seem less 
contentious than for other pupils. However, such pupils are often 
neglected. They were not even mentioned in the first three years of the 
government's strategy. ' Some underachieving able pupils are not 
considered 'worthy' or deserving of resources due to negative attitudes 
69 
and difficult behaviour. Others are written off due to physical disability or 
sensory impairment. " 
A performance model of high ability is not an inclusive approach. It is easy 
to identify a bright child who produces excellent work, is keen to answer 
questions and take a full and active role in school. Other, 'invisible 
children' may choose to stay out of the limelight, under-performing for a 
variety of reasons or may indulge in anti-social behaviour. XXV" In recent 
years, underachievement and disaffection, have been increasingly 
studied, particularly in boys, and it is through this new interest that 
research projects have attracted government funding. 
Deliberately performing badly at school may seem a strange tactic, but 
many pupils make use of this strategy for a variety of purposes, including 
boredom and a dislike of school-work, particularly when working hard only 
results in the expectation of completing more of the same uninspiring 
tasks. Able children, just like their classmates, need stimulation and 
interaction in order to flourish. For the busy teacher, 'the temptation was 
great to leave the more able to work unaided (Freeman, 1979; Hegarty, 
1993; George, 1995). Although this was not to be condoned, it was at 
least understandable' (Lee-Corbin and Denicolo, 1998: 35). In my own 
study, I found that children expected by teachers to perform averagely, 
with reasonable results and without any trouble, had a battery of time- 
wasting techniques at their disposal. They tended to make an explicit 
effort to live up (or down) to their teachers' expectations, even making 
deliberate errors in order to avoid being put into a work group with extra 
tasks to perform. They made clear decisions about which tasks to 
complete and which to undertake painfully slowly, based on factors such 
as the follow-up choices available and the teacher's mood. They were 
adept at duping their overstretched teachers and were certainly not 
demonstrating their academic potential. Children are adept at deliberately 
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failing tests in order to move into a lower set if they can be with friends, or 
escape from a particular teacher (Hallam and Ireson, 2000). 
Even with exciting tasks and teacher attention, some able pupils will not 
apply themselves for reasons of peer pressure. This factor depends 
greatly on the school ethos, age of pupils and often gender, particularly if 
a pupil's friendship group is not in sympathy with the aims of schooling. 
If they do work hard they get called a boff. At Thirsk school 
boff doesn't necessarily equate with intelligence, as much as 
diligence - and diligence isn't cool. """' 
Williams, 1995: 3 
Few children relish being called 'brain' or'geek' or 'nerd'. 
Consequently one of the most favourite of strategies is for 
gifted students to deny their own giftedness, with the most 
gifted students being most likely to protest their giftedness 
(Swiatek, 1995). Many minority students who are gifted feel 
under additional social pressure to conform to student 
norms. 
Gallagher, op cit: 683 
When the child's cultural group holds values that may not match those of 
the school, this difference can cause children to be overlooked in the 
classroom with deliberate non-compliance assumed to be bad behaviour 
triggered through a lack of understanding rather than a rational decision 
on the part of the pupil (Lee-Corbin and Denicolo, 1998). Such problems 
can occur with able children from lower socio-economic backgrounds, 
different countries of origin, unusual religions and amongst children of 
Travelling people. Highly able children falling into these groups are 
unlikely to be receiving provision designed to meet their needs, partly for 
reasons of funding, partly through lack of understanding, leading to bright 
pupils remaining unidentified (Lee-Corbin and Denicolo, op cit: 57-60). 
Problems also arise where there is a clash between the school and family 
culture and children do not want to lose the aspects of their identity that 
71 
make them feel comfortable in their home settings. 
Some children have learning difficulties that can mask exceptional ability. 
Most common are problems of a dyslexic nature, generally resulting in 
handwriting difficulties, too often dismissed as laziness or petulance. 
Others just do not do well in tests. "x Some very able pupils manage to 
compensate for learning difficulties for much of their school career, 
perhaps achieving reasonably and thereby not attracting attention. 
Teachers have become increasingly aware of such problems, for example 
children who have trouble spelling are not now automatically assumed to 
be non-academic. xxx Despite improvements in teacher understanding of 
learning problems, busy classrooms and constant demands on time can 
lead to problems being missed. The most common outcome for a very 
able pupil with a minor difficulty is that they are perceived as moderately 
able although they are in fact, highly able, but producing poor quality 
written work. Kellmer-Pringle noted that the majority of 'able misfits' were: 
... just doing enough that 
he [sic] will not be bothered by the 
teacher. As a result he is often rated average or below 
average but without being considered a real failure. 
1970: 20 
There are of course those whose underachievement is a result of their 
sensory impairment, physical disability or lack of language skills. As with 
pupils trying to cope with learning difficulties, the focus is on remediating 
what is perceived as the main problem and the area of high ability is often 
left unchallenged. For example, in most schools, an able child with 
handwriting problems will receive extra handwriting exercises, but it is 
unlikely these tasks will also be tailored to tap into their main intellectual 
interests. 
The other main influencing factor concerning underachievement is the role 
of parents (Lee-Corbin and Denicolo, op cit: 21-24). Studies have found 
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that marital and relationship problems negatively affect school pupils' 
performance due to change in economic factors and inevitable emotional 
stress. This is hardly surprising, but worth noting, as when an 
underachiever's grades start slipping this will be less visible than those 
identified as high achievers. 
So, in considering definitions of the highly able, underachievers should be 
taken into account and performance-based definitions only used in 
conjunction with other measures. 
2.6.4 Incorporatinq Performance and potential: provision-led 
definitions 
Using a non-achievement based model of high ability for allocating 
provision will yield inclusive results that allow more pupils to benefit from 
challenging activities and tasks. Pupils can be encouraged to orient 
towards activities based on their abilities and interests, providing 
opportunities for everyone to express some of their skills. This allows 
underachieving able children to bring their abilities to the attention of the 
teachers, as even though they are considered average in ordinary class, 
their talents could emerge in this freer setting. This provision-led definition 
is used in countries such as China. Here, Children's Palaces are designed 
as spaces in which all school children are exposed to a wide range of 
activities, all of which are in relaxed, free settings with open access. All 
children are therefore observed by their teachers who assess ability 
through their play performance and engagement in activities without 
external pressure (Shi and Zha, 2000). 
Observing children working and playing before designing specific tasks 
can help teachers plan work that starts where the child is conceptually, 
providing challenge and encouraging individualised (or at least 
differentiated) provision. 
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Identification and provision have always been seen as 
closely linked, in that good provision allows ability to be 
displayed, whilst good identification leads to provision. 
Eyre, 1997: 19 
Generally, though, the phrase 'provision-led definition' is used differently. 
It is mostly taken to mean that provision can be made for a certain number 
of pupils, and this defines who can be listed as highly able. Eyre (op cit) 
identifies that definitions of the able are often framed in terms of 
appropriate provision, and that this is unavoidable. The current 
government definition talks in terms of the top five to ten per cent of pupils 
but there are obvious drawbacks to such an approach (DfES, 2003). 
The government, for example, would pay for x number of activities and y 
number of children could attend, defining the number of gifted children as 
y. The proportion of the population defined as 'very able' depends, 
therefore, upon the level of provision in place. If all provision were 
cancelled there would be no able people and this is clearly absurd. 
Perhaps taken to its limit, if provision were individualised you could 
similarly eradicate the term 'very able' as all people would be provided for 
in terms of their personal needs. No-one would require any kind of label. 
This individual approach is unrealistic in the current school climate. The 
most likely scenario is that the school system will continue to exist as we 
know it and that this will cater for the majority of pupils who tend to 
perform in a largely predictable way, in terms of their abilities to complete 
tasks deemed appropriate for their age. Pupils performing outside of these 
norms will require specific provision, as currently described in Special 
Educational Needs (SEN) legislation. It must be noted that able children 
are not included in definitions of SEN except for very few extreme cases of 
statemented individuals. Children receiving support for SEN normally have 
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to deal with some kind of learning difficulty or other problem that triggered 
the provision of help. With any such support, it is very much up to the 
discretion of the school, teacher and Local Education Authority as to how 
such pupils have their needs met. (Porter presents a model of assessment 
through provision that could be adopted, but this requires empirical 
research to consider its viability, 1997: 104. ) 
In terms of sound activities and excellent classroom ideas, most source 
books seem, in truth, to be advocating little more than generally accepted 
good pedagogical practice, within a broadly based liberal arts curriculum. 
There is now an emphasis in books for the able, on breaking down 
stereotypes of ability and helping teachers to value pupils whatever their 
strengths, often by allowing children to respond in different ways from the 
usual written requirements. This may be an improvement on the rigidity of 
the National Curriculum but does not really provide a satisfactory answer 
to the needs of able children, who may well be approaching tasks in a very 
different way from their peers. More radical provision would probably be 
appropriate. 
Ultimately, providing varied opportunities to all pupils may help 
teachers pick up detailed information about their abilities, but this is 
a method of identification rather than a definition, or explanation, of 
high ability. 
2.6.5 Summa! j of the chapter so far 
So far this chapter has critically commented on the definitions and 
concepts found throughout the mainly psychological literature of high 
ability. Having explained something of the complexity of the task of 
defining the able (2.1 and 2.2), 1 then went on to consider the current 
government viewpoint. I introduced the general aspects that inform 
discussion in this area, to unpick the way that definitions have arisen in 
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the literature (2-4). Section 2.5 constituted a critical review of the main 
groups of definitions of the able pupil in school, including a consideration 
of genius, and an examination of the notion that the highly able could be 
qualitatively set apart from ordinarily able children. The ubiquitous concept 
of potential was examined in section 2.6. As the psychological literature 
tends to use the term without being absolutely clear about its meaning, 
some clarification was sought from philosophical texts. 
now present my own positive account of high ability, with some potential 
criticisms. 
2.7.0 What is meant Whigh ability'? 
My characterisation of high ability owes a great deal to definitions and 
research already mentioned, as well as to personal observations and 
practice. Influential thinkers are acknowledged in the sections already 
presented. Sometimes it is those ideas which are distant from my own that 
have influenced me the most, through disagreement. I should like to 
reiterate the fact that the area is nebulous and fraught with difficulty. 
This definition is to be read as a loose, soft thesis, not a strong, rigid 
notion of high ability. It hinges on some aspects of the traditional views 
that should be salvaged from the negative reaction to the single capacity 
theory that has characterised much theory over the last twenty years, 
rather than taking one side or another of the polarised view. For this 
thesis, I consider the research on the origins of abilities and nature-nurture 
argument to distract from the definition rather than being of central 
importance, because schools need to nurture pupils and provide for their 
development, wherever ability originates. 
Discussion in this thesis is focused on intellectual high ability, and as such 
the definition is stipulative. I reject the hierarchy of subjects that holds 
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Mathematics, Science and Language to be of more value than other 
subject areas, but I am omitting extended discussion of the skills and 
abilities involved in practical Music, Sport and making Art for two reasons, 
neither of which have anything to do with the value of the subject areas. 
I am not focusing on these areas firstly, because skill development in 
these subjects behaves very differently from the development of 
intellectual abilities (Heller, 2000; Porter, 1999; Eyre, 1997; Freeman, 
2001). There are well-researched ways of predicting potential high 
achievement closely tied to these fields. Secondly, because I am 
concerned with appropriate provision for developing skills in school and 
despite the narrow nature of the National Curriculum (NC), children with 
special abilities in the areas noted are often able to pursue their interest 
through a wide range of clubs, and facilities are made available for their 
development. This is not so with many 'intellectual pursuits' partly because 
they are tackled in the NC, and partly because they constitute minority 
interest outside of the classroom. This is not to say that the extra- 
curricular facilities for all subjects are necessarily adequate, just that they 
are better developed for some subject areas than others. This makes 
success more socially acceptable amongst peers; pursuing sport, music 
and drama is lauded by pupils, whereas pursuing academic study outside 
of school is ridiculed (Freeman 2001). For the purposes of this discussion 
I am adopting a somewhat simple dichotomy, dividing subjects loosely as 
either intellectual and non-intellectual. 
Research into non-intellectual areas of development has not been as 
affected by the political pendulum ushering ideas of single capacity ability 
in and out of favour. There is less controversy about aptitudes for Music, 
Drama, Art and Sport than for History and Physics. Traits such as drive, 
resilience and perseverance are recognised as necessary for success, 
whilst the 'possession' of high intelligence is a good enough explanation 
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for doing well in intellectual subjects. xxx' Of course, success in all domains 
('intellectual' or'non-intellectual') requires a significant investment of time 
and practice, as well as knowledge and experience. Just as the value of 
practice is less emphasised in intellectual domains, so knowledge tends to 
be ignored in non-intellectual areas. 
The rejection of 'g'-centric notions has allowed for an opening up of 
definitions of the highly able and a re-examination of the way we value 
non-academic abilities (not just subjects, but qualities such as Gardner's 
inter- and intra-personal intelligences, 1983). However, the backlash 
against single-factor intelligence theory has resulted in some elements of 
the theory being discarded unnecessarily. Just as the concept of 
intellectual ability brings together a range of subject areas, so certain 
abilities are implied, raising the suggestion that there may be some value 
in ideas of a general capacity. It is possible to preserve aspects of 'g' 
without resorting to the worst scenarios presented through 
misinterpretation and misuse of the theory. Some elements of general 
ability seem to be untenable, or at least contestable, but others make 
sense both in theory and in practice. General ability is part of a definition 
of high ability, but not the whole story and there is a clear precedent for 
having a range of conceptions of high ability. 
There is no ideal way to measure intelligence and therefore 
we must avoid the typical practice of believing that if we 
know a person's IQ score, we also know his or her 
intelligence. [ ... ] we 
have cited these concerns to highlight 
the even larger problem of isolating a unitary definition of 
giftedness. At the very least, we will always have several 
conceptions (and therefore definitions) of giftedness. 
Renzulli and Reis, 2000: 369 
This thesis though, focuses on only one area; intellectual ability. I consider 
a highly able child to be someone who has significantly greater aptitude 
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for some aspect of intellectual learning than would be considered typical 
for their age and background. Aptitude for learning is demonstrated 
through some form of achievement, conventional or unconventional, 
including notable, isolated incidences that serve as evidence of special 
ability but are otherwise difficult to categorise. 
The following section (2.7.1) deals with five possible objections to this 
definition, but before exploring these I will expand the central notion of an 
aptitude. People can, of course, have aptitudes for a wider range of ideas 
than intellectual subjects, but the focus here is narrow, and so, for this 
thesis, aptitude for intellectual learning can be defined as a particular ease 
in ability progression once the learning process is underway, 
characterised in intellectual domains as an easy and effective mental 
engagement with complex ideas of the subject matter in question. 
Not many theorists write about aptitudes, preferring instead the language 
of gift and talent, but Freeman notes that an aptitude is 'sufficient ability to 
gain a foothold in the learning process' (1998: 7), suggesting an 
understanding not reliant on performance alone. Gagn6 considers 
aptitudes within high ability as 'the possession and use of untrained and 
spontaneously expressed natural abilities to a degree that places an 
individual among the top 10% of age peers' (Gagn6,2000: 67). (1 am not 
committed to the percentage differentiation here as it is impractical and 
restrictive, but in the context of Gagn6s study it was relevant). This 
inclusive definition considers potential, allowing for beginner learners or 
people without experience, as well as those who already demonstrate 
mastery (even those with experience and skills will have more to learn). 
The definition strongly suggests an on-going process, rather than an 
achievement-based model, although some expression of the aptitude 
must be visible, however erratically expressed, such as in the Nebraska 
Starry Night Model presented in Appendix 11. 
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There seem to be two broad explanations why an aptitude may not yet be 
apparent. One version is that the aptitude is dormant, a kind of sleeping 
giant, waiting to be awakened by a specific trigger such as a new subject 
area at school or an inspirational teacher. Once engaged, the aptitude can 
be nurtured, allowing for achievement. An alternative scenario is when an 
aptitude is hidden, prevented from presenting itself due to a barrier, or 
blockage, unseen, like an invisible man. Once the barrier is lifted, for 
example, through remediation of a learning problem or access to the 
dominant language, high achievement is allowed. Both 'sleeping giants' 
and 'invisible men' can result in underachievement. The first are helped 
through a range of enrichment activities and the second through useful 
and sympathetic recognition of problems, with some form of support. 
However, I am resisting breaking down the nature of high ability further, as 
this results in the proliferation of lists of characteristics that tend to render 
the notion of high ability meaningless. I am also neglecting to comment 
here in more detail on the measurability of these aspects, discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
2.7.1 Some possible criticisms 
Any definition of high ability will quite rightly be the focus for critical 
evaluation. Here, I consider some more obvious issues that could 
potentially be seen as flaws in my positive account. 
a) Too loose - With a soft definition, the conception is too loose to be valid. 
The examples in Appendix I can be used to illustrate the lack of 
homogeneity amongst highly able children, but to also demonstrate the 
'family resemblance' of the related factors. Despite supporting some 
aspects of generalisable intellectual abilities, I am not presenting a clear- 
cut IQ-style definition. What I have is a messier notion, but one that is 
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informed by the research as presented in this chapter and also by practice 
with children, teachers and with clinical and educational psychologists. It is 
not clear what is needed to constitute a fully validated definition, due to the 
heterogeneity of the target group. 
A tighter definition would be too rigid for the heterogeneous pupils in 
question. 
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b) Too suboective - By basing definitions on minimal and disparate 
evidence, there is an over-reliance on teacher interpretation and 
insufficient obiective evidence. 
There is clearly disagreement amongst psychologists and educators about 
what constitutes high ability, but there are recurring themes. My definition 
allows for subject-based checklists of characteristics that correlate with 
success in a field (George, 1992; Eyre, 1997; Koshy and Casey, 1996; 
Wallace, 2000; Freeman, 1998) as well as the use of professional teacher 
judgement through careful observation of qualities and features that may 
fall outside usual measures. The best way to help teachers to increase 
objectivity is to improve understanding of highly able children and their 
needs. Through training, accuracy of identification with supporting 
evidence will improve, even for students demonstrating flashes of ability, 
showing their potential. Such pupils are likely to be successful with help, 
but stand little chance if they are not even identified. In the UK, on-going 
attempts are being made to address the lack of professional courses and 
support for teachers, and it also remains a significant issue in the broader 
arena. 
Without exception however, there is a need for training of 
teachers globally which in turn will prepare them to 
recognise and meet the needs of children from all cultures 
who exhibit gifted attributes. 
Baldwin, Vialle and Clarke, 2000: 571 
Building an evidence base helps reduce subjectivity, preventing teacher 
bias. 
cl Too exclusive - By focusing on narrow intellectual ability, an elitist 
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definition results, with Pupils already favoured by the National Curriculum 
content yet again the focus of attention. 
I have explained reasons for focusing on intellectual ability, but I am not 
going down the traditional route of I schoolhouse giftedness'. This is 
defined by Renzulli and Reis as: 
Schoolhouse giftedness might also be called test-taking or 
lesson-learning giftedness. It is the kind most easily 
measured by IQ or other cognitive ability tests, and for this 
reason it is the kind most often used for selecting students 
for entrance into special programs. 
ibid: 369 
The pupils for whom I am advocating do not fit into this narrow conception. 
Of the examples presented, most of the children would fail to be selected 
for provision by these criteria; Billie's handwriting and presentation would 
let her down and Louis and Nat both have negative attitudes to testing, 
preventing them from doing well. Charlie's attention span and Stan's 
idiosyncratic approach to set tasks would be likely to harm their results. It 
is probable that Andre and Doris would be accepted on a programme, but 
they are the most settled children, arguably least in need of something 
outside of the curriculum. 
The definition is not elitist or exclusive, despite its focus on intellectual 
ability. Children with other skills, talents, abilities and aptitudes are 
considered as different cases, not as excluded. The definition tackles the 
awkward aspects of high ability, those falling outside traditional test-taking 
measures. It also incorporates some aspects of more contemporary 
multiple measures allowing personal characteristics to be taken into 
account. 
d) Too s fficient to consider aptitude as predictive of 
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success. 
I am not making such a claim. I am describing children of high intellectual 
ability, not ensuring their success. The suggestions for provision later in 
the thesis tackle this issue, but at this point I would like to present the oft- 
quoted Galton comment concerning capacity, adding the importance of 
the learning and home environments as significant factors in success: 
By natural ability, I mean those qualities of intellect and 
disposition, which urge and qualify a man to perform acts 
that lead to reputation. I do not mean capacity without zeal, 
nor zeal without capacity, nor even a combination of both of 
them, without an adequate power of doing a great deal of 
very laborious work. 
1869, and 1962: 77 
Aptitude must be recognised in order to then be fostered. There is no 
guarantee of success through recognition of ability alone. 
e) Too vaque - There is no cut-off point or distinction between only slightly 
able and profoundly able children. 
In order to be inclusive there is no absolute presented in order to 'qualify' 
as highly able, as the aim is not to find an ultimate unchanging cohort. The 
definition is flexible and wide-ranging, designed to be dynamic. A pupil 
who very rarely demonstrates their aptitudes may be allowed to partake in 
activities that ultimately fail to stimulate repetition of their achievement. 
Their inclusion in the tasks will be reconsidered after several attempts. 
Others may suddenly show areas of ability that have apparently been 
dormant and they will be provided with a chance to explore and extend 
their work. 
Pupils who have exceptional abilities will be identified along with those 
whose aptitudes are more modest, yet still above average. As noted, the 
most extreme cases of high ability are rare, impossible to deny and 
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usually catered for by Special Educational Needs procedures. Therefore, 
my focus is on the highly able pupil in particular, including the 
underachieving and troubled child, whose abilities may be harder to 
detect. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The notion of high ability is complex and controversial. There are so many 
different definitions and possible explanations that the concept can seem 
irrelevant and meaningless. However, some people are more able than 
others of the same age and background, just as some fall below the 
average expected for the general population. Some are ahead of their age 
peers by a considerable margin and their achievements are startling and 
surprising. There are others still who may be unable to express their true 
abilities due to personal or social difficulties, but their potential for 
expression of high ability can be discerned through occasional revealing 
performance and/or a compelling constellation of characteristics that make 
such performance likely, given the appropriate opportunity. There is no 
clear definitive collection of characteristics or group of features shared by 
highly able children and not exhibited in the ordinarily able, because high 
ability is not the essence of a homogenous group. There are very many 
different ways in which people can be highly able and these will suggest 
qualities and learning styles that are as wide-ranging as the subject areas 
in which they are able. 
Some people have ability in a specific domain. Others seem to present 
more general abilities, or abilities that cluster around related areas, 
suggesting some sets of skills and knowledge are closely linked, existing 
perhaps as general pre-requisites for some areas of accomplishment. 
Identifying the one defining characteristic feature of high ability is 
impossible. Aptitude is a useful guide, however, as even when different 
cultural values and fields of expertise are considered there is a focus on 
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easy mental engagement with difficult ideas and activities. Generally this 
leads to increased practice and commitment, which in turn fosters 
improved performance. Just applying oneself to a task with gusto would 
not be enough though to produce an exemplary performance; aptitude 
would also be necessary. Aptitude without application, will not produce 
high achievement, however. High ability is founded on the aptitude to do 
well in a field. When this is combined with commitment and opportunity, 
success is likely. If factors conspire to prevent the aptitude developing, 
underachievement is the result. 
It is impossible to create an account of high ability without recourse to 
discussion of the concept of intelligence, and it is to this task that I now 
turn. 
' For a review of the shift in focus in worldwide gifted education research, see Heller and 
Schofield, 2000: 123-137. Data about age related research is on p136. "A frequently cited example of this is the story of Dame Alice Markova who was pushed 
into ballet in order to help correct her flat feet (Freeman 1998: 16, among many others). 
"' 'A prodigy is a child who, before the age of 10, performs at the level of a highly trained 
adult in some cognitively demanding domain' (Morelock and Feldman, 2000: 227). 
iv These terms were chosen by the government against the unanimous advice of the 
advisory panel made up of teachers, examiners, specialist advisors and academics. 
Evidence was presented to the committee and is reported in the Hansard House of 
Commons Review (1998-9) in which the term 'high ability'was recommended to the 
government. 'Gifted and Talented'was adopted by the head of the strategy to avoid time- 
consuming debate on terms to describe the able as this was considered a waste of time 
(personal communication with two separate members of the House of Commons Review 
and Advisory Group from 1998 to 2001/2). 
v German: Begabung or Hochbegabung, French: dou6s or surdo6s. See also Monks 
and Mason for a summary of different cultural perspectives and discussion of how 
'meanings are tainted by an emotionalism that seems to engulf the concept of giftedness' 
(p 144). 
` 'Introduced in September 1999, the strategy operates in 1000 secondary and 400 
primary schools to help disadvantaged able children, many of whom are underachieving, 
to reach their full potential. The strand operates in 70 LEAs and by September 2003, up 
to 200,000 pupils are likely to benefit. The main elements are: 
1. Identifying the gifted and talented cohort - the 5-10% of pupils identified by each 
school as eligible for the teaching and learning programme; 
2. Introducing a whole school policy for the gifted and talented cohort; 
3. introducing a distinct in-school teaching and learning programme for the gifted 
and talented cohort; 
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4. Introducing an extensive programme of out of hours study support opportunities 
for those pupils, provided through local networks. 
Each Excellence in Cities (EiC) area has a Strand Co-ordinator (and a School Co- 
ordinator for each secondary school) and schools are grouped into 'clusters'. Each cluster 
has formed a network with a range of external partners such as higher education 
institutions, libraries, museums and businesses to support the provision of out-of-school- 
hours activities. ' WES website; August 2003. 
Vii A termly conference is held in November, March and July. Delegates and speakers are 
all invited and comprise of teachers, policy-makers, pupils, academics, students, activity- 
Rroviders, parents and other interested parties. 
V11i , New Zealand Maori peoples value a broad range of qualities in the spiritual, affective, 
aesthetic, intuitive, creative, leadership and cultural domains in addition to Western 
culture's intellectual emphasis. The Maori emphasis is holistic and group-oriented... 
Individuals who excel in any domain will use their special abilities in the interests of 
others. ' (Porter, ibid: 32), and 'Aboriginal peoples value talents in such areas as 'healing, 
lore, story telling, religion, music, crafts, hunting and tracing culture. Individuals who are 
talented in these domains are expected to be humble and, although recognised for their 
talent, are not afforded higher status because of it. ' (Harslett, 1996: 102) 
'x This is one reason why the House of Commons Review recommended the less 
contentious term 'high ability' (1998-9). Many cultures historically believed that human 
talents were an endowment of the gods (Hunsaker, 1995). Several examples are raised 
in Heller et al 2000: 'in ancient Greco-Roman culture special intellectual and artistic 
abilities were believed to come from the Muses'(Moon and Rosselli, 2000: 501); wisdom, 
equated with giftedness, has been considered a divine gift (Pasupathi and Staudinger, 
2000: 253-67); Ziegler and Heller (2000: 5) explore Greek, Chinese and Christian religious 
themes. 
x This has been reflected in some recent successful and popular movies, notably'Good 
Will Hunting', 'Billy Elliot' and 'Bend it Like Beckham'. 
x' Perhaps any deviation from the general accepted codes of behaviour can be deemed 
harmful within some structures. It might seem heavy-handed to suggest this but in the 
microcosm of school, this is what often happens, with pupils punished for breaking with 
convention, even when this is only a minor misdemeanour, such as breaking a uniform 
code. 
Xii This can be seen with very young highly able children who have a sophisticated 
comprehension of the rules of a game, but lack the social skills to play effectively with 
peers who cannot keep up with their complex rule structures. Lack of social ability and 
consequent disruptive behaviour was the most common reason for me being asked to 
visit Nursery classes in my capacity as Senco. My experience is echoed by other Sencos 
and co-ordinators of the gifted and talented, with anecdotal evidence from conferences, 
network meetings and discussions with both school and psych o logy-based professionals. 
Xiii Simonton notes that Terman expressed 'belief in Samuel Johnson's (1781: 5) assertion 
that 'the true Genius is the mind of large, general powers, accidentally determined to 
some particular direction' (2000: 112-3). 'Exceptionally gifted children comprise a 
population characterised by their scarcity. [ ... 
] Over the last 70 years, researchers have 
repeatedly found that the number of children actually identified in the range 160+ far 
exceeds the theoretical expectations derived from the normal curve of distribution 
(Terman, 1925; Burt, 1968; Robinson, 1981; Silverman, 1989; Gross, 1993a); 
nevertheless, even the most generous over-prediction must acknowledge that these 
young people comprise an extremely small minority of the child population' (Gross, 
2000: 181). For a thorough explanation of the distribution of IQ scores, see Simonton, 
2000, particularly p1 13 where he discusses membership of the Mega Society (IQ over 
176; membership one-in-a-million). 
x'v Just a brief glance at the Sunday newspapers shows a peppering of the word 'genius' 
to describe, variously, a pupil who gained high W-level grades ('superkid genius'), a tv 
chef who has had an original idea for healthy and tasty picnic snacks ('genius picnic 
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solutions'), a pop band whose latest single has a free downloadable mobile'phone ring 
tone ('marketing genius) and the ubiquitous footballer ('Will Beckham's genius shine as 
bright in Madrid? '); from the Sunday Telegraph, Mail on Sunday and the Observer, all 17 
Aug 2003. 
" Jausovec (2000) showed gifted subjects to have higher levels of cortical arousal both 
at rest and whilst structuring solutions to problems. He concluded that this would lead to 
superior readiness to deal with set tasks, as well as more efficient results. 
Xvi An example of this would be Billie working out from a newspaper article that there will 
be a fossil fuel crisis by the time she is old enough to have children. This led her to worry 
about the how she would get her children to school, to the point where she began bed- 
wetting and was absent from school having been wrongly diagnosed by her doctor as 
suffering from an infection. The OE scale has been adopted widely, particularly in Africa 
where this has helped to identify children who do not show up through more formal 
psychological methods (Coleman and Cross, 2000: 204). 
Xvii Even though mental instability and high ability is rare, it has become linked in the 
popular imagination with more general notions of high ability. Terman collected his data 
to demonstrate that genius was not close to madness, but found that with eminence 
came emotional difficulties (Gallagher, 2000: 683). 
Xviii See, for example, suggestions for helping build self-esteem and self-understanding in 
Bland, Sowa and Callahan, 1994, and Porter's sections on social skills coaching and the 
teaching of group entry skills, ibid: 164-5, with further suggestions on p166. 
x'x Noted in Porter, ibid: 25-6, and also Forster, 1997: 80 (citing Sternberg and Davies, 
1985) who discern 'qualitatively different metacognitive functioning in the gifted'. 
xx Jackson and Butterfield (1986: 38), consider that 'gifted children use the same 
strategies as everyone else but simply become more proficient in their strategy use at 
younger ages'. 
" Personal communication with the British Psychological Society and the National 
Association of Gifted Children and evidence from the discussion group - 
www. gov. ngfl/abil, a high ability networking site. That teachers rely on IQ tests is also the 
subject of conversation in discussions at conferences and with teachers on Inset days. 
xx" Gardner uses the word 'intelligence' to denote what Porter labels 'domains in which 
one can excel' (ibid: 24). It is unclear, though, what is meant by'excelling in a domain' 
and how this differs from excelling in a process. Gross perceives a clear link between 
Gardner and Thurstone (2000: 187), whilst Porter suggests a link between Thurstone and 
Sternberg, saying they 'focus on the intellectual processes that are required to produce 
an intelligent response'. 
xx... Renzulli emphasises the interaction of these different elements and welcomed the 
environmental aspects added by Monks in 1992 (Monks and Mason, op cit: 146) thereby 
broadening the definition. 
xx'v In recent years, some exceptional teenagers have become multi-millionaires through 
working as internet entrepreneurs, selling toys that have become fashionable (such as 
scooters), brokering deals for exclusive mobile telephone ring-tones, and mixing music as 
DJs. 
xxv WES 1997-2000, information from the Gifted and Talented Unit including personal 
communication with people working in the department. 
Xxvi Having recently been involved with a project looking at children of high ability with 
sensory impairments, it became clear that many people (teachers, researchers and 
lay 
people) had not considered such a combination could even be valid, unless 
they had 
close personal contact with people with disabilities (Winstanley, 
in Montgomery, ed., 
2003). 
xxv" 'This is not to say that underachievement causes delinquency: both delinquency and 
underachievement themselves appear to have a prior cause - namely, non-conformity 
to 
social norms, or antisocial attitudes and values. ' (Porter, 
ibid: 232). My MPhil thesis in 
1990 looked at able children in ordinary classrooms, observing their behaviour, 
in 
particular noting qualitative information about time spent off-task. 
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This research found a culture in which girls were permitted to achieve and to work 
hard, but boys were unable to work hard if they wished to maintain a valuable social 
reputation (Williams, 1995: 3). Other studies have found the reverse to operate (e. g. 
Ayles, 1991, cited in Lee-Corbin and Denicolo, 1998: 20). The point is still relevant, 
however, that peer groups and school ethos are variables in pupil underachievement and 
achievement. 
XxiX Eyre, (1997: 19) considering whether or not Standard Attainment Targets (SATs) are 
valuable in identifying the highly able, notes: 'Some able pupils make errors because they 
cannot conceive that the answer could be so simple. Some refuse to complete the test 
because it is so routine and dull. ' 
)('0' Montgomery (1993) vigorously points out that spelling problems do not mean lack of 
ability. 
)=i See, for example, Bamberger, 1982; Feldman and Goldsmith, 1986; Howe, 1990; 
Radford, 1990; Shutter-Dyson and Gabriel, 1986; Winner and Martino, 2000. 
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Chapter 3 Intelliqence 
3.0 Introduction 
An examination of intelligence is necessary for understanding high ability 
and my purpose here is to provide some clarity in this fuzzy area. I will 
argue that although no single clear definition of intelligence can 
successfully capture its nature, the concept is not rendered useless. 
Intelligence is often portrayed as some kind of mystery, and in current 
literature the concept is frequently discarded in favour of consideration of 
abilities to do x, or y, rather than a singular definition. The concept of 
intelligence is justly seen as particularly significant in the population of 
people known as highly able. By examining presuppositions, the definition 
of high ability presented in Chapter 2 will be strengthened, through better 
understanding of the nature of intelligence and consequent implications for 
practice. 
'Intelligence' is a widely used word, seen and heard in many contexts and 
on the lips of a wide range of professionals and lay people. There are, 
therefore, different aspects to the understanding of the word 'intelligence' 
and of the concept it describes. In trying to isolate useful definitions, we 
must examine intuitive and commonplace meanings, deciding which are 
worth preserving and which can be discarded as extraneous or simply 
wrong (3.1). Some questions recur in the intelligence literature, connected 
with major schools of thought dominating the field for the last century. 
They are mainly psychological issues (considered in section 3.2) and 
concern the nature of intelligence and its origins. Following this, four 
claims about intelligence are discussed in sections 3.3 to 3.6. In 3.7,1 
present my own account. 
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3.1 Everyday talk about intelliqence 
As with high ability, generally accepted and commonly used meanings of 
intelligence need closer examination when they impact on education. The 
concept is controversial, complex and confusing and yet 'intelligence' is 
often used without careful consideration. Although the concept touches 
the lives of most people, not much turns on its meaning in everyday 
conversation. Whether or not the use of 'intelligence' is supported by 
theory or conceptually sound, is irrelevant in most cases. In education, 
psychology and policy making, however, an examination of underlying 
assumptions is essential, in the same way as it is with definitions of high 
ability, because provision for children may result (for example, the 11 -plus 
examination). 
Teachers are well placed to observe how their pupils learn, by presenting 
them with a range of tasks that will enable them to demonstrate their 
aptitudes and abilities over some time, rather than the snapshot that one- 
off tests provide. However, the rise of political correctness and the threat 
of potential future ramifications have resulted in reluctance amongst 
teachers to make use of their professional judgement about students' 
abilities. ' In recent years we have become generally more sensitive to 
how language is used to describe people's capacities and attributes. 
The status of careers in non-academic fields in our society has risen, with 
accompanying public acclaim, since more traditional professions are 
failing to attract new recruits, the value of having 'school-house abilities' is 
affected. Respect for such abilities is not vanishing as much as being 
balanced by the recognition of achievements in other spheres. Perception 
that intelligence is demonstrated by school results is tempered by the real 
life stories of those who have defied their apparent lack of ability by 
demonstrating significant accomplishments. Among teachers this results 
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in reluctance to assign specific labels of intelligence to children for fear of 
missing a special ability that so far has not been discernible. 
Despite this shift, there is a contradiction with teachers still displaying a 
curious adherence to the notion of IQ, which is often considered 
synonymous with 'intelligence'. The British Psychological Society and 
organisations such as 'Children of High Intelligence' (CHI) and the 
National Association of Gifted Children (NAGC) offer support to teachers 
looking for verification of suspected high ability. They provide the contact 
details of qualified practitioners and these are advertised as appropriate 
sources of IQ testing. When on Inset and training sessions, I am 
frequently asked which of the IQ tests is the most accurate and useful, but 
I am rarely asked whether they have any value. The internet 
conversations on the high ability networks also reveal teachers to be very 
preoccupied with finding accurate intelligence tests. It is not entirely clear 
whether they are persuaded of the value of the tests beyond providing 
additional evidence for presenting to senior teachers and LEAs, but most 
teachers certainly seem very determined to persist with testing. 
They continue to believe that it is possible to define a child's 
level of ability by the use of a test and to give it a numerical 
score. 
Eyre 11997: 3 
Psychology is the field with the largest body of work on the concept of 
intelligence, with ideas so dominant they have seeped into common 
usage. This is not always useful, as everyday understanding of the 
concept has not been subject to rigours of academic argument and 
discussion, allowing for the domination of ideas based on inaccuracies. 
When new evidence is presented, it can take a long while for public 
perception to change and what remains are pseudo-scientific ideas 
accepted as fact. 
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Intelligence is a topic more written about by psychologists 
than philosophers. [ ... ] Everyone will know about the 
controversies over the IQ that have preoccupied 
psychologists for most of the twentieth century. 
White, 2002: 78 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, surveys have shown a close 
correspondence between 'scientific' and 'popular' notions of 
intelligence (e. g. Sternberg et al, 1981; Fry, 1984). 
Richardson, 1991: 3 
But what is the extent of the effects of these commonly held conceptions 
of intelligence? Siblings are often afforded different opportunities by their 
carers, based upon notions of intelligence; extra chess lessons for the 
bright girl and French tuition for the boy who might not make it through his 
exams. Informal assessment of intelligence levels is usually based on 
school performance, showing how far-reaching such influences can be. 
Teachers plan classes and support to provide for individual needs, or 
decide who should move to a higher or lower set or stream, while many 
schools still select pupils based on their intelligence divined through pencil 
and paper tests. Our successes and failures at school and in life are often 
'explained' or confounded by the consensus of our apparent level of 
intelligence: 'Only the one'A'? Really? But she's such a bright girl. ' In a 
wider context, doors are opened or closed as result of this contested 
notion of quality or quantity of intelligence. The gravity of the situation is 
shown by the increase in employers' use of psychometric tests and scores 
as part of their recruitment process and possibly also for university 
entrance. " These tests are premised upon the quantifiability of 
intelligence, aptitude and potential. It is rather a surprising status for such 
a nebulous notion and it is clear, therefore, that the concept needs careful 
and critical examination. 
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So how is the word 'intelligence' used in common parlance? 'Freddie is 
not at all intelligent'; 'Norah is quite intelligent'; 'Erroll is very intelligent'. 
Most often it is meant as a capacity, or kind of internal mental strength but 
it is also frequently understood that this capacity can be employed 
effectively or ineffectively. Thus we can say: 'Freddie might not be too 
intelligent but he makes the most of what he's got'; 'Yes, Erroll is a really 
intelligent boy, but he doesn't apply himself. This distinguishes between 
capacity and performance, but still makes use of a central mental power or 
mental mechanism model. 
Intelligence is generally considered 'a good thing', but only if served up in 
the right sized portion. Too much is rather threatening and can be isolating 
and unattractive. Too little is problematic, although this can be 
compensated for. Mostly however, people require their friends and life 
partner to be intelligent. Many a 'lonely hearts' entry mentions this quality, 
apparently prizing it above physical attractiveness, independent means, 
love of travel, or a GSOH (good sense of humour) and treating it as the 
same kind of quality. This would imply a fixed characteristic, like skin 
colour. It is quite clear, then, that people have an idea of what they mean 
when they think about 'intelligence' and the personal qualities implied 
therein. 
Over recent years, in discussing my work, I have asked many friends, 
colleagues and family members (including several school and university 
teachers) their opinions on this matter, and found that almost all had a 
clear idea of their own conception. This is a kind of intuitive 
characterization, a sense that intelligence is part of our very make up. No- 
one made reference to any kind of empirical or anecdotal evidence in 
support of his or her ideas, unless probed for reasons to explain them. 
Most people seemed to think it was a 'non-question' and the answer was 
obvious, shared and uncontested. Exploring these ideas resulted in 
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frustration at the difficulties encountered in trying to pin down such a 
seemingly simple and obvious issue. Responses were mainly suggestive 
of a general capacity with specific talents and dispositions also viewed as 
relevant, to varying degrees. These views were shared by lay people and 
experienced professionals alike. They were in no doubt that it is an 
important characteristic, valued highly, despite a lack of concordance and 
clarity about its nature. 
And the words we use to talk about intelligence? As noted in Chapter 2, 
subtle nuances in language illustrate the concept's complexity and betray 
accompanying values. The metaphors and imagery are telling. It would be 
somewhat perverse to prefer to be called 'dull' or'dim' than 'bright' or 
'sparky'. To have intelligence is to be'switched on', 'able' and 'alert', not 
'foolish', 'slow' or'limited. The words soon have a negative ring, however, 
if the person in question has rather too much intelligence, or is too eager 
to share their ideas or understanding. They are suddenly 'egg-heads, 
'nerds', 'swots', or'boffins', considered 'precocious' and to be'showing- 
off'. Being intellectually advanced is as anti-social as being 'backward'. 
'Intelligence' is used in a multitude of contexts and scenarios, ranging from 
descriptions of highly acclaimed poets, to boxers, criminals and dolphins. 
It could be argued that the very breadth of usage dilutes its meaning, but 
these creatures are not considered 'intelligent' in the same sense of the 
word. The poet is a wordsmith extraordinaire and the dolphin displays 
human characteristics of sophisticated communication, amazing memory 
and expressive playfulness. There is no obvious defining element to these 
widely differing conceptions. As Richardson observes: 
Just because we have a name for something does not mean 
that the term has a clear referent; nor does it mean that it 
corresponds with anything actually existing. 
Op cit: 2 
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Perhaps there is a defining common characteristic that can help us to 
clarify a coherent, complete and compatible definition of intelligence. It is 
mostly viewed as an endowment and believed that we all possess a 
certain amount, and that this must be fixed and measurable. This belief 
explains the persistence of importance placed on IQ scores. 
Other uses of the term exist. Winch suggests that it is only psychologists 
who subscribe to the model of intelligence as a processing ability, 
presenting examples of how the word is commonly used in speech and 
contrasting this with (Spearman's) notions of a unitary property of the 
mind. He cites examples of adjectival uses of the term: 
We have no difficulty with such expressions as 'he is an 
intelligent footballer' or'she handled that parent in an 
intelligent manner 
1990: 7 
I agree that we infer dispositional characteristics from such uses, linking 
intelligence to specific activities and behaviour. However, this is more a 
description of proficiency and the result of experience than intelligence. 
When people talk of 'an intelligent footballer' the context usually 
determines what they mean by the use of the word 'intelligent' and how it 
relates to the person in question. It could mean that the person 'is 
intelligent and a footballer ', which could still imply the psychological central 
processing or capacity model and I think this is what people often 
understand by intelligence. The alternative interpretation would be that the 
footballer 'plays intelligently' and in this case the word 'intelligently' can be 
substituted by the word 'skilfully'. The skills involved in football naturally 
involve concept application and the flexible adaptation of means to ends, 
in addition to physical skills. In terms of use of language, we more 
commonly say that someone is intelligent and possibly use this as an 
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explanation for being good at x, or y; not that they are 'intelligent at' x or y. 
The confusion arises over the way in which 'intelligence' is sometimes 
synonymous with 'intellectual capacity' and sometimes used as a 
synonym for'skilful'. Both uses are found in everyday language and 
nuances of speech or writing often indicate the particular meaning. Just 
because we are comfortable saying 'She handled that parent in an 
intelligent manner', this does not mean that we do not also have a 
conception of 'intelligence' as noun, representing the capacity understood 
as the psychologists' central processing model. In one of these instances, 
the intelligence described is general and a property of the mind and in the 
other it is about performance and application. For clarity, words such as 
'skills', 'talents' and 'abilities' need to be distinguished from one another, 
and from the term 'intelligence). 
In everyday usage, intelligence is frequently used as an explanation, but in 
trying to explain, we can be left with a circular argument. For example, 
'Chet is a talented trumpeter because he plays the trumpet well. Chet 
plays the trumpet well because he is a talented trumpeter'. 
Although the level of someone's intelligence is frequently put 
forward as being a possible reason for that person's success 
or failure at intellectual tasks, intelligence level is in reality 
only a descriptive measure, not an explanatory concepQ... 
invoking someone's high measured intelligence in order to 
explain a person's success is no more meaningful than 
putting forward productivity as the explanation of a factory's 
level of output. 
Howe, 1988: 349-50 
Howe simplifies the issue here. Intelligence is being used to explain a 
particular performance in terms of a general capacity. Certainly, 
intelligence cannot constitute the entire explanation of success or failure, 
but can be used in part explanation of someone's performance. Howe 
considers that 'a person's level of tested intelligence provides rather little 
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information about that individual, and considerably less than many writers 
who use the term in psychological literature appear to believe' (p358). This 
may be so, but does not mean the concept is useless. 
As noted, most people do not need precision in their use of 'intelligence , 
but those who consider its nature within their professional life must be 
clear. Psychologists, teachers, philosophers, medical staff, social workers 
and employers need a coherent working definition, though this can 
reasonably vary across fields, as long as it is always suitably grounded. It 
is intriguing to consider the similarities between the aspects of personality, 
achievement and attitudes that would be highlighted by a teacher of 
nursery children and those of a university graduate lecturer. Even within 
psychology, there is a range of contested concepts, and whilst there is 
some agreement, no clear overall single definition. "' Howe emphasises 
this: 
I think there are strong factual grounds for questioning a 
number of those assumptions about human ability that many 
people see as self-evidently true, or 'obviously' correct, or 
just common sense. [ ... ] in connection with young people's 
capabilities, even those assumptions that almost everyone 
takes for granted may actually be mistaken. That is a serious 
matter, because the ways in which we adults think about 
abilities have practical consequences that affect the lives 
and fortunes of numerous children. If the beliefs that guide 
our decisions and actions are faulty, it is entirely possible 
that we could be denying children opportunities that would 
help them to thrive, by cutting them off from valuable 
learning experiences and effectively slamming doors in their 
faces. 
1997: 28' 
So it seems that ordinary language use of the word 'intelligence' merits 
investigation as it can affect provision for children or result in barriers to 
certain activities. Everyday understanding of 'intelligence' perpetuates 
ideas that intelligence stems from some kind of underlying mechanism, 
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possibly with measurable and quantifiable capacity, and maybe fixed; a 
kind of personal characteristic such as eye colour. There is also an 
adverbial use of 'intelligence , where, for example, describing someone as 
performing 'intelligently' can be used in the same way as performing 
I skilfully' or'very well'. Ordinary usage of the word seems to have been 
informed by psychology. How did such conceptions arise and are they 
accurate? 
3.2 Psychological investiqations 
Before breaking down the claims made by psychologists it is necessary to 
say something about the field itself and briefly trace the history of the 
development of theory. Without this context, it is difficult to see how 
opinions have formed in the arenas of both public opinion and in 
education. Some aspects are integrated into the four claims (3.3 to 3.6). v 
Despite more than 100 years of study, with numerous developments in 
neuroscience and psychology, not much has significantly changed: 
We know how to measure something called intelligence, but 
we do not know what has been measured. We do know that 
whatever has been measured is predictive of performance in 
academic settings. And we know that what we have 
measured is influenced by a person's genes. We do not 
know what, if anything, should be done with this knowledge. 
A study of the history of research on intelligence may inform 
us about how prescient our forebears were. In large 
measure we know what they knew and we do not know what 
they did not know and what we find controversial and 
objectionable in their work is equally so today when similar 
ideas are advanced by our contemporaries. 
Brody, in Sternberg, 2000: 30-1 
Biometrics was born in the nineteenth century, as scientists attempted to 
quantify everything in the natural world, a relatively new approach used 
famously by Francis Galton, who considered intelligence to be both 
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hereditary and measurable. Through studies of eminent families and their 
achievements, together with calculations of the physique, reaction times 
and sensory perception, he established a measure of intelligence that he 
claimed could explain differing abilities. His first publications (1865) were 
used to 'explain' the dominance and superiority of his race over others. 
From the outset, this field has been beset by controversy over methods, 
conclusions and use of data. 
One of Galton's detractors was Alfred Binet, who was 'astonished by the 
considerable place reserved to the sensations and simple processes' in 
Galton's work' (1896, cited in Brody ibid: 17). Binet (with Henri and later 
Simon) proposed far more complex tests based on cognitive processing, 
with elements of digit span, simple arithmetic, writing and sentence 
completion. These were designed to help diagnose children with learning 
and behavioural difficulties. Over the years, increasingly sophisticated 
measures such as the testing of reasoning, judgement and understanding 
of abstract ideas were included, and a comprehensive diagnostic test was 
developed. It is important to emphasise that the impetus for Binet to create 
this quantitative index of abilities was the need to improve the educational 
experience of 'retarded and abnormal children'. Binet never converted 
mental age scores to IQ (this was done by Stern in 1912) as he was rightly 
concerned that his tests would be misused. His test is still in use today (4 th 
edition) and remains based on the idea that intelligence resides within the 
individual and is largely, although not exclusively hereditary (Khatena, 
1992). 
In America in 1904, Spearman published his two-factor theory of 
intelligence incorporating both general and specific aspects; 'g' and 's' (as 
noted in the previous chapter, section 2.5.1). The concept of general 
ability was (and still is) used to explain how people perform, taking as its 
central idea the intellect as a hierarchical structure within which 'g' dictates 
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the level of achievement in all sub-skills. Despite Binet's objections, the 
focus soon became a comparison of scores and standardised results, 
ranking children by ability. Spearman consolidated these ideas in 1927, 
listing and interpreting common components of test scores as the 
explanation of any individual's performance. 
Spearman's aim was 'to find a coherent and even brutally simplified 
structure beyond the multiplicity of form and observation presented by the 
natural world' (Brody, op cit: 19). Binet's opposing view is all about nuance, 
subtlety and difference, believing 'precision to be illusory with respect to 
understanding anything as complex as intelligence' (ibid). 
Since these early pioneers, explaining intelligence has been a major field 
of study, particularly in the psychological study of the 'biological metaphor' 
(Sternberg, 1990: 4). Measurements have been updated and now cortical 
arousal, analysis of brain activity in problem solving and hemispheric 
localisation are all investigated, published by key researchers such as 
Jensen and Eysenck. A number of theorists have investigated high ability, 
as a kind of anomaly (e. g. Jausovec, 2000). Backlash against IQ theory 
and accusations of being a'pseudoscience' has made some 
psych ornetricians defensive (Carroll, 1997: 48), but despite continuing 
study and research, the same central questions about the nature of 
intelligence have yet to be settled. 
Contemporary theories fall into four categories: 'neural efficiency$ I 
concerning physiological aspects; 'hierarchical', based on the perceived 
structure of the mind; 'contextual', to do with external aspects; and 
'complex systems' models examining interacting multiple factors 
(Davidson and Downing, 2000). They use different techniques and 
explanations in their investigation of intelligence, but share a common 
factor of valuing 'adaptability of cognitive processing as an important 
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aspect of intelligence' (ibid: 47). They are also all lacking, both in specificity 
of basic principles, and in elaboration of practical realisation of their ideas. 
We are left with some sketched-in detail of certain aspects of intelligence, 
but are not much further along in addressing issues raised by questioning 
I common usage of the word 'intelligence . 
From early to current research, key themes remain central in the study of 
intelligence and discussion of these claims constitutes the next four 
sections of this chapter. 
1. Intelligence is a capacity 
2. Intelligence is fixed and innate 
3. Intelligence is a singular entity ('g') 
4. Intelligence can be measured 
3.3 Claim 1: Intelliqence is a capacity 
Following Spearman and Galton are the ideas of Cyril Burt, who defined 
intelligence as 'innate, general cognitive ability' (1955: 162) and confirmed 
ceilings of ability as a central part of intelligence theory. 
The degree of intelligence with which any particular child is 
endowed is one of the most important factors determining 
his general efficiency all throughout life. In particular it sets 
an upper limit to what he can successfully perform, 
especially in the educational, vocational and intellectual 
fields. 
Op cit: 202 
White calls this particular interpretation of capacity the 'milk bottle model': 
We can only hold just so much intellectual substance. Some 
of us may be quart-size, others pint-size, others quarter-pint- 
size. 
2002: 89 (also 1974: 42, and 1997: 27) 
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This capacity model is prevalent in common usage, along with its 
implications of fixed limits to achievement. White argues against this, 
presenting alternative understandings of the term 'capacity', drawing on 
Aristotelian theory, clarifying different aspects of intelligence. 
We have, then, three concepts of intelligence: 
(i) as the capacity to form concepts 
(ii) as the acquired capacity to operate with concepts 
(iii) as the actualization, i. e. the correct application, 
of conceptual capacities mentioned under (ii) 
adapted from 1974: 41 
The use of the word 'capacity' here in no way implies the limits or ceilings 
integral to Galton and Burt's understanding. The meanings in the last two 
definitions are tied to learning and so are affected by opportunity and 
circumstance, but again, there is no ceiling in the sense of an individual 
being unable to acquire and apply a concept through an innate lack of 
ability. Capacity is used in the same way that we might use'power', and 
no statement is made as to the possibility of an eventual limit to this. If 
there were any limit on capacity, it would be no more or less that the limits 
of human possibility and would be the same for all people. This is a broad 
notion, as the limits of human possibility are linked to the uses humans 
make of the resources at their disposal. Access to technology has allowed 
previous boundaries to be continually surpassed; flight, instant global 
communication, and space travel, were all considered out of reach of 
human accomplishment. v' 
It could also be argued that limits are also suggested by the popular 
developmentalist notion of mental progression with its understanding that 
human minds develop in a way analogous to the development of plants, 
as an acorn grows into an oak. These theories reach back to the work of 
Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel and are echoed in the ideas of Piaget 
and now Gardner. White (2002: 70-77) notes that it is difficult to see 
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human mental development in these terms. An objective definition of the 
initial (acorn) state is elusive, as is the end-point of full maturity (the oak). 
Development is explained by growth being a sort of 'unfolding', both 
inevitable and natural, which is an insufficient explanation of how people 
learn. This implies limits to learning and mental growth. 
Galton's concept of ceiling is to do with individuals developing to different 
levels, limited by their intellectual capacity, which cannot be improved or 
increased. This has strong implications for the value of educational 
experience. White emphasises: 
I cannot stress too strongly the difference between this 
Galtonian concept of intelligence and the first of the 
'Aristotelian' senses. To say, in the Aristotelian way, that we 
have an innate capacity to acquire learned abilities does not 
imply that there is any upper limit, peculiar to the individual, 
on the abilities attainable. It does not imply an innate 
capacity in the milk bottle sense of 'capacity'. 
Op cit: 89 
He finds the Galtonian/Burtian ceiling notion both unverifiable and 
unfalsifiable. An Aristotelian understanding of capacity does not have such 
upper limits. The only limits are that of being human; we could not turn 
invisible, develop X-ray vision, or grow an extra physical dimension. This 
useful discussion of the Aristotelian ideas can be considered in the context 
of teachers talking about their pupils. Bearing in mind everyday uses of 
terms such as 'intelligence, 'potential' and 'limits of ability' helps us to 
understand how children are considered and consequently how they are 
treated. To return to White's description of 'three levels of intelligence, 
a) Biological aspect - the capacity to acquire capacities. 
Human beings and other animals are - nearly always - born 
with the ability to acquire concepts/flexible forms of 
behaviour as they grow up. They are intelligent creatures in 
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the way that filing cabinets and sausages are not. To say 
that human beings are intelligent is to say that they are 
constitutionally - genetically - equipped with the ability, or 
capacity, to acquire such skills as speaking, playing hockey, 
driving cars, planning holidays, doing algebra, and an 
unlimited host of things. 
lbid: 85 
The opposite of this quality is non-intelligence as shown by entities such 
as rocks, or paperclips. The capacity to acquire capacities is innate, and 
available to all sentient beings, but there is no comment on ceiling or 
individual variation accompanying the notion of possession of intelligence 
in this sense. When teachers talk of intelligence this is not the sense they 
are alluding to. Perhaps they may be distinguishing between the innate 
capacities of humans and other animals, for a specific purpose, but this is 
unlikely to be their meaning in talking about individual pupils. Where 
severe brain damage or disabilities exist, there may be some relevance, 
but there could still be possibilities of developing capacities (e. g. 
Feuerstein's work in Chapter 6). 
b) Learned capacity - acquiring skills and abilities. 
White uses the example of the non-driver: 
We are not saying that just because he has not learnt to 
drive he is stupid or a dimwit. His lack of intelligence is 
simply not possessing the skill in question. We all lack 
intelligence in this sense in a million and one ways. Children 
from deprived backgrounds often lack intelligence in areas 
where their more fortunate coevals are already adept. That 
is not at all to say they are 'thick'. 
lbid 
This capacity concerns the possession or non-possession of the skill in 
question. It is the capacity to do or perform an act, presuming the 
possession of the capacity to acquire capacities, (a), above. This is not 
what most teachers mean by the word 'intelligence'. For this they talk of 
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the possession or non-possession of skills. Teachers do not tend to 
describe children lacking particular skills as unintelligent. 
c) Appropriate application of the skill - not doing this 
would be acting stupidly 
We are all stupid from time to time[ ... 
]Stupidity consists in a 
lapse, a failure. We have the relevant conceptual 
abilities[ ... 
]but fail to apply them on a particular 
occasion. [ ... 
]Stupidity is not a personal quality on a par with 
vices such as meanness or intolerance. It is not an enduring 
feature of our personality, but a one-off or occasional failure 
to activate the know-how we possess. 
Op cit: 86 
White presents the distinction between acting stupidly and being stupid. 
He states: 
A stupid action is one where the agent fails in some way to 
apply relevant concepts. 
1974: 40 
Perhaps a distinction should or could be made between people who 
fail to apply appropriate concepts with more or less regularity. If 
someone only applies inappropriate concepts once a year, how 
does this differ from someone making these errors, say, three times 
a day? Having taught an idea or concept, teachers often set a task 
that requires students to put the learning into context. They judge 
children as more or less intelligent through observing their 
response to the set task. If a whole class fails to successfully 
complete a task, a teacher could look to themselves for an 
explanation, but if, for example, only one child habitually fails to 
apply the learning, teachers are likely to explain this as a lack of 
intelligence. 
Particularly relevant to the underachieving able is consideration of 
motivations for certain behaviour that could be perceived as stupid. 
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What initially appears as a lapse of correct concept application 
could be a deliberate action, with awareness of the obviously 
logical alternative. Without full understanding of motivating factors, 
a false judgement may be made. It could be that the agent is 
prohibited from acting as they would choose, and that they 
undertake action against their better judgement for overwhelmingly 
important reasons. 
It can be difficult to assess intelligence and stupidity from observing 
action without accounting for motivation. A teenager, for example, 
stupidly deciding to fail a test to avoid being teased by friends; a 
patient stupidly 'forgetting' to take their medicine to avoid using it 
quickly and burdening her family with further expense; a sibling 
stupidly failing to give a correct answer, in order to allow his brother 
the rare chance for parental praise. Certainly, the lack of 
medication or limiting of academic success could have lasting 
damage, but we are imposing our values on the decision, in which 
considering these aspects is more important than the protection of 
family or friendships, as perceived by the agents in question. 
In such cases the person in question is not acting stupidly by failing to 
apply obvious relevant concepts. Without intimate knowledge of motivation 
and an understanding of ultimate aims, we may not always be in a position 
to decide whether it would be correct to describe an act as intelligent or 
stupid. There is not always a stark dichotomy between intelligent and 
unintelligent acts as determined by an analysis of behaviour. 
So, what might teachers understand by the word 'intelligence'? Since the 
idea of fixed limits is difficult to reconcile with the experience of helping 
children confound expectations through careful, effective teaching, it is 
likely that many teachers would subscribe to the first of the Aristotelian 
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capacity ideas. Capacity notion (a), allows for all but the most severely 
disabled potentially to acquire certain skills. This is a useful way for 
teachers to conceptualise intelligence as it permits people a wide range of 
opportunities. 
However, teachers are faced with children who demonstrate variation in 
understanding, ease of learning and quality of performance and so are 
probably attracted to the ideas shared by Binet, Galton and Burt that 
concern the belief that it is possible to isolate and specify some of the 
factors that contribute to the individual intellectual functioning. Galton and 
Burt state that intelligence is fixed and general, whereas Binet has a more 
flexible understanding, more in line with contemporary views on the role of 
education. 
In terms of the capacity described by (b), those who work with children 
would be unlikely to dismiss a child as stupid if they have not yet been 
taught an idea or skill. They will use their experience and judgement, 
though, to decide whether they consider a child is learning a new skill or 
idea with ease or difficulty. This need not concern the speed of uptake or 
quality of directly related tasks, but could be more about the correct 
application of new concepts and integration of new ideas into existing 
mental structures. These are revealed through working together with 
children on problems and discussing new ideas. Teachers tend to 
describe children as intelligent when they demonstrate an easy 
engagement with new and challenging concepts. This is particularly the 
case in terms of describing the able child. In the literature aimed at 
teachers and through conferences, personal experience and internet 
networks, discussions about the nature of high ability often refer to high 
intelligence in this way. 
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The notion presented in (c) is also relevant to the school situation. 
Teachers want children to apply the correct concepts habitually and avoid 
the lapses describable as stupid acts. This can be supported by the 
inculcation of dispositions which can be considered as another aspect of 
intelligence. Dispositions, or habits, are tendencies and inclinations to 
behave, or act, in a certain way. They can be already discernible in an 
individual, or acquired, through practice, training or mediated support. 
Motivation and interest are closely bound up with achievement and will be 
reflected in approaches to tasks which can result in changes in measured 
ability. Recognising the importance of dispositional elements creates 
possibilities for success for more children, than trying to discern the 
ceilings and limits of capacities. Calling something a disposition means 
that the behaviour is habitual, part of the child's frame of mind, or 
temperament, and that skills, knowledge and concepts are habitually used 
correctly. 
Intelligence in terms of the appropriate application of skills is considered to 
be an intellectual virtue by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 6 Section 5). 
To be practically wise, rather than merely 'clever, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the quality of consideration of good consequences, and to 
care about such outcomes. Omitting this aspect of intelligence leaves only 
an impoverished and 'denuded notion of intelligence' (White, 2002: 96) 
that Aristotle referred to as mere 'cleverness I. 
Francis Schrag also distinguishes between ('innate') capacities and 
dispositions, calling them 'skills' and 'virtues'. 
A person may be clever without being thoughtful and vice- 
versa. In the first sense we commend something skill-like. In 
the second we commend something like a virtue or trait of 
character. 
1988: 8 
109 
He suggests that both skills and virtues can be fostered through the 
medium of the environment and the mediating presence of the facilitator, 
as noted by, for example, Plato and Rousseau. Schrag cites Dewey in 
support of both the direct teaching of skills and the inculcation of values, 
or virtues: 
The development within the young of the attitudes and 
dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life 
of a society cannot take place by direct conveyance of belief, 
emotions and knowledge. It takes place through the 
intermediary of the environment. 
Op cit: 1 1 
Schrag also makes a connection between philosophy and psychology, 
showing how both disciplines have impacted on the concept of 
intelligence. 
The effective thinker, whatever his or her level of 
intelligence, manifests certain character traits. In the 
philosophical tradition, following Aristotle, Aquinas and 
Dewey, these are thought of as virtues or habits. In 
contemporary psychological research these dispositions are 
studied primarily under the rubric of cognitive style. 
(Brodzinsky, 1985; Kogan, 1985) 
Op cit: 23-4 
Binet echoes the also emphasised concepts of practical wisdom, 
considering the core of intelligence to be: 
... judgement, otherwise called good sense, practical sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting one's self to circumstances. 
To judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these are 
the essential activities of intelligence. A person may be a 
moron or an imbecile if he is lacking in judgement; but with 
good judgement he can never be either. Indeed the rest of 
the intellectual faculties seem of little importance in 
comparison with judgement. 
Binet and Simon 1916, cited in Sternberg, 1990: 74-5 
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What matters to teachers in this discussion is helping children develop 
their thinking, as a way of translating cleverness into practical wisdom. 
Schrag states that he is concerned primarily with the development of 
virtues and considers 'the character trait of thoughtfulness to be the 
hallmark of a good thinker' (p14). He relies on Dewey to lend weight to his 
consideration of irrational thought and explains that this is explained by: 
... inclination rather than the absence of technique or ignorancej 
... ] These biases do not depend upon mental 
capacity or information available. [ ... ] Learning to be thoughtfu/ is not learning to perform a particular action nor is 
it acquiring a method of obtaining a particular result; it is 
developing a 'second nature'which transforms heart and 
mind. 
Op cit: 15 and 38 v". 
Intelligence is clearly a capacity in terms of Aristotle's model of being 
capable of developing other capacities and as the flexible adaptation of 
means to ends. The fact of individual differences is often taken to imply 
difference in capacity in a Burtian sense, but this is not necessarily the 
case. It could be more to do with motivation and propensities, or interests. 
Capacity to apply concepts correctly is complex to assess, as other 
motivations are factors in behaviour despite understanding of correct 
concepts. Lack of capacity caused by not having yet learnt a skill or idea is 
not a lack of intelligence. 
I think teachers consider a capacity model of intelligence to be about the 
ease with which children are able to comfortably learn new ideas and 
skills. They accept the notion that individual differences exist between 
pupils and that these may be partly affected by environmental influences, 
but can also have something to do with 'intelligence'. It is impossible to 
talk of intelligence without a focus on the disposition to apply known 
concepts and this involves an emphasis on aspects such as personality, 
attitude and motivation. I think that in teachers' understanding of 
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intelligence there exist some elements of both the capacity to learn, and 
the disposition to apply concepts correctly. 
3.4 Claim 2: Intelliqence is fixed and innate 
Viewing intelligence as fixed and innate had an enormous impact on social 
policy and educational structures, particularly from the 1940s up until the 
introduction of comprehensive schooling in 1965. Galton considered 'there 
is no escape from the conclusion that nature prevails enormously over 
nurture' (cited in Eysenck, 1998: 29) and more recently, this has been 
reiterated: 
The fact that intelligence test scores are often normally 
distributed in the same way as physical characteristics has 
been offered as evidence that intelligence is genetically 
determined (Jensen, 1980) 
Mayer, 2000: 523 
Describing people's intelligence as 'a single quality of a person with 
definite limits' (cited in Winch, 1990: 32) is ultimately simplistic, as 
demonstrated by Galton's analogy of intelligence to physical strength. It is 
criticised by Ryle, among others, as an inadequate definition of both 
strength and intelligence. Ryle asserts that it is impossible to provide a 
simple answer to questions of the nature of intelligence or of strength, and 
this is supported by Howe, 
Those who subscribe to intelligence theory reject the 
possibility that the mental capabilities tapped by an IQ test 
are simply acquired knowledge and learned skills. 
1997: 40 
The other problem with using a physical analogy for describing intelligence 
is, yet again, the issue of a ceiling or limit. As already noted, this is both 
unverifiable and unfalsifiable and therefore without meaning (White, 1974). 
The nature of intelligence, and indeed physical strength, is that it is not a 
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single quantity but instead a cluster of abilities and propensities to do 
more or less well, at certain activities. 
The traditional capacity notion can be illustrated with a pack of cards 
analogy, in which each of us is dealt a hand. Some people will receive a 
full house, or a smattering of aces, while others will be dealt a low scoring 
selection. We must also take into account how the hand is played, 
although there is a strong likelihood that a losing hand is so labelled from 
the outset of the game with limited room for manoeuvre. Howe presents 
evidence of changed IQ scores of individuals and indeed of whole nations, 
claiming to be 'badly denting' the traditional conception that there exists an 
underlying fixed inherent quality that can be called intelligence. 
Using Aristotelian understandings of intelligence, only the first sense can 
be described as innate; the capacity to acquire capacities, as to be 
intelligent in this way is part of what it means to be human. Other aspects 
are considered to be learnt. Burt goes much further stating that intellectual 
limits vary between individuals and are fixed. Burt was wrong to consider 
that an IQ score is a definitive description of intelligence as research has 
shown that individuals' measured intelligence scores can change. This 
demonstrates the importance of the learning environment, which needs 
further investigation. 
The notion of fixed limits is of particular importance in education because 
embracing the idea results in potentially writing off some pupils. However, 
teachers need to make judgements about matching tasks to pupils in 
order to facilitate their learning and this necessitates understanding the 
difference in pupils' propensities and apparent abilities. Teachers need to 
be prepared to revise judgements made about apparent abilities, allowing 
pupils a range of ways to express their learning and understanding. If 
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indeed there are limits to abilities that differ from child to child, these 
cannot be said to be definitively proven in the average school situation. 
This question is part of the broader nature-nurture issue, an old problem 
recently reframed, after criticism for being a false dichotomy and an 
ultimately spurious way of considering issues. In social psychology, 
criticisms from Bronfenbrenner emphasise the quality of family interactions 
and of society as more important than the extent of its influence (Bee, 
1998). 'What effect does interaction with the environment have on 
development? ' has replaced 'How far does the environment affect 
development? ' Similar points are raised by other theorists in the field of 
gifted education, for example, Freeman, in 1991. 
The fire has been rekindled somewhat by neurology and genetic science 
fanning its flames as techniques for examining DNA and brain activity 
become increasingly sophisticated. Plomin and co-workers have 
undertaken genetic studies resulting in identification of groups of genes 
that are together partly responsible for what we call intelligence. "" They 
recognise, though, that these can ultimately account for only a part of 
development. 
Individuals are not passive receivers of influences. They interact with their 
environment and this, in turn impacts on them. For example, a child with a 
rich vocabulary gleaned from a variety of well-educated role models may 
well seek out opportunities to converse with adults and others who 
respond positively to her use of language. Such experiences will serve to 
increase her vocabulary further. A child lacking such fluency may be 
confused by such conversations or disinclined to extend her range of 
discussion partners. She is not presented with widely-based speech 
patterns and her vocabulary remains impoverished. This 
does not prove, 
however, that she is incapable of acquiring and using a rich and varied 
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vocabulary. She may well have the potential to outstrip her more 
advantaged peers in terms of language use. It is just not correct to 
interpret the difference to be a direct result of genetic make up and 
limitation. It is speculation. The key point is that we can never be sure 
what limits we may have unless we can be certain we have compensated 
for every environmental variable. Eysenck confirms that: 
It must be clear even to the meanest intelligence that a 
debate over nature-nurture must be quite pointless; to 
produce anything, nature and nurture must co-operate. 
1998: 29 
White asks if causal factors can be quantified, citing an example of the 
origin of a warehouse fire, asking if the fire was to be attributed to the 
flammable material in the warehouse by 30 per cent and to the source of 
the first flame by 50 percent, etc (1974 : 48). 'x In trying to separate 
influences of nature and nurture, empirical twin studies have been 
undertaken. White considers the evidence: 
The claim that individual differences in IQ are largely 
determined by innate factors only makes sense, I believe, if 
it means that innate factors fix the upper limits of one's 
intellectual development while environmental factors operate 
only within this innately determined framework. [ ... ] Far from 
this twin research being able to show us that people have 
their own intellectual limits, it is clear, I think, that this 
assumption is built into the research itself. 
1974: 48 and 49 
Winch recognises the importance of hereditarian claims of twin studies 
(and IQ theory) but rejects them as 'essentially empirical rather than 
conceptual matters' (1990: 94). He and White note: 
an ideology legitimates a certain organisation of society 
because it provides a justification for the rise and 
maintenance of, for example, capitalism. 
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Winch, 1990: 95 
... the proposition that we all have innately determined upper intellectual limits has become the hub of a new ideological 
system. 
White, 1998: 32 
In the 1960s however, Burtian notions that had so informed policy, were 
upset by the dissenting voice of the Newsom Report ('Half Our Future', 
1963) declaring: 
Intellectual talent is not a fixed quantity with which we have 
to work, but a variable that can be modified by social policy 
and educational approaches. 
Benn and Chitty, 1999: 17 
Let me reiterate the meaninglessness of the 'limits' issue in this 
discussion. If intelligence is to do with attitude, motivation and personality 
traits, talk of 'limits' seems irrelevant. It is difficult to measure 
characteristics. Barrow exemplifies this by showing that trying to quantify 
or assess a person's vanity or happiness would be equally meaningless, 
supporting White's view that ideas of intelligence ceilings are both 
unverifiable and unfalsifiable and therefore an agnostic stance should be 
adopted (1974: 50). Later White admits: 
It is not clear to me when, if at all, one would be justified in 
concluding that a normal individual has reached his ceiling 
and that no further teaching efforts would be of any use. [ ... ] What is undeniable in the sense that it cannot be falsified is 
not necessarily undeniable in the sense that it must be true. 
1998: 30 and 32 
White is not saying that intelligence is limitless, just that it cannot be 
known whether or not it is. Let us assume for a moment that such a limit 
does indeed exist. The person charged with defining it would have an 
impossible task. It just could not be measured. How could a test be set? 
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Winch cites Ryle who points out: 'that a best performance is a best 
performance to date does not constitute it as a ceiling of ability' (1990: 33). 
It is clear that a more useful and realistic understanding of the nature of 
intelligence than a IQ based one, such as the'flexible adaptation of means 
to ends' (White, 1974) would be impossible to measure, or cap with an 
upper limit. A conception of intelligence that credited people with making 
use of their own resources would cause further problems. In school 
examinations, pupils are sometimes allowed to use texts and calculators 
in order to construct arguments and solve equations. Measurement of 
their ability incorporates how appropriately they use aids. The judgement 
of intelligence based on 'raw' achievements is difficult to interpret clearly in 
this context. What if a pupil devised an aid to a test that confounded the 
marking scheme? We have all heard the folk tales of gifted students 
passing their final exams by merely writing 'yes' to a rather obscurely 
framed question that was expected to be answered in long essay form. 
What do art and design testers make of the sometimes groundbreaking 
conceptual responses to set tasks? The enterprise of measurement 
becomes like trying to determine the extent of an ocean with a centimetre 
ruler or a set of bathroom scales. 
In order to determine a ceiling, there must be at least one other person 
functioning at a higher level, to undertake the measurement. How could 
this person then be measured? It is also impossible to define the moment 
at which someone would no longer benefit from any efforts to develop 
ideas or push their boundaries yet further. The next new tactic may be the 
one to get the idea across. White asks ' ... what could possibly 
falsify the 
proposition that we all have intellectual ceilings? ' (1998: 31) He asserts 
that Galtonian innate upper limits: 
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... cannot be empirical hypotheses and therefore subject- 
matter for scientific investigation. They are, rather, 
metaphysical speculations in a Kantian sense that they 
transcend the bounds of any possible experience. 
ibid 
Deciding about limits matters because teachers can unknowingly 'write 
children off' by telling them they have low limits. Faced with the job of 
determining the provision for a child who seems not to be functioning well 
within the ordinary school setting, teachers need to be sure they have 
understood pupils' actual abilities and this is difficult, partly because of the 
lack of precision in the field. Batteries of tests are often conducted in order 
to identify a child's potential and assign appropriate support. As these 
tests are founded on definitions and postulations parading as scientific 
certainties, trying to forecast success or failure through measured 
potential is not a useful practice. Individuals will be affected by trying to 
live up to or defy their label. There is no single right answer to questions of 
educational provision as noted by researchers into high ability suggesting 
definitions are more or less educationally useful, rather than simply right or 
wrong (Sternberg and Davidson, 1986; Gallagher, 1996; Porter, 1999). 
In order for provision to match needs, concepts of ability need careful 
consideration, but many psychologists seem to neglect to examine their 
theoretical bases. In an interesting paper examining the apparent rise of 
intelligence, Robert Howard (1999) searches for'real world evidence' of 
such a claim. He cites better health and diet, more education and 
environmental stimulation, increased out-breeding, test sophistication, 
smaller family size and then effects of growing up in a visual culture. He 
settles on chess as a key indicator of increasing intelligence, looking at the 
age and achievements of champions, but nowhere does he challenge the 
underlying notion that intelligence can be interpreted as a simple, single 
measurable quality. 
118 
He does concede that measured intelligence can be changed, though, 
unlike hereditarian arguments that suggest a quantity of intelligence, of 
raw material. Let us assume, for a moment, that intelligence equates with 
measurable IQ. If the Burtian concept was correct, there would be no way 
to increase the basic intelligence of any individual. You have what you are 
given, or endowed with, and it is how you make use of this capacity that 
determines whether or not you reach your potential, which is fixed. 
Empirical studies by pioneers such as Reuven Feuerstein (1980) certainly 
show how teaching can affect test scores and, as a result, ability. Children 
of low mental capacity, deemed unteachable, flourish under his care. 
Children with measured IQs of less than 70 have been taught to read, 
write and cope within society, with IQ increases of around 20 points, 
challenging assumptions of fixed ability. x 
This work has resonance with Ginsberg (1997) and Vygotsky (1978) 
whose emphasis on dynamic assessment provides an 'important 
incentive for revising the view of intelligence as a static skill' (Mayer, 
ibid: 524). This elasticity of intelligence was accepted by Binet, who: 
... argued against the 'brutal pessimism of those who believed intelligence to be unmalleable'. He advocated the 
use of techniques of mental orthopaedics designed to 
increase the intelligence of children. 
Brody ibid: 26 
Maybe it would be more accurate to say that abilities may have been 
added to someone's inventory. Whatever you call it, measurable ability 
can be altered by attention to the nature of tests and conditions under 
which they are taken. Scores on IQ tests are certainly not fixed. If, 
however, it is considered that intelligence is a Burtian / Galtonian capacity, 
it must be suggested that Feuerstein has found a way to give out more 
'raw material'. This is clearly ludicrous. Improvements in measured IQ in 
these cases are however undeniable and so the model of intelligence 
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must be re-examined in order to explain such changes. A more likely 
explanation for an increase in test scores would be to look at how the 
students make use of their abilities, taking process into consideration. In 
such a view, attitudes and motivation would be far more important than 
any kind of inherited capacity. Some factors could certainly be affected by 
an inspirational teacher or facilitator. 
It is wrong to characterise intelligence as a merely innate quality, but 
reasonable to understand that innate, genetically determined aspects of 
the self will indeed affect how we exhibit qualities grouped under the 
umbrella term 'intelligent behaviour'. Active interaction with the 
environment can expand or reduce opportunities and education is well 
placed to present possibilities and compensate for difficulties. Intelligence 
is not a predetermined, fixed entity, but rather a quality that has some 
continuity and some change over time in response to different stimuli, 
learning and experience. 
3.5 Claim 3: Intelliqence is a sinqle entity ('q') 
The theorist most associated with 'g' is Spearman whose two-factor theory 
stated that: 
... performance was 
determined by a general factor ('g'), a 
universal due to a person's intelligence, and a specific factor 
('s') due to a unique ability or activity related to a particular 
test. [ ... ] all branches of 
intellectual activity have in common 
one fundamental function. 
Embretson and Schmidt McCollam, 2000: 424 
The resonance of this theory can still be felt in the contemporary 
understandings of intelligence. Sternberg highlights continuing controversy 
by comparing two major symposia (1921 and 1986) in which psychologists 
were asked to define and discuss intelligence. The theme of intelligence 
as either a single concept, or to have manifold aspects 'continued to be of 
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concern, although no consensus existed in either symposium' (2000: 8) 
and this question is still an issue today. 
Spearman characterised 'g' as a fixed amount of 'mental energy that an 
individual can assign to different tasks at different times' (Davidson and 
Downing, op cit: 36). The way he describes aspects of the general ability is 
vague, and it has been criticised as perhaps meaningless as a result. 
Here, for example, is Winch, considering 'apprehension of reality', one of 
the mental powers identified by Spearman: 
The phrase 'to apprehend reality' suggests a fairly passive 
consciousness that receives data of varying strength through 
the sense organs, data that is then grasped and retained 
with varying degrees of tenacity. But what people actually do 
is not like that at all. 
1990: 33 
Winch then goes on to explain the complexities of various tasks, 
highlighting the reductive and insufficient concept of 'g. From a 
philosophical standpoint, the notion of 'g' as intelligence is woolly and 
incoherent. It is unclear whether it is a mental structure or some kind of 
process although either explanation needs to be contextualised as ability 
to perform a certain task, or as intelligence as directed to a specific 
activity. Psychologists also criticise early understandings of 'g' and 
Spearman was forced to clarify and revise his presentation of intelligence 
as merely a reaction to sensory input. This was considered insufficient by 
his detractors, particularly Binet, who felt intelligence was considerably 
more complex. 
Other psychologists have also questioned notions of a single view of 
intelligence (Thurstone, 1938; Guilford, 1960; Renzulli 1978; Taylor 1978; 
Sternberg 1997), but their response has mainly been to try and create a 
more accurate battery of sub-tests rather than consider the possibility that 
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the underlying theory is wrong. (This was until the influential work of 
Howard Gardner, 1983, who proposed a more radical, multiple 
reinterpretation of intelligence. ) 
It should be remembered that test conditions do not always replicate 
everyday life. Test items are designed to build a picture of how people 
behave under a range of circumstances and performing different 
controlled tasks. From this (rightly or wrongly), information is extrapolated 
about how people are likely to perform in normal circumstances. Certainly 
the most successful cross-cultural intelligence test, in terms of correlation 
with academic success in intellectual activities bears very little relation to 
what people do in their lives. This is Raven's Progressive Matrices, 1956, 
which consists of a series of three-by-three complex figures with missing 
elements to be completed from a given selection, which show very strong 
correlation with academic success (see Embretson and Schmidt 
McCollam, ibid: 429). 
But what of philosophy? Philosophers have paid little attention to 
intelligence theory in general. Ryle is an important thinker in this domain 
who does not want to separate a general, intellectual ability from the 
performance of tasks in general. He favours a polymorphous description, 
contending that: 
... the 
boxerY the surgeon, the poet and the salesman apply 
their special criteria in the performance of their special tasks 
they are appraised as clever, skilful, inspired or shrewd, 
for the ways in which they conduct these performances 
themselves. 
1949: 48 
Ryle uses intelligence as an adverb to describe performance, saying that 
activities can be performed intelligently or unintelligently and this view can 
be applied to any task, intellectual or otherwise. White supports this, 
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noting that the enormous range of human activity must be mirrored by the 
same range of types of human intelligence. This view would not endorse 
the notion of a singular, general approach: 
Intelligent action has to do with the flexible adaptation of 
means in the pursuit of one's goals and there are as many 
types of human intelligence as there are types of human 
goal. 
1998: 4x' 
The concept of intelligence as a processing ability does not necessarily 
contradict this entirely. It suggests that intelligence is synonymous with 
intellectual ability, but this does not preclude using forms of the word 
'intelligence' as adjectives or adverbs. 
What of the empirical data that 'proves' the existence of 'g'? Current 
viewpoints of psychologists are summarised: 
... in this field there is no longer any 
debate about the 
structure of human mental ability differences. A general 
factor emerges that accounts for about half of the individual 
differences among the scores for a group of people [ ... ] but this is not proven to represent a model of the organisation 
and compartments of the human brain. 
Deary, 2001: 15 
Criticisms of statistical methodology have dogged test data though, 
summarised here by Howe: 
The fact that it is possible to derive 'g' is no basis for 
concluding that 'g' must be either a physical quality or an 
entity that can be regarded as the source or cause of mental 
abilities. [ ... ] So we end up with a 
technique (factor analysis) 
that gives rise to a 'general' factor that may or may not 
represent a singular underlying entity, and then we are told 
that this general factor is correlated with IQ, and finally, that 
the latter (IQ) is its validation as a truly general factor! 
1990: 210-211 
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Howe considers it useful to think of aspects of intelligence rather than a 
single, all-encompassing model. This approach has given rise to subject 
domain models, typified by the 1972 Marland Report multi-faceted notion 
of high ability and the better-known work of Gardner. As many writers 
have noted, he was not the first to consider a multi-dimensional model, 
with even Binet's work focusing on different types of intellectual ability 
early in the twentieth century. Thurstone's multiple concept included a 
hierarchy incorporating 'gl, as did Vernon's understanding, in which the 
influence of education was taken into account. Guilford and Cattell opted 
for a taxonomy rather than a hierarchy, but these also included a notion of 
a general processing ability. These differ from Gardner's theory, in which 
the notion of intelligence as a simple 'thing-in-itself' is rejected, in favour of 
several distinct abilities. Gardner identifies at least seven: 
linguistic; log ical-mathematical; spatial; musical; bodily- 
kinaesthetic; interpersonal; intrapersonal. Gardner has 
recently added to this list with naturalist intelligence 
(knowledge of the living world); spiritual intelligence 
(cosmic issues) and existential intelligence (ultimate 
issues). 
Freeman, 1998: 5 
He describes these as 'relatively autonomous human competences' 
(1983: 8) admitting that they may at times be working harmoniously so 
'their autonomy may be invisible' (p. 9). This echoes the problems with 
other multidimensional models trying to reject the notion of 'g'. There is 
overlap between subject areas and many shared skills. This renders the 
separation of abilities somewhat contrived and sometimes so specific as 
to lose meaning. He has presented some neurological and empirical 
reasons for his choices, but research has been into exceptional people. 
They have either excelled, or are autistic savants, sufferers of brain 
damage and child prodigies, but I am not sure that these models are 
appropriate to generalise an understanding of the nature of intelligence(s), 
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as these people's lives are extraordinary and their experiences unusual. 
The validity of this research has been challenged (e. g. Howe 1990: 173) 
and as White points out: 
The seven or eight categories are too close to familiar 
curricular areas for comfort. They make curriculum planning 
deceptively easy. 
1998: 35 
Gardner's work dominates the field, with its popularity tending to 'obscure 
other modern theories of intelligence' such as Anderson (1992) and 
Sternberg (1988), (Corner, 2000: 227), but it would seem that the separate 
areas or intelligences do not serve to illuminate the nature of intelligence, 
merely to provide ways that may help teachers and researchers break 
down some of the issues to be considered. Despite the new categories 
that lean towards more practical forms, this similarity to the curriculum still 
exists and perhaps explains why the theory of multiple intelligences was 
warmly received by teachers. White describes the theory as 'decidedly 
flaky' (p93), lacking justifications for the criteria used to pick out the 
particular intelligences (p94). 
Gardner has modified the language used in his theory, shifting between 
apparent synonyms for 'intelligence ', such as 'talent' and 'ability ', which 
serves to confuse matters. Reflecting on difficulties with his theory, and 
showing how his objection to the use of 'intelligence' to differentiate 
intellectual tasks from others is more about the labelling of activities than 
the nature of the tasks, he muses: 
I am often asked whether an intelligence is the same thing 
as a talent or an ability. While I love to achieve conceptual 
clarity, I do not love terminological discussions because they 
are inconclusive or even counter-productive. I have no 
objection if one speaks about eight or nine talents or 
abilities, but I do object when an analyst calls some skills 
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(like language) intelligences and others (like music) 'mere' 
talents. All should be called either intelligences or talents; an 
unwarranted hierarchy between capacities must be avoided. 
1999: 83 
Howe agrees that it is difficult, or impossible, to make clear connections 
between some areas: 
... different abilities are in fact remarkably independent of one 
another, autonomous, and specific to the particular kinds of 
knowledge that the individual happens to possess. 
1990: 221 
Although Gardner's theory has had a significant impact on the world of 
education, many psychologists consider his ideas to be 'on the semi- 
popular fringes of scientific psychology' (Deary, ibid: 15). The positive 
correlation between the 'intelligences' are interpreted as evidence of a 
general mental ability and some are viewed as spurious, as they'are not 
normally considered to be mental abilities, i. e. not within man's cognitive 
sphere' (op cit). 
The most widely accepted notion of intelligence is a group definition, 
famously first appearing in the Wall Street Journal in 1994. Here is the 
1997 version: 
Intelligence is a very general mental capability, that among 
other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve 
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn 
quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book 
learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. 
Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for 
comprehending our surroundings -'catching on', 'making 
sense' of things, or 'figuring out'what to do. 
Gottfredson, 1997: 13 
This definition has not avoided the problems of previous attempts, with 
ambiguous unexplained language. There is also a mixture of a kind of 
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capaci y the ability to reason') together with more dispositional elements 
('figuring out what to do'). Intelligence also involves dispositions and 
subject knowledge at least. Correct application of concepts is implied in 
solving problems, but the emphasis is on a kind of passive understanding, 
rather than any kind of action. 
The concept of intelligence as a single notion is difficult though, partly for 
reasons of its history, partly for the lack of account of the range of human 
activity and partly for its implication of fixed limits. It is accompanied by 
more than a century of baggage and undeniable negative links to both IQ 
testing and policy decisions resulting in unfairness. Psychologists though, 
seem to have reached a consensus that a central cognitive ability exists 
and that this varies between individuals. What matters about this is how it 
reveals itself through observable performance and how it can be altered 
through interaction with the environment and education. Any genetic 
component will account only for part of people's performance. Most tasks 
require a combination of theoretical and practical applications and so if 
there is indeed a group of abilities such as intellectual ability, this will be 
insufficient to guarantee an assurance of success in any area. 
3.6 Claim 4: Intelligence can be measured 
From around 1860 when scientists began investigating intelligence 
in a biological way, there has been an on-going search for criteria 
used to measure intelligence. There has been little doubt 
expressed that it is impossible to quantify. Even Binet, who 
expressed a subtle and tentative notion, still considered that 
something could be calculated. In earlier sections above, both 
historical and contemporary evidence has been presented to 
demonstrate that, whether correct or incorrect, it is widely accepted 
that intelligence can be identified. Teachers have complex attitudes 
to IQ test scores. Although they may disregard scores to avoid 
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dismissing pupils as low in ability, they often rely on IQ to validate 
reasons for special provision. 
The emotive aspect of this story comes from the uses to which IQ test 
scores have been put over the years. As Binet forewarned, the scores 
became more important than the individual and when working as a Special 
Needs Coordinator (Senco), I found this to be true; no help was 
forthcoming until the child in question was firmly labelled by a 
psychologist. Like many, I am sceptical about attaching of a numerical 
value to ideas of intelligence, but in the field of gifted education this is a 
major tool in the kit-box for identifying the highly able. Since Terman's 
work in the 1930s, there has been an emphasis on collecting IQ scores 
and considering performance of identified subjects at school, even 
ascribing posthumous scores to the eminent. x" 
Galton founded a eugenics movement that resulted in enforced 
sterilisation of people with low ability and later developments saw IQ 
scores used to assign rank to the US army reinforcing stereotypical views 
about immigrants and calls for stricter rules to avoid 'propagation of 
defective strains' (Brody, 2000: 28). In the UK, testing has been 
commonplace in determining schooling provision since the 1940s. In the 
1990s the controversial work of Herrnstein and Murray brought the highly 
charged issue of race and intelligence into the arena once again. x... As 
White notices: 
Even after the demise of the eugenic project in post-Nazi 
times, the notion that children with very low lQs are 
somewhat less than fully human has stuck like a burr to the 
popular mind. 
1998: 87 
Evidently, some of the early pioneers of testing, in particular Binet, were 
trying to help children, especially those of low ability. Working before the 
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concept of IQ, Galton used his various test results for less laudable 
reasons and he was not alone. Let us put aside these obviously 
objectionable uses of IQ and consider whether Binet's aims of usefulness 
were successfully realised. 
To envisage an education system that does not use labels is almost 
impossible, though there is no problem with the idea of taking a 
measurement, if it is done accurately, giving data that is put to good use. 
There are, however, better ways than test scores to see how children are 
doing, or might do, at school and these involve working closely with the 
children themselves, considering the processes they use along with their 
interests and helping them to understand the way that personality factors 
such as determination and perseverance interact with their work. It is not 
clear that a number label can be of any help. Psychologists rarely suggest 
that IQ is enough to understand a child. Carroll is typical in making the 
point that: 
Intelligence or general ability scores should not be taken as 
direct measurements of hereditary intelligence. Rather they 
should be taken as measures of an individual's progress, at 
a given point in time and for whatever reasons (genetic or 
environmental), in attaining the full range of mental 
development that is possible in an advanced society. Over 
the years of childhood to young adulthood, mental ages 
report the relative rate of that progress as compared with 
that of persons of comparable chronological age, with an IQ 
of 100 supposedly representing the average rate. 
1997: 48 
The use of IQ scores is not the only problem, however; the tests 
themselves are riddled with widely discussed difficulties, such as test 
conditions, cultural difference and the test subject's background (see 
Appendix 111). Efforts have been made to produce culture fair measures 
and Raven's Matrices (op cit) have been found to cross a range of 
cultures very effectively, limiting bias as far as possible. Perhaps the most 
129 
relevant issue for the able is the setting of the test ceiling. Able pupils 
often burst through test ceilings by providing all the correct answers and 
then go beyond the limits of the test by adding an extra quality of flair, 
humour or comments that demonstrate other areas of their ability, but 
which are not'point scorers'. Psychologists argue that such 
demonstrations tell us little; pupils have failed to read instructions, that 
they wish to make some kind of anti-authoritarian point, but it seems to me 
that tests are not allowing pupils to express themselves appropriately. This 
is a failing of the test, not the candidate. IQ merely describes some mental 
abilities by evaluating the response to set tasks. 
Deary notes, 
... tests of mental abilities 
do not assess all important 
aspects of brain function, let alone all important human 
qualities. [ ... ] they do not measure personality, social 
adroitness, leadership, charisma, cool-headedness, altruism, 
or many other things that we value. But that [proper point] is 
not the same as saying they are useless. 
2001: 16 
Winch highlights and refutes the four major components of IQ theory 
(issues tackled in this chapter are noted in parentheses): 
1. IQ is a factor that underlies particular abilities. (3.5) 
2. IQ is a fixed potential for intellectual achievement. (3.4) 
3. IQ can be given a precise numerical value. (3.6) 
4. IQ is to a large degree inherited by children 
from their parents. (3.4) 
1990: 25 
While testing Of intelligence has been broadly criticised, there is generally 
agreement that some kind of predictive qualities can be discerned through 
examining IQ scores and it is certainly of use in breaking down 
approaches to tasks and isolating problems with factors such as auditory 
and visual discrimination. Whether or not one's conception of 
intelligence 
130 
concurs, collides or merely touches upon elements highlighted in the IQ 
test, it is clear that the predictive validity of academic achievement in a 
school context has a strong correlation, able to help teachers improve 
provision. 
If intelligence is considered as the flexible adaptation of means to ends, 
then creativity is implied as part of this process, as the variety of situations 
would demand a wide range of responses allowing for the exercise of 
imagination and judgement of appropriate action. Tests and checklists 
generally name flexibility as one of the constituent parts of creativity and 
highly creative people would be distinguished from others in their 
application of creative thought (Torrance, 1960). 
Various studies have considered the relationship between creativity and 
intelligence (Getzels and Jackson, 1980) and it has been noted that for 
success in some subjects, a certain amount of rule-bending is implied. In 
Urban's creativity test (1998), for example, extra points are available for 
'breaking boundaries' on what most people interpret as a framed drawing 
(assumed rather than stated). In a school situation such a response is 
unlikely to be rewarded; clear instructions in academic contexts lead 
children to believe that breaking a boundary would be unacceptable. To 
respond to a set task in a way that scores highly on the this test may 
displease a teacher, so perhaps a low score has less to do with lacking 
creativity than with a desire to do 'what is right'. Therefore a creative 
response could be considered less than intelligent by school standards, 
depending on criteria and circumstance. 
Creativity tests generally take the form of responding to a question that 
requires thinking beyond generally expected responses, such as the 1960 
test in which respondents were asked to suggest '100 uses for a brick' 
(Torrance, 1960). Answers were graded with reference to their'fluency, 
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flexibility, originality and the depth of possible elaboration'. More recent 
tests (e. g. Urban and Cropley, 1995), require a drawing response and are 
marked on highly subjective criteria such as 'showing humour'. Clearly 
what may elicit a chuckle from one person may leave another quite cold, 
raising the question of whether or not such emotions can be quantified 
and then translated into a score for ideas and unusual thinking. 
The claim that intelligence can be measured is qualified. Elements of the 
cluster of behaviours and mental acts we know as intelligence can indeed 
be appraised but this is insufficient to constitute a complete measurement 
of intelligence and used to decide issues such as school provision. IQ can 
be a very useful diagnostic tool, but must be handled with extreme care. 
3.7 Mv view of intelliqence 
It is impossible to present my own view in a vacuum. As I have 
shown, study of intelligence has always been accompanied by 
social issues and so I would first like to separate understanding of 
intelligence from the political and emotive aspects of the field. 
These have made it difficult to align oneself with any acceptance of 
individual difference, due to implications of ceilings and subsequent 
assignment of children to failure. Issues surrounding IQ, such as 
racism and maltreatment of the disabled have lent the area an 
understandably negative cast. 
There are three different ways of looking at how intelligence theory and 
societal issues have interacted (based on an idea in Sternberg, 2000: 12). 
The first is the old-fashioned notion that we are born with differing levels of 
intelligence meaning society must be structured so the able have power to 
rule the less able. This notion can be traced back to Platonic ideas of the 
philosopher-kings and linked to the Eugenics movement. An opposite view 
would state that we are all equal as humans and in terms of 
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compe encies, as suggested by Aristotle's concept of everyone having the 
capacity to acquire capacities. This allows for people to be substitutable, 
except for specialised skills. Such skills can, however, be learned by 
anyone, since we are all equal. 
The third view is that we have equal rights and opportunities, but different 
propensities and aptitudes (of the three, I have most sympathy for this 
view, expanded in the following chapter). Disadvantage should be 
compensated for and we should make every effort to allow people to 
demonstrate their abilities in whatever socially valued field they may lie. 
We should avail ourselves of opportunities by choice, rather than being 
forced into areas of study. I make no comment here about the importance 
of high ability in any particular area, nor about choices of society to 
financially reward, for example, star musicians over nurses. 
As with my definitions of high ability in the previous chapter, my 
stipulative definition of intelligence here focuses on intellectual 
learning. I consider other aspects of performance to be better 
described as skills, and suggest that what most people mean by 
'intelligence', is flexible cognitive engagement with abstract 
intellectual ideas. The adverbial use of 'intelligently' is synonymous 
with 'skilfully' in many cases. 
There is certainly individual difference in how people perform tasks 
as well as the ease with which they engage with intellectual ideas. 
That this difference can be explained by an underlying capacity is 
certainly conceivable, although the psychological 'proof'through 
testing is insufficient to support the claim. Too many variables exist 
to be able to confidently isolate 'g. Performance on groups of 
similar activities are obviously strongly correlated and this would 
suggest some transferability of ability to connected tasks. If these 
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connected tasks are all intellectual in nature, it would be coherent 
to talk of abilities that are general to the intellectual tasks. In 
schools, children who demonstrate easy engagement with abstract 
notions and 'academic' subjects are often labelled as highly able. 
This usually only happens when their performance demonstrates 
this comfortable engagement with difficult ideas. Children who 
easily engage with complex ideas, but fail to perform set tasks 
effectively can often be misunderstood as lacking ability. The 
definitions of high ability and intelligence I am presenting allow for 
these children to be considered intelligent, despite their poor 
performance. 
Teachers know that effective teaching and a positive environment 
can allow children to defy labels assigned through IQ testing. This 
of course, calls into question the value of any label that purports to 
describe a child as having an unchanging capacity to learn. Ability 
to perform tasks and undertake tests show that performance can 
indeed be altered. Any measurement of ability is no more than a 
snapshot of particular ability at a particular moment. Some aspects 
of ability may indeed remain constant over time, whilst others may 
change. Just because this may be true does not mean that IQ is an 
accurate measure of lifetime ability. 
Origins of ability are likely to be partly genetic and partly 
environmental, but the interaction of the two is the most important 
factor, as neither can guarantee success, nor should the origin of 
ability (whatever it may be) prejudice education providers to favour 
or deny an individual. 
It is not objectionable to postulate and accept that individuals have 
different, strengths and perhaps potential(s) in all areas. These 
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could include some kind of capacity/group of capacities, or some 
kind of disposition/groups of dispositions. It is neither falsifiable nor 
verifiable to suggest that people have upper limits that mean that 
some peoples' abilities are somehow lesser than others. It would, 
however, be objectionable to suggest that people should be defined 
and limited by their apparent levels of ability, especially if these are 
surmised from a snapshot assessment, such as the IQ test, taken 
at an apparently critical moment in their development. 
Howe notes: 
Some individuals acquire ability more smoothly and 
effortlessly than ordinary people[ ... ] Differences between 
people and in the ease in which a particular skill is acquired 
may be caused by any number of contributing factors. These 
include various motivational and personality influences as 
well as previous learning experiences that equip a person 
with knowledge, attitudes, skills and self-confidence. 
2000: 9 
My stipulative definition of intelligence is as the term used to describe an 
individual's intellectual ability, in particular the propensity to engage with 
intellectual ideas. Dispositional elements deeply affect learning and these 
seem to be dependent in part on innate personal characteristics. Neither 
the propensity nor the dispositional aspects are fixed; both are open to 
change through interaction with people and the environment. Intelligence 
tends to indicate the ease with which people are able to learn, 
notwithstanding problems that may affect learning such as learning 
difficulties, emotional problems or disabilities. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been two-fold. The primary aim has been 
to clarify some of the terminology and confusion accompanying the term 
'intelligence 1, allowing me to present my own definition, particularly linked 
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to the definition of high ability already presented. The other main purpose 
has been to demonstrate the political complexities of the area. This 
atmosphere of emotion and contention soaks the area of intelligence, high 
ability and provision for the highly able, but is rarely confronted in 
discussions in these areas. I have shown the extent of these issues. 
Central to the intelligence debate is a series of notions that are commonly 
held and rarely examined. Intelligence is a construct applied to people 
based on a cluster of factors, the characteristics of which are extrapolated 
by observing their behaviours within their particular contexts. We infer 
intelligence from this. Internal, or mental activities cannot be seen, only 
inferred. This description does not tell us much about the nature of the 
concept we generally mean when we talk about intelligence, however. 
Commonly held views about intelligence are linked to the history of 
psychometrics and have influenced both educational policy and widely 
accepted views of how we think and learn. Older, single, generalisable 
capacity notions have been challenged, in recent years, by the more 
inclusive notions of multiple abilities, and by upsetting the long held 
dominance of subject-based hierarchical views and the highly emotive 
concept of IQ. The MI perspective has helped to break down older views 
of intelligence, making the concept more inclusive, rejecting the 
dominance of traditionally accepted academic and hierarchical subjects. 
People are accepting of the Gardnerian concept that being adept in one 
area constitutes an 'intelligence' that is just as valid as any other area. 
However, intelligence is also inextricably bound up with thinking, which is 
a private mental act. 
The reaction against the notion of 'g' led to the rejection of any concept of 
central aspects of what we talk of as intelligence. Judging intelligence 
through discerning appropriate behaviour does not tell the whole story. 
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Sometimes, apparently unintelligent actions have intentional and 
reasonable grounds, but are misconstrued. Values often blur ideas of 
intelligence. Saying that someone is intellectually able is no more 
contentious than saying they are good at playing the tuba, or preparing a 
salad. Saying, however, that someone would never be capable of x or y is 
more problematic. 
It is important to have an understanding of intelligence to support any 
concept of high ability and my intention has been to clarify terms being 
used. I have located my understanding of intelligence and high ability in 
the arena of intellectual activity. Having established the target group, I 
need now to argue in favour of supporting them with provision. Before 
saying anything about the nature of such provision (Part Three), I must 
show how they merit support, which is the task of the next chapter, which 
constitutes Part Two. 
' There are rare well-publicised cases of students suing schools and colleges for failing 
to identify learning difficulties, and having instead disallowed exam entrance with the 
Justification that a pupil did not have the ability to pass. 
"A spate of broadsheet newspaper articles in August 2002 (Independent, Times 
Educational Supplement, Guardian, Telegraph) called for USA-style entrance 
examinations. Other articles noted around the time of national examination results show 
this to be an issue that continues to bubble under in the educational press and careers 
advice columns. 
iii For an excellent exposition of these different views, see Sternberg's 'Metaphors of 
Mind'(1990) in which key theories are grouped by metaphor and explored, highlighting 
significant similarities and differences. 
'v In this paper, Howe disputes the three commonly held views of intelligence being fixed, 
directly inherited and that accomplishment depends on possession of innate gifts. 
v Information in this section is gleaned from a wide range of sources, some of which are 
unknown. Direct quotations are referenced and key texts are Sternberg, 2000, in 
particular Brody, ppl6-33. 
v' This also connects with the Kantian idea, as expressed in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
that limits are only equal to the bounds of possible experience. Leaving our universe 
would therefore be beyond our limits. 
v" Schrag then goes on to note how Socrates considered the importance of environment 
in developing dispositions (ibid: 38). 
Viii Plomin has been involved in a series of important studies that have some influence on 
gifted education. The work is predominantly in the field of neurosicence, however and 
without spending significant wordage on this field, it is difficult to do justice to his 
contribution. Key relevant issues are the 1990 studies of critical phases in development, 
his emphasis on the genetic aspect of development (1999), and an emphasis on the 
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genetics of cognitive abilities (1998). For a clear and useful summary of recent 
developments in neurology, see Challoner, 1999. 
ix Hebb says ' to ask how much heredity contributes to intelligence is like asking how 
much the width of a field contributes to its area', cited in Eysenck, 1962. 
x 'Except in the most severe instances of genetic and organic impairment the human 
organism is open to modifiability at all ages and stages of development. ' (Feuerstein et al 
1980: 9) 
A See also R. S. Peters and his definition concerning adaptation. 
Xii Estimations of early intelligence of the eminent were made by comparing their 
childhood achievements with those of contemporary children from whom test norms had 
been derived (Radford 1990: 37). Research has shown that the IQ of JS Mill was around 
190-200 and that others in that range would include Pascal, Voltaire, Coleridge and 
Schelling. Musicians and artists are measured at around 145, writers at 160, soldiers at 
125, scientists at 155. Philosophers come in at 170. 
Xiii Carroll (1997: 47), reappraises Herrnstein and Murray's data in his 1997 paper and like 
many of his colleagues he comes to different conclusions. 
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Part Two. 
What it is fair to do for able children 
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Chapter 4 What it is fair to do for highly able children 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a morally defensible position for provision for the 
highly able. I argue that able pupils are entitled to be challenged and 
stimulated by their statutory schooling, even if this requires provision 
beyond the basic curriculum. I explain my argument briefly in this 
introduction, and show how my view differs from the more commonly 
expressed alternatives. I also raise some of the difficulties expanded later 
in the chapter. 
Previous chapters have shown the complexities of trying to describe the 
able pupil. This entails rejecting simplistic definitions that equate ability 
with achievement, taking instead a non-traditional view of ability, allowing 
for the inclusion of highly able children with special educational needs and 
those who may not show their abilities in conventional ways. Once high 
ability is framed in this way, making an argument to support these 
underachieving pupils is not particularly controversial, as teachers 
obviously want to help children with easily recognisable individual needs. 
Provision is not necessarily contested, but it is still unusual to see anything 
but an achievement-orientated focus, as demonstrated by the relative 
lateness with which the government strategy has begun to recognise the 
needs of underachieving able pupils. 
When children have special educational needs or cultural disadvantage, 
provision is compensatory, a more comfortable notion than extra funds for 
the already privileged. Creating an argument for able children without 
problems is clearly going to be more difficult. Research (in the USA in 
particular) continues to demonstrate 'gifted education' programmes are 
dominated by children already enjoying social advantage and familial 
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support. In recent decades, governments and educationists have 
increasingly focused on minority groups and the underprivileged (although 
the underachieving able pupil has rarely fallen into this category). This has 
meant, quite appropriately, that less attention has been directed to the 
development of the able achiever. It is my task to find reasons for 
providing for able pupils without any specific needs, as well as 
underachievers, making a defensible argument for their support. 
This is difficult because provision for the able implies that teachers will be 
deciding that some pupils are 'superior' to their peers and that those 
excluded from special activities are less important. Schooling is striving to 
redress unfairness, allowing people to do their best, breaking down 
barriers to success. Where there is no need for compensation for 
disadvantage or any type of difficulty, provision for the able seems only to 
serve as the creation of an elite group, which is abhorrent to most 
teachers. Whilst other pupils are fighting for scarce resources, provision 
for the able is seen as at least an unnecessary luxury and at worst a 
terrible tactic, increasing social division and elitism. 
These commonly held views are challenged in this chapter. I have first to 
explain the link between understandings of elitism and its application to 
provision for the able. The usual arguments for gifted education are 
problematic. They tend to draw on premises that education should be 
elitist, with more resources directed at the able because they are more 
deserving. In exploring elitism, it soon becomes clear that there are a 
range of meanings, some of which are associated with exclusion and 
exclusivity, which is the reverse of what most schools are quite rightly 
striving to attain. Because of their educated parents and social and 
cultural advantage, provision for the privileged able is an objectionable 
use of limited educational resources, responsible for perpetuating a kind of 
social elitism. 
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But this definition of elitism is not applicable to provision for the able where 
such provision is designed to meet individual needs. An understanding of 
elitism as high quality, or the best of something, is a less objectionable 
notion. If children are capable of extremely high levels of attainment, 
outstripping standards that usually count for excellence amongst their 
peers, this kind of elitism could have a place in schooling. With this sense 
of elitism there is no question of inclusion or exclusion, just of an 
education planned to meet requirements for flourishing, in response to 
pupils' interests and motivations. 
Encouraging children to achieve excellence must be done for good 
reason, however. Promoting excellence for its own sake is not suitable, 
especially when this takes away from children who are failing to meet 
even basic levels of attainment. Excellence in order to improve society 
through enhancing efficiency and maximising economic growth could be 
more acceptable, but rewards are not guaranteed and measuring the 
efficacy of strategies is problematic. Striving for excellence for the sake of 
personal well-being could perhaps be considered appropriate, but there 
must always be a balance with other pupils. Directing resources at a 
select few at the expense of many others will certainly not result in well- 
being for the deprived group and it is also possible that the favoured group 
may be unable to enjoy the advantage gleaned from the fruits of their 
labour and ability, knowing that others are suffering. 
Instrumental aspects of education are key in arguments against additional 
provision for the able; they do not need anything extra as they are likely to 
benefit from education anyway. However, rather than considering the 
instrumental aspects of education, I think it necessary to look at the 
experience of the able child in school. In this sense, arguments about 
social unfairness are irrelevant to my account of provision for the highly 
142 
able. My focus is on the school experience, not on projected career 
development and future benefits. 
It is not the fault of schools that societal distribution is unfair and that the 
playing field is uneven for pupils before, during and after their schooling 
experience. Children should be supported and helped whatever their 
background and the school's role is to challenge and stimulate their pupils 
as they learn. What is of concern is encouraging pupils to do all they can 
to fulfil their potential during their time in school. Actual and potential 
ability should be the starting point for school provision, not the pupil's 
background, nor, incidentally, the origin of abilities, whether socially or 
genetically determined. A pupil performing significantly better than peers, 
or with that potential, needs stimulation and challenge at an appropriate 
level, whatever their background. 
High ability brings people advantage through no merit of their own. 
Questions of desert are unavoidable and effort expended by pupils will 
affect teachers' responses to suggested provision. Where they are unable 
to make the most of their ability, they should be given appropriate support 
to overcome obstacles to their development. This is part of their 
flourishing. Even able children who are not beset with problems should be 
entitled to provision, but redirecting funds to meet their needs may well be 
outweighed by reasons of social justice. I would certainly, unlike the 
government, put the needs of the disadvantaged able above the 'ordinary 
able'. In discussing this, I consider the notion of the meritocratic ideal and 
how this 'talent times effort' equation may affect provision. 
Fairness of provision is explicitly discussed, with attention to different 
relevant concepts of equality in education. Perhaps education should be 
characterised by equality, whether of resources, opportunity or outcome. 
Providing for the able will be inegalitarian in several ways but I argue that 
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this may not matter. What does matter is meeting the needs of children. 
Equality of resources will not allow education to adopt a compensatory 
role, as it should if it is to meet individual needs. Equality of outcome may 
set limits on achievement, and equality of opportunity could be impossible 
to achieve if the able with aptitudes in a broad range of subjects are 
allowed to develop in all areas. I have demonstrated that the highly able 
are not a homogeneous group, and will therefore have complex 
requirements. This implies a range of educational responses, matched to 
pupils' motivations and interests. I argue that it is more important to meet 
children's needs and entitlements than to be concerned about equality for 
its own sake. The aspect of equality I do feel to be important for schools is 
the value of the experience of schooling and the quality of cognitive 
challenge for pupils. I call this 'equality of challenge'. 
Before explaining my positive thesis in more detail, I consider some of the 
commonly expressed justifications for provision for the highly able. As 
already noted, I find the elitist 'excellence for its own sake' argument 
inappropriate. Some other arguments are empirical questions with 
insufficient research and evidence, such as the proposition that support for 
the highly able will necessarily lead to a general improvement in standards 
for all. There are only tenuous conclusions to be drawn from the 
contention that activities for the highly able will result in benefits for society 
through more and better economic and social goods. The argument that 
all children need an education beyond the bare minimum is relevant, of 
course, to all pupils, not just the able, but it is unclear what should be put 
in and left out of this basic education, making it difficult to decide what 
counts as extra and what should be mandatory. 
All children should be provided with an enabling education with sufficient 
resources to allow the development of their talents to a high level, 
particularly when there is a significant discrepancy between their potential 
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and their performance. This is true even where potential achievement 
exceeds expected requirements. 
This chapter constitutes a discussion of political and policy issues 
pertinent to education for the highly able and the overriding matter both in 
literature and in practice is the unresolved tension between the 
contradictory dual educational aims of excellence and equity. While this 
thesis is written from a UK-based perspective, many of the issues raised 
have currency for a broader context. As these matters have to be 
addressed by all countries, it is both relevant and illuminating to examine 
the different responses and discern useful general principles or 
frameworks. To this end, the chapter now moves on to an examination of 
global approaches to education for the highly able (4.1.0 and 4.1.1). 
4.1.0 The 
_qlobal context 
Despite wide differences between educational systems and cultures, there 
is a consensus that some pupils seem to be more able learners than their 
peers, or seem to have a greater potential for achieving in school-based 
activities. Most countries consider this can contribute to their development 
and growth, if they do what they can to ensure the potential is translated 
into achievement. They therefore strive to make appropriate provision, 
while retaining a sense of fairness, particularly in the distribution of 
education resources and allocation of limited funds. There is no country 
for which funding is unproblematic. All the issues of identification and 
provision mentioned so far are magnified when the problem is expanded 
into a global arena. ' 
Contrasting cultural perspectives of 'giftedness' and policy-making for the 
able from a range of countries brings to light complexities of 
understanding justice and fairness infrequently made explicit in the 
literature and research. Sure enough, practices and policies vary, along 
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with underpinning values and this is all illustrated by competing 
understandings of the origins and nature of giftedness and of diverse 
provision. 
... modern cultures tend to believe that unusual abilities are the result of heredity, environment, individual effort, or some 
combination of these. Which of the three receives the 
greatest emphasis in a particular culture can have a 
dramatic impact on gifted education. 
Moon and Rosselli, 2000: 501 
Examples presented in the literature are difficult to summarise 
without falling into a simplistic exposition of views and reinforcing 
stereotypes. So, it is not intended in any way that these short 
sketches should serve as a thorough explanation of ideas; the aim 
is merely to highlight contrasts. For example: 
In the US and Canada, a prevailing cultural belief is that 
individual differences in abilities are largely the result of 
natural endowments. 
ibid 
In Canada provision is 'inconsistent, unsystematic and based on 
practitioner enthusiasm', organised by individual states or local education 
services (Leroux, 2000: 695-6). In the USA, the equity-excellence 
pendulum has driven research and provision with a recent focus on finding 
hidden talent within disadvantaged communities which are viewed as a 
'major untapped resource'. The current jumble of provision has some 
admirable aspects and the US leads the world in research in this field, but 
the lack of cohesion results in a 'laissez-faire' approach (Gallagher, 
2000: 691). Australia and New Zealand are interesting cases where 
egalitarian concerns have overridden the needs of the able for some 
years. As a result of reviewing the poor performance of minority groups, 
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schools tried to redress the balance, particularly from the 1950s to the 
1980s. 
In its starkest form, the issue was seen in terms of 
alternatives: education could concentrate on those with 
special needs (the disadvantaged) or those with special 
abilities. [ ... ] the New Zealand Education Act of 1989 decreed that 'equity objectives shall underpin all activities within the 
school'. There were moves to downplay the concept of 
giftedness as such and use different terminology highly 
able, or children with special abilities. 
Op cit: 780-1 
In most developed countries, gifted education is tainted with an 
inescapable hangover from links with elitism and exclusivity. Modern 
approaches have equality at their core, as part of the social efficiency 
argument encouraging all members of society to reach their potential in a 
range of activities, but public justification for policy is typically rather 
vague. Different players in government may have a range of reasons for 
supporting particular policies, but there is rarely coherent public 
explanation of the aims in question. This is the case even in the field- 
leading countries with more mature policies. In the USA, 'poor and 
minority students are disproportionately excluded from programs for the 
gifted' (Kornhaber, 1999), which underscores the difficulty in realising 
aims, due to issues of wealth distribution. The same problems arise in the 
UK, where parents who can afford to, may move home to take advantage 
of publicly funded education that best suits their needs. It is also apparent 
in the explosion of demand for private tutors in areas where 'superior' 
schooling (defined through measured academic success as reported in 
league tables) is accessible through passing examinations. In Australia 
and New Zealand, some states have found their drive for equity 
incompatible with the success of programmes for the previously 
disadvantaged able pupil. Teachers report that they are unable to continue 
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programmes as inequality is being created by allowing the more able to 
succeed (Benbow and Stanley, 1997). 
This contradiction is also seen in other ways, where some abilities are 
considered as fair opportunities for investment, while others are viewed as 
elite. Gross compares how extra funding for sporting prowess is often 
considered more acceptable than extra funding for academic areas: 
Both nations (USA and Australia) abhor racial, social, and 
religious bias. ... yet we do hold a pervasive, insidious bias 
when it comes to talent development. All gifts are equal, we 
seem to say, but some gifts are more equal than others. ... Our bias becomes apparent, however, when the children's 
precocity is sited in the cognitive domain. 
Gross, 1999: 3 
Myriad articles lament the refusal of leaders and administrators, in the 
name of equality, to differentiate exceptional students (e. g. Lloyd, 1996) 
and such concerns are seen in a variety of different cultures, including the 
Philippines and Korea. 
Democratic societies, whether long established or newly 
forming, often have reservations about special programmes 
that meet the needs of only a few - particularly when those 
programmes expand the gifts of the already talented 
individuals. However, in the future, as educational strategies 
and programmes are refined, the issue will not be equity 
versus excellence, but equal opportunities for all students to 
achieve excellence in their special talents. 
Wollam, 1992: 67 
In most Asian countries, individual differences are accounted for through 
effort, with an emphasis on 'teacher skill and pupil diligence), while in the 
Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore, some family values forbid differential 
treatment of siblings as this is seen to be unfair. Consequently, highly able 
children are often denied extra-curricular activities unless their siblings are 
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also involved, even if one child has no particular aptitude or desire for 
something that is wished for and easily accomplished by the other child. 
Some countries develop programmes with aims of economic development 
and of maximising the nation's human resources. Underlying principles 
suggest the populace is governed 'on the basis of employing the talented' 
and a 'societal tendency to value intellectuals and the wise' (Wu, Cho and 
Munandar, 2000: 775). 
'Bitter experiences with social elitism' (op cit) have led to a strongly 
egalitarian policy in Japan, where 'gifted education has become almost a 
taboo subject within Japanese society' (p768). There have been some 
recent moves to cater for older students, but nothing is available for the 
younger pupil. 
This attitude is rooted in a belief that ability is not inherent, 
but rather the result of practice and hard work, even at the 
youngestage. [ ... ] Japanese people believe that the individual differences, even at the fetus stage are influenced 
by the environment and one's efforts rather than by innate, 
stable and fixed characteristics. Therefore, they believe that 
the government should not enhance individual differences by 
intentionally providing special programs for those who are 
already doing well. 
p769 
This has resulted in an egalitarian provision pattern similar to the 
Nordic model that defines Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and, to a 
lesser extent, Finland. Ironically, similarities in provision have very 
different roots. Japan is characterised by the 'propensity for 
embracing and awarding individual excellence' whilst the 
Scandinavian ideal is of inter-dependence and 'reluctance to 
reward or promote policies or actions that would cause some 
individuals to excel more than others' (Persson et al, 2000: 718) 
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Nordic provision is exceptionally egalitarian and it is even considered 
improper to exhibit pride of self. Schooling and society reinforce the sense 
that no one is 'special,. ii 
Swedes are ambivalent about their'stars' [ ... ] whether in sports, show business, or culture. Successes may be 
admired, but their exclusiveness and out-of-the-ordinary 
achievements often give rise to envy and therefore to 
malicious pleasure when the stars'fall'. The high value 
awarded to sameness makes all personal success 
problematic. 
Daun, 1994, cited in Persson et al, op cit: 719 
In some Eastern European countries during the Communist period there 
was a denial of the existence of genetic variation, which acted as a barrier 
to the development of gifted education programmes, for example in 
Poland. Similar issues arose in Russia and the search for the talented 
consists of competitions now harnessed to help build profiles for entry into 
higher education rather than coercion into an identified field of potential 
excellence (Grigorenko, 2000: 739) for the 'enhancement of national 
honour' (Moon and Rosselli, ibid: 502). In China, psychologists use the 
term 'supernormal' to describe the able (since 1978). It conflates two key 
concepts in gifted education in China: the statistical meaning of being 
'relatively superior to most normal children' and the role of God-given 
talent. 'Gifted' in Chinese'tian cai' means the God's bestowal upon mani 
(Shi and Zha, 2000: 758). 
In developing countries, policies have not been cultivated because of 
other pressing needs, but models now being adopted generally follow the 
US/Australian/New Zealand style. They reject European ideas, as these 
are rooted in a performance-based understanding of high ability and linked 
very closely to a traditional formal schooling system with a long history of 
perpetuating class divisions. Historical inequity, colonial rules, political 
struggles, civil unrest and lack of funding have dominated educational 
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development in Africa and Latin America over the last century and the 
notion of singling out a small group for special treatment is reminiscent of 
elitist practices of the past (Taylor and Kokot, 2000: 803). There are also 
cultural understandings of the individual, family and society that affect the 
development of differentiated education (also in Maori culture, where 
social and leadership skills are more important than academic 
achievement). In Africa, for example, the concept of 'ujamaa' meaning 
family, or togetherness represents: 
... a call 
for communal co-responsibility towards the 
upliftment of those in society who, in some or other respect, 
have remained behind. 
Op cit: 801 
Misconceptions about the able are rife in Central and South America, 
apart from Cuba, where differentiated curricula have been in place since 
1991. For the most part, however: 
... a strong prejudice is firmly rooted in popular and teachers' thinking that any differentiated practice with the gifted 
threaten equity and democratic principles of education. 
Soriano de Alencar et al, 2000: 823 
It is commonly considered that able pupils need no instruction as high 
ability will be clearly evident in every sphere. High ability is equated with 
high accomplishment and it is thought that social and emotional troubles 
are inevitable (op cit: 823-4). 
In every country, fairness is controversial. The examples demonstrate that 
the issue cannot be overstated and that cultural factors affect ideas of high 
ability. In sum (and rather baldly dichotomised): 
On the one side, it seems, stand critics who equal talent- 
selection to creating a socially privileged societal stratum 
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potentially beyond democratic principles. On the other side, 
stand proponents arguing the democratic rights of children to 
develop to their full potential. 
Persson et al, op cit: 703 
4.1.1 The UK and other European countries 
In the UK, policy is still in its infancy and current discussion is rather 
dominated by political correctness. The normative percentage- 
based definition of high ability seems inadequate and gifted 
education is inseparable from issues of selective schooling and 
exclusivity. 
Recognising and nurturing high ability has, in a sense, been 
an integral part of English society for a long time. Interest in 
high ability, however, has been largely class-bound, and has 
become a part of the sometimes conflicting interests of the 
higher and lower strata of English society. 
lbid: 723 
As explained in Chapter 2, high ability is not recognised in special needs 
legislation and the most vociferous campaigners for education for gifted 
education have been parents' groups. 
Like other European states (e. g. France and Germany), there is separate 
school provision for different pupils and geography makes all the 
difference to the kind of education a pupil is likely to receive. In the UK, 
there are even wholly different systems (comprehensive, selective, 
independent, public), with resulting inflexibility making it complex to pass 
between schools and systems in order to take advantage of the most 
appropriate provision (Rudnitski, 2000: 728). Despite this range of 
provision, it is still a battle to create provision specifically for the able. 
Due to the dominance of political egalitarian conviction, as in 
the Scandinavian countries and former Communist Europe, 
resistance to focus on gifted education as a separate issue 
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in the English school system - irrespective of the existence 
of traditional elite schools - has been formidable. 
Op cit: 723 
Having set the scene, I shall now consider arguments against 
providing for the able, followed by arguments in favour. 
4.2.0 The usual suspects: common arguments aqainst providinq 
for the highly able. Arqument 1: Provision for the hiqhly able is elitist 
As illustrated in the previous sections, elitism pervades discussions of high 
ability provision issues all around the world. In the UK, the government 
admits confusion over this issue, with New Labour blaming the'Old Left' 
for the muddle: 
We have always wanted to make opportunity open to all, to 
allow people to progress and improve themselves by merit 
and hard-work, and to tear down the barriers that prevented 
the disadvantaged from making a better life for themselves. 
But we made a mistake. In our determination to open up 
opportunity to the whole of society, we confused elitism with 
excellence. [ ... ] We were embarrassed 
to celebrate 
excellence, for fear we would be taken for celebrating the 
elite. It went further. There were those who thought that the 
highest achievers could take care of themselves and our 
efforts should be put into those who were under-performing. 
We thought there was a trade-off between tackling 
underachievement and promoting excellence - we created 
our own set of illusionary taboos. It is time to break them. 
Morris, May 02"' 
The government 'Gifted and Talented' strategy is part of the Excellence in 
Cities (EiC) initiative, where achievement (in city schools) has been 
celebrated. Four years into the scheme, underachieving pupils are being 
taken into account for the first time and so it seems the focus so far has 
been on high achievers; an elite group? 
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People are more aware of societal inequality now than ever before. The 
media bring images and words telling stories of how people in their own 
and other countries cope with difficult lives, and international travel has 
allowed people (at least from wealthy nations) the opportunities of seeing 
these struggles for themselves. People seem naturally averse to elitism, if 
it is synonymous with unfairness. Two different meanings of the term 
elitism are noted in in Winch and Gingell's philosophical dictionary 
(1999: 76): 
1) Some students will do consistently better [ ... ] than other students. They will form an elite with regard to this subject matter. 
2) A sense in which only a very narrow range of abilities are 
considered to be educationally worthy and are therefore specially 
catered for in our education system. 
The first definition is about achieving highly and therefore becoming 
specialists, whereas the second description makes value judgements. 
This echoes negative and out-dated aspects of Galtonian and IQ theory 
(Chapter 3) which seeks to 'rank human intellectual attributes in an 
unreasonable manner' (op cit: 77). Ordinary dictionary usage is 
represented by the following: 
1. The belief that certain persons or members of certain classes or 
groups deserve favoured treatment by virtue of their perceived 
superiority, as in intellect, social status, or financial resources. 
a. The sense of entitlement enjoyed by such a group or class. 
b. Control, rule, or domination by such a group or class. 
2. (adj) Selected as the best; 'an elect circle of artists'; 'elite colleges' 
(n) group or class of persons enjoying superior intellectual or social 
or economic status. 
In everyday usage, elitism is loaded with baggage; people mostly imply 
the first of the above meanings when they use the word. 'Favoured 
treatment' should not result from any of the characteristics described and 
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people will quite rightly reject a system that allows this to happen. The 
second definition is a jumble. The adjective refers to people who actually 
are the best at something, whilst the noun is used for status that need not 
have been earned. The example of 'artists' is perhaps a difficult choice, as 
it represents a field that is not made up of a clear and objective set of 
skills, but is notoriously victim to fads and fashions. The ability of the artist 
as draughtsperson can be measured, although the extent of their influence 
on future generations cannot be instantly assessed. 'Elect' implies chosen 
and it would depend on the selection criteria as to whether that would form 
an acceptable or unacceptable group. 
Rigorous training and examination are no less than we would expect for 
aspirant members of the Parachute Regiment or SAS for example. Most 
people want our best soldiers in the field, our greatest footballers in the 
World Cup and most accomplished musicians in our international 
orchestras. This kind of elite is acceptable. 
Other forms of elitism are more confusing. A divine notion of elitism is 
difficult to refute, as it would entail proof, or not, of a divine being or 
beings. The selection of the Dalai Lama and the Pope rely on such 
guidance and royal families are also determined by an alleged divine right. 
An historic tradition has then built up over centuries, ingraining these 
ideas. Birthright elitism concerns parents giving advantage to their children 
and is acceptable to many people. Swift argues that in this case, even 
when the political ideal of equality is supported, the conflict with other 
values is too strong to abandon. Parents are passing on the benefits of 
hard-earned wealth, whilst simultaneously contributing to wider society 
through their taxes. It is an all-things-considered benefit for their children, 
although it is likely to bring with it some educational advantage. Being able 
to pass on wealth will probably reflect a life in which aspects of 
educational advantage can be bought through having time to support 
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children and the pursuit of extra-curricular activities. Swift notes that 
... many people say they want "equality of opportunity" when what they 
really want [ ... ] is actually just less inequality of opportunity' (2001: 101). 
Social elites are also complex. Families can acquire wealth but still be 
excluded from the goods to which they aspire. Entire comedy shows are 
built on the 'joke' of the unsuitable rich social climber, suffering while 
trapped in a lower social stratum than they believe they deserve. We 
laugh collectively at their delusion, knowing they will never be admitted to 
the elite club after which they hanker. 
Forms of exclusion often considered synonymous with elitism concern 
class, race and gender issues interlaced with the idea of elitism as 
superior ability. Historically, women, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, 
people of certain religions and of lower socio-economic status have been 
variously excluded from a variety of activities and institutions. The 
excluding institutions have been dubbed elitist. Disallowing people on an 
irrelevant basis is abhorrent and intolerable. This, however, is different 
from disallowing someone through their lack of actual ability to benefit 
from a specific activity or membership, for example joining an advanced 
choir without being able to read music, or applying for the Magic Circle 
without being able to perform any tricks or illusions. This confusion is 
demonstrated in a recent article considering the nature of the Royal 
Society and its funding: 
The Royal Society, by its very nature, is an elitist 
organisation. What else can a national academy of science 
be? Its whole raison d'6tre is to represent the best of science 
in this country. [ ... ] The word elitist means 
different things to 
different people [ ... ] elitism 
has (also) become an all-purpose 
boo word for condemning any kind of exclusivity, justifiable 
or not. One doesn't want to be elitist in the sense of saying 
'we're only going to have white men' or'we're only going to 
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have people who went to Oxford the society has an 
historic problem. ' 
Watts, 2002: 18 
In education, increasing sensitivity has been shown towards elitism, to the 
point of 'positive discrimination. What the government seems to suggest 
in their fight against old-school elitism is a meritocratic system in which the 
able are allowed to achieve highly, and nothing acts as a barrier to these 
accomplishments. They have expanded the number of university places 
and been met with criticism that they are 'dumbing down' education. 'v 
Tony Blair, however, is determined to make changes. 
'There are some traditionalists who believe that more means 
worse - that only a minority have the brains to go on to 
university [ ... ] It is a cosy elitism that has bedevilled and 
weakened our education system for more than a century. ' 
Blair, quoted by Goddard, 2002: 3 v 
Recent initiatives have spawned a new type of complaint in this territory. 
The Faculty of History at Bristol University rejected students with top 
grades from independent schools in favour of students who constitute the 
next level down in terms of achievement coming from state schools. v' The 
Bristol faculty considered that these students would have worked much 
harder in order to achieve their grades and would therefore make more 
committed students. The university considers this a fair and meritocratic 
process, but some independent schools have complained about this tactic 
as being elitist and Bristol University has been boycotted by some head 
teachers and careers staff. " (It seems ironic to be advocating for the able 
privileged as a group suffering from discrimination. ) 
There is no reason why providing for the able should be elitist in the 
negative sense of the word, if suitable criteria are applied. There is little 
point designing activities of no value to potential participants. Restricting 
them to people who have the requisite skills, experience or interest is 
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acceptable. It would be less contentious to describe this tactic as 
'appropriate provision', rather than 'elitist provision,. 
4.2.1 Argument 2: Provision for the hiqhlv able will increase the 
qap between rich and poor 
Schools are unable to control the inequity of the society in which they 
function. If meeting the needs of the children in their care could increase 
the gap between the richest and poorest in society, it is not necessarily 
their concern. Schools strive to do the best for their pupils and people 
obviously expect schools to aim to compensate for deficiencies and 
disadvantage wherever possible. It would seem counter-intuitive to ask 
schools to hold children back, however, and so until broader society is 
more equable, schools are likely to contribute unwillingly to social division. 
What schools tend to do within their own communities, is assign provision 
on merit. 
Meritocracy cannot be dichotomised with elitism as the former is a political 
system and the latter is not. Meritocracy can be defined as the principle 
that: 
... each person's chance 
to acquire positions of 
advantage and the rewards that go with them will 
depend entirely on his or her talent and effort. In 
such a society inequalities in different people's life 
chances will remain, but social institutions will be 
designed to ensure that favoured positions are 
assigned on the basis of individual merit (talent 
times effort) and not allocated randomly, or by 
ascriptive characteristics such as race or gender, or 
by the machinations of the already powerful. 
Miller p177, cited in Brighouse, 2002 
Miller's notion of 'talent times effort' relies on the concept of desert, which 
is contentious among political philosophers. John Rawls, for example, 
considers that people cannot be held accountable for their degree of talent 
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and that'... luck plays too great a role in determining how much people 
can sell their productive activity for' (Swift, 2001: 40). In the same vein, 
Harry Brighouse argues against this notion as a suitable principle on 
which to base the distribution of educational resources. He considers the 
notion of desert inappropriate, stating that: 
... natural ability, like social class background is something 
we cannot reasonably be held responsible for, [ ... this] suggests a strongly compensatory principle, that significantly 
more educational resources should be spent on the less able 
than the more able. 
2002: 40, point 5 
Interestingly, Swift observes that popular opinion endorses the concept of 
desert whereby people are entitled to earn more than one another even 
when this is for reasons beyond their control, which is obviously out of 
tune with the Rawlsian view already presented. It is also disputed by 
Robert Nozick, who is sympathetic to difference and to some aspects of 
public opinion as noted here, but not to distribution by desert. 
... they agree with one another that achieving social justice is 
not about making sure that people get the value of their 
productive activity on the grounds that they deserve it. 
(Rawls because of the'moral arbitariness' objection, Nozick 
because distributing according to desert is a patterned 
principle. ) 
Swift, op cit: 40v"' 
Swift contrasts three different view of desert: the 'conventional'; 'extreme'; 
and 'mixed' views. The 'conventional' view is that noted in the previous 
paragraph, allowing for inequality in earnings and supported by popular 
understanding. The 'extreme'view disallows reward for effort as well as 
talent because it is considered that how hard someone works is out of 
their control. It is irrelevant whether a strong work ethic is in-born or 
instilled at an early age, but it should not be an incentive for higher pay. 
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The'mixed'view allows for rewarding aspects that people can control and 
choices they have made. Rawls rejects the mixed view as it is impossible 
to discern which aspects of someone's performance can be derived from 
their own efforts. 
Teachers tend to hold the mixed view. This can result in children being 
prevented from participating in enrichment programmes perceived as fun 
rewards. Children are expected to demonstrate both parts of the merit 
equation (talent and effort) and are disqualified if they are considered lazy, 
sometimes even when there are extenuating reasons for 
underachievement, such as learning problems. The western attitude is 
that a work ethic is well within an individual's control and any given talent 
should be properly utilised. This notion contrasts with Asian and Pacific 
Rim cultures in which talent is viewed exclusively as the reward of effort. 
University places and other such educational privileges are distributed 
entirely on the basis of a concept of talent as success earned through 
endeavour. 
Using desert as a basis for provision for the able at first sight seems 
reasonable; reward for hard work, not unfair advantage. However, if hard 
work is as much a result of background influence as other aspects of 
talent, pupils who are able but have not been encouraged are likely to be 
excluded from such schemes. High achievers are favoured again and 
some pupils with potential to benefit from unusual activities can be passed 
over in favour of those who are less able but more conforming. (I have 
heard talk of the 'able worthies' and the 'able unworthies' in staff meetings 
for allocating provision. ) 
Some children have less talent and work hard and others can achieve the 
same results with abundant talent and less work. If merit is to be used as 
a basis for reward, there must be a way of ensuring that every child has a 
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fair opportunity to demonstrate both effort and ability. Underachievers can 
fail to apply themselves for a range of reasons, or can present a false 
image of exertion. This makes it difficult to assess ability accurately or to 
know how much effort they are making and consequently what they merit. 
Astute underachievers can convince teachers and parents that they do not 
need the extra work bound to follow from a true assessment of their ability 
(in Appendix I i, see Louis, an expert in this regard). Some who do not 
exert effort as they see little purpose in a set task, and some (such as 
Billie, Appendix I ii) who are so lacking in confidence that they cannot 
engage with the task at all. It seems that merit is a problematic basis for 
distributing resources. (A different way of considering merit and Miller's 
concept of meritocracy would be from the perspective of enhancing 
efficiency rather than desert and this is taken up in section 4.3.2. ) 
I do not think issues concerning the gap between rich and poor should be 
the overriding concern of the school and should certainly not preclude 
provision for the able. 
4.2.2 Arqument 3: Hiqhlv able children do not need special 
provision as their ability and backqround will assure their success 
This common claim is grounded on two false assumptions, as clearly 
demonstrated with the evidence presented in Part One. It is not true that 
high ability equals success, evidenced by the underachieving able. Neither 
is it true that all able children come from privileged backgrounds. It is a 
fact though, that children from privileged homes do indeed demonstrate 
advanced knowledge of academic conventions and have familiarity with 
the atmosphere and attitudes of school, unfairly allowing for success in 
selection tests. Some will have been prepared for the examinations, 
conducted invariably in their first language and in a recognisable format. 
This suggests it would be fair to change entry to the programme rather 
than disallow the disadvantaged able pupil from partaking in provision. 'x 
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To help refute the argument that the able need no support, it is useful to 
summarise potential variations amongst pupils, despite this analysis being 
rather simplistic: 
1. average or low level of aptitudes 
2. average or low level of aptitudes 
3. high level of aptitudes 
4. high level of aptitudes 
unfavourable environment 
favourable environment 
favourable environment 
unfavourable environment 
Children in the first category have some programmes to help them and no 
teachers would wish to deny them this help and support. Similarly the 
second group have a certain advantage from their background. It is often 
assumed that all able children fit the third group, but this is not the case, 
as shown by the fourth group. Pupils in this last group are likely to exhibit 
unconventional behaviour or disaffection as their home background is 
more likely to be in conflict with the values of the school and because of 
their high ability they may be acutely aware of this fact. Of course pupils 
from a favourable environment can also fall victim to disaffection, but this 
is less likely. 
Children invited to attend in-school enrichment sessions are usually those 
who accede to school requirements, 'teacher pleasers' who work hard and 
are not disruptive. However, it is often the case that they do not need 
enrichment programmes in order to profit from schooling as they are 
probably in a social situation with a share in the goods that come from 
successful education and family advantage. Of course they should be 
allowed to participate in enrichment activities and not be bored at school. 
There are limited places on enrichment schemes and conventional pupils 
are normally rewarded with such opportunities in recognition of their hard 
work. Pupils who are also able, but do not meet teacher expectations, are 
often more likely to benefit from these programmes, but are less likely to 
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be selected. Enrichment could provide the chance to explore unusual 
ideas unlocking motivation, or just the freedom to explore their own 
strengths in a non-judgemental environment, free from the pressures of 
peers who think their abilities are luncooll. 
The underlying understanding of high ability and a sense of fair distribution 
of resources are the factors that lead teachers to make decisions about 
who should and should not attend sessions. It is not necessarily an 
unprofessional lack of rigour leading to misdiagnosis of high ability. It 
could be a particular sense of merit that ends up perpetuating divisions 
between likely and unlikely achievers. Teachers' concern is often for 
rewarding conventional behaviour and task completion rather than 
encouraging less obviously talented pupils. ' 
George (1992) has created a provoking list of characteristics of the bright 
and gifted child in school. He includes the following items which show how 
the bright child fits the conventional role of school pupil with less disruption 
than the gifted child: 
Briqht child 
Is interested 
Answers the questions 
Knows the answers 
Top set 
Grasps the meaning 
Is alert 
Completes the work 
Has good ideas 
Enjoys school 
Good memory 
Is pleased with learning 
Is receptive 
Learns easily 
Enjoys straightforward 
sequential presentation 
Enjoys peers 
Absorbs information 
Gifted child 
Is highly curious 
Discusses in detail 
Asks the questions 
Beyond the group 
Draws inferences 
Is keenly observant 
Initiates projects 
Has unusual and silly ideas! 
Enjoys learning 
Good guesser 
Is highly critical 
Is intense 
Already knows 
Thrives on complexity 
Prefers adults or older pupils 
Manipulates information 
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This list is not exhaustive or definitive but does highlight some differences 
between children that teachers tend to recommend for provision ('bright 
children') and those referred to the Senco for some kind of investigation 
('gifted children'). My concern is for the underachiever who often fits the 
non-conventional high ability profile. 
Preceding chapters have presented research to demonstrate that highly 
able pupils are a heterogeneous group of people needing provision and 
attention to ensure their abilities are translated into success. 
4.2.3 Argument 4: Provision for the highly able offends against 
equalitv 
Most teachers would subscribe to an ideal of equality and it seems that 
since able children already have an advantage through their aptitudes, it 
would increase inequality to provide anything extra for them. On the face 
of it, providing for the less able seems to be a reasonable way to move 
towards equality. It sounds like a sensible and fair ideal, but scratch the 
surface and complexities are revealed. In fact, there is no reason why 
everything should be equalised. It may well be that the distribution of 
resources and provision for pupils is unequal as this ultimately allows for 
greater fairness. I am specifically concerned with school policy here (as 
distinct from social policy) and as such consider it acceptable to pursue a 
non-egalitarian distribution of goods in order to achieve fairness. I do not 
consider that it is the role of schooling to level the playing field. 
It is perfectly coherent to reject equality at the philosophical 
level, as a fundamental ideal, while arguing that, for other 
reasons, resources should be more equally distributed - 
perhaps much more equally distributed - than they are at 
present. 
Swift, 2001: 92 
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In my experience, however, many teachers strive to be egalitarian, 
equating the term with fairness. Neither egalitarianism nor inegalitarianism 
are precise terms (Winch, 1996: 128) and whilst initially it seems obvious 
to side with equality, on closer inspection, value emerges in an anti- 
egalitarian stance, a 'middle position, based on a genuine commitment to 
meeting everyone's educational needs' (White, 1994: 180). 
Winch notes that the principle of equality of treatment: 
... requires that goods and outcomes be allocated equally to 
all, regardless of factors of entitlement, need or desert. 
1996: 115 
Few teachers would ignore entitlement, need and desert when deciding 
how to allocate resources. As Swift summarises: 
What matters is not that people have equal shares of good 
things. Nor is it even that people have equal opportunity (or 
access to) good things. What matters, if we think about it, is 
that everybody has enough, or that those who have least 
have as much as possible, or that people who most need 
things take priority. 
2001: 92x' 
White rejects both egalitarianism and equality, emphasising that this does 
not imply acceptance of right-wing views of education. Meeting needs 
should be separated from valuing equality, and equal access to leading a 
flourishing life need not mean equal distribution of goods (p174). White 
cites Raz, emphasising that the real concern is not for equality, but for the 
suffering or need of the individual in question. We may redistribute goods, 
but this will be for reasons of relieving hardship, not for creating equality 
(pl 75). According to White, this supports the notion that ' ... one has good 
reason to attend more to the needs of those more lacking' (pl 80), which 
would seem to rule out most, but not all, able pupils. If it were feasible to 
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clearly delineate ability and achievement, pupils with a considerable 
performance-potential gap could be viewed as lacking. 
Rawls' principles underlie ideas in this discussion, in particular the fair 
equality of opportunity principle, which on the surface seems to be a 
meritocratic principle, insulating educational opportunities from class 
difference. It allows more resources for the able, until the difference 
principle is carefully considered. This principle operates as long as social 
class has no influence over social equality, but given the state of our 
unequal society, and the minority of high ability people, the greatest 
benefit to the least advantaged is unlikely to be served by the distribution 
of more to the able. 
General equality arguments do not seem to hold much promise for the 
able child thus far. Perhaps it will be helpful to clarify exactly what is 
meant by equality. The literature tends to focus on three areas: equality of 
resources; equality of opportunity; and equality of outcome. 
Concerning the distribution of resources, Brighouse argues with John 
Wilson, suggesting it would be fair to spend the same amount of money 
on each student's education (p418). He rejects the way in which Wilson 
problematises this notion. However, it is unclear how equality of resources 
could be made to work and even, in fact, whether or not it would be 
desirable. Some training and learning is just more costly than others and it 
would be both unnecessary and prohibitive to allow for fund-matching for 
all potential students. In their papers, Wilson is referring to university 
education and Brighouse to earlier years, but neither is crystal clear about 
boundaries for provision, a point that would be important in trying to create 
a funding formula or policy. In a footnote, Brighouse acknowledges this 
difficulty, recognising that there is a difference with Higher Education as it 
is applicable to adults, who should be freer to make their own choices. 
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While this is relevant, it also worth noting that access to Higher Education 
is often decided much earlier, with some groups of (less privileged) people 
ruled out and others all but guaranteed participation. This factor, surely, is 
part of the equation. 
Brighouse quite rightly criticises Wilson's woolly notion of resources being 
awarded to those who can 'profit from them most'. What is meant by 'profit 
most' in this case? If interpreted as getting the highest grades, it could 
apparently be advantageous to able achievers. If the profit is calculated as 
value added, disadvantaged or weak students should be key beneficiaries 
but if profit is measured by enjoyment, children with an enthusiastic 
disposition would be rewarded by resources, and so on. What would 
happen if the investment failed to reap benefits? Resources should be 
distributed according to need, favouring underachieving able children over 
high achievers in order to increase the likelihood of their success. 
Swift identifies three understandings of equality of opportunity: 'minimal'; 
'conventional'; and 'radical' (p9l). The 'minimal' view considers people's 
gender, religion or race, etc, must not prevent them from opportunities in 
areas such as education and employment. The 'conventional' view goes 
further, suggesting that not only should people's competences be 
considered above their race, etc, but that they should have had an equal 
chance to acquire the competences in the first place. (This echoes the 
meritocratic principle of rewards for talent times effort, with the added 
dimension of aiming to assure a level playing field as a backdrop. ) As 
already noted, many people like this idea but balk at some of the 
measures that would have to be taken to ensure its realisation, for 
instance restricting or demanding certain practices in the home, such as 
supporting children with homework. Without equalising parental support, 
I conventional' equality of opportunity cannot be assured. 
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The third conception of equality of opportunity is labelled 'radical' and 
I requires that untalented children - whether rich or poor - should have the 
same opportunities as talented children' (p102), which again would oblige 
the state to revise some deep-seated structures and values, such as the 
meritocratic aims it seems to hold. 
It is difficult to say exactly what is meant by equality of opportunity, as it is 
not even clear what opportunities are in question. By lowering the bar, we 
could be sure that all pupils have the opportunity to achieve the basic 
minimum. This implies that where possibilities exist for only some pupils to 
train for district level sports, or learn the piano, it would be better for all to 
be denied the chance in the name of equality. This seems counter-intuitive 
and ultimately unfair and I agree with Brighouse when he suggests that 
equality of opportunity is only a desirable ideal if qualified by other 
principles to stop it undermining more important values. 
Equality of outcome is also a complex concept, open to a range of 
interpretations. 
Equality of outcome is a principle of equality that asserts that 
the endpoint of a process ought to be the same for everyone 
who goes through it. 
Winch, 1996: 115 
It is difficult to define the 'endpoint' and the 'process' in education and so 
this view can be interpreted along a spectrum from a weak to a strong 
conception. A weak notion would require something like the National 
Curriculum which is a fairly rich minimum of educational experience, 
covering a reasonable range of subjects and considering that children 
should emerge from school with roughly the same set of life skills. Even 
with this conception, highly able children without problems are likely to 
complete their requirements earlier than their peers, but are still expected 
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to stay in school. With equality of outcome they would be unable to 
undertake additional work and so would be wasting time. However, if the 
standards were raised to meet their abilities, many other children would be 
unable ever to reach the same high levels and the cost of trying to do so 
would probably be prohibitive. 
A much stronger interpretation would require specificity about the school 
experience, or process, implying less diversity in schooling. In order to 
allow everyone to achieve the same endpoint, teaching would have to be 
in far smaller groups, or minimum levels would need to be set at a fairly 
low level. (We can see the effect of these ideas by looking at the issues 
raised by various Swedish and Australian programmes of education, in 
section 4.1.0. ) 
4.2.4 Summary of arquments against providing for the hiqhly able 
To illustrate the points raised in terms of arguments against provision, let 
us take the example of two pupils, Oscar and Ella. One will symbolise the 
reasons people intuitively reject high ability programming as perpetuating 
division and offending against equality, and the other will exemplify the 
path too often taken by able pupils where provision is inadequate. 
Typically middle class, Ella begins state school with an advantage over 
many of her peers due to her private nursery. Her well-educated parents 
value schooling and provide an enriched home life with museum visits, 
educational computer games, books and general knowledge. When tested 
for the gifted programme Ella is nervous and mindful of her performance. 
Ella, of course, shares her parents' values and once successfully installed 
in the enrichment programme she continues to make full use of her well- 
ingrained work ethic, achieving reasonable grades. Her friendship group is 
drawn from the highly able peers in her class and their shared interests 
and study approaches are echoed through the high expectations of 
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teachers and pupils. Barring disasters in her personal life, Ella's academic 
success is pretty much assured. 
Oscar is able and interested, but his parents are unable to secure him a 
nursery place. He is happy and safe with his child-minder, but seems to 
prefer the company of adults and older children to those of his own age. 
When Oscar begins school, he is all at sea. Despite the activity and 
freedom, he fails to bond with the other pupils, spending much of the day 
enjoying the book corner, the quietest part of the open plan room. He 
completes activities quickly, but the short-cuts he creates to finish tasks 
earn him a reputation for carelessness. Oscar applies his same rushed 
attitude to the test for the gifted programme, answering the oral questions 
impatiently and emerging as a borderline candidate. His teachers consider 
he would benefit from staying in normal class to improve his 'slapdash' 
attitude and allow a 'more deserving hard worker' to be awarded the 
place. 
Oscar becomes increasingly bored with school, retreating further into a 
world of his own and paying less and less heed to his parents' pleas to 
take classwork more seriously. He bides his time, kicks his heels, keeps 
out if trouble and leaves school as soon as he can, with an 
undistinguished clutch of qualifications and a sense of disappointment. 
Equality of provision should bring Oscar's opportunities up to those of 
Ella's but should not deny Ella the chance to participate in activities that 
bring her challenge. It would be unethical to hamper Ella by using her 
background as a reason to disallow her enrichment. She works hard and, 
as such, merits the opportunity to benefit from the enrichment programme. 
Oscar deserves to have a valuable time in school. He should not be 
bored, but challenged. Denial of provision based on a notion of his lack of 
desert is unfair, largely because his behaviour is being misinterpreted. He 
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is indeed 'lazy' and 'slapdash' and these are not qualities to be praised. 
He has, however, been unable to develop the disposition for a positive 
work ethic through a combination of factors beyond his control. Why then 
should he be penalised? 
I shall now consider the five most common arguments in favour of 
provision for the highly able. 
4.3.0 The usual suspects: common arguments in favour of 
providing for the able. Argument 1: Academic excellence is intrinsicaLly 
wilimhIp 
Mostly we consider academic success as directly linked to job market 
options and as assuring financial success and stability. Able pupils without 
specific problems will be likely to reap the rewards of their high ability if 
they expend some effort and receive reasonable schooling. This can result 
in excellence, often translated into higher education and a graduate 
salary, or other similar, lucrative opportunities. 
Some consider, however, that the subjects generally central to traditional 
curricula are good in themselves and that excellence in these disciplines is 
its own reward, separate from the instrumental benefits just outlined. This 
view is presented by David Cooper who talks of: 
... a 
fundamental human concern in myriad areas of human 
practice - the concern with the attainment, in whatever field, 
of excellence; the concern that some should scale the 
heights. 
1980: 54 
This sets some people above others, potentially breeding resentment and 
leading to the view that programmes to help those of high ability are trying 
to provide a foot up into a different class stratum, simultaneously 
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suggesting that unselected pupils are somehow less valuable and merit 
being 'left behind. 
Patricia and John White effectively critique Cooper's ideas, demonstrating 
both the elitist nature of his argument and also that he fails to 'show why 
excellence in the possession or pursuit of knowledge for its own sake 
should be a central educational aim'. They wonder if the excellence ideal 
would enjoy the same popularity if it resulted in a disadvantage in the job 
market, suggesting that it really is valued as a means to an end and not as 
an end in itself. They also note that pushing children in one direction 
towards excellence can jeopardise well-being: 
... Cooper has to show why their good is to have a lower 
priority than his excellence ideal: why, that is, their own good 
has to be sacrificed to knowledge (etc) for its sake. 
1980: 241 
Cooper's views focus on high ability children already demonstrating a 
certain level of achievement. Those with difficulties may be more 
expensive to teach, as well as subject to more risk factors, making them 
less likely to receive support than higher profile achieving pupils. 
So, to refute this argument, I consider that encouraging the promotion of 
excellence for its own sake is too closely linked with elitist notions to be 
acceptable for general educational provision. There is no good reason 
why this should take precedence over more widely distributed reasonable 
achievement or over personal choice and well being. 
4.3.1 Arqument 2: Economic and social benefits accrue from 
focusing on the highly able, ensuring they achieve 
There are two connected but slightly different aspects to this argument 
because economic and social benefits are both linked together and also 
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discrete. Encouraging excellence and high achievement will be likely to 
help the country's economy, through taxes and the development of more 
productive and efficient business practices. This will be to everyone's 
benefit, as increased goods and wealth are redistributed to the rest of the 
population. Of course, this advantage is built on two questionable 
assumptions: fair distribution and able people achieving success. Firstly, 
higher productivity will not guarantee that others will benefit, until the 
redistribution of these goods is effectively managed. The second 
assumption that the highly able will indeed turn their talents to 
economically productive uses is also uncertain. Neither of these are 
aspects under the jurisdiction of education per se, although schools do 
have a responsibility to deal with moral education for their pupils. 
Hopefully this will have a positive effect on the way that pupils choose to 
develop and use their abilities. 
As noted in 4.2.0, there is another way of considering meritocracy that 
links to the argument presented here and shows how there could be more 
goods for distribution. 
... the efficiency-enhancing character of meritocracy makes 
it 
desirable - if people are allocated to positions (and the 
rewards that attach to them) according to merit (effort x 
talent) there will be more surplus, or social product, for us to 
redistribute. So instead of having a desert-based case for 
meritocracy [ ... 
] we have an efficiency-based case. 
Brighouse, 2002: point 6 
Although this may be clearer than the complex desert notions, its success 
still rests on the two assumptions of efficient distribution and the able 
making the best use of their abilities. 
Socially useful work and valued abilities are generally encouraged by 
teachers, and an ethos that celebrates its pupils is obviously 
173 
recommended. Here, we are to consider what abilities should be nurtured 
in terms of society's needs, placing these above the needs of the 
individual. In this argument, where there is conflict, the multi-talented pupil 
should be directed towards a socially useful role, even if this is their 
second or third choice. 
This could be accomplished in part by linking funding for expensive higher 
education to a certain amount of state service. Presently, many students 
sign up for costly courses and yet fail to translate training into practice. 
Without schemes that trace the state's investment in education to the 
productivity of the individual it is difficult to guarantee value for money and 
a direct financial return on specific and targeted provision. Schemes that 
aim to do this are probably unworkable with so many non-vocational 
subjects studied and too many variables to make direct links. 
Some pursuits are less obviously linked to the economy or mainstream 
workplace, connected instead to perhaps a more contentious notion of 
what is useful for a society. An example of this would be the cultural 
benefits of education, funding for artists and musicians, even where there 
is not controversy about the nature of what constitutes 'good' art or music. 
Throughout history, key contributors to a nation's cultural development 
have fought for appreciation, unrecognised by their contemporaries, often 
struggling for survival. Their cultural and financial contribution may not 
have been immediately apparent, but this more intangible contribution is 
just as valuable as those in other more obvious fields of endeavour. 
It is also difficult to separate the advantage to society from the advantage 
to the individual. If someone is supported in doing what they feel to be a 
worthwhile activity, this will impact on their own sense of well-being. Taken 
further, there is a notion of protecting society that can be called into play 
here. Unhappy able individuals could efficiently turn their abilities to 
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activities that may not benefit society, or that could even be harmful. 
Empirical evidence has shown that while this is an unusual state for the 
able, there is some susceptibility to mental health problems among the 
extremely highly able and also that disaffection in school can result in 
unlawful conduct. Provision for the able could therefore be considered as 
necessary protection from future problems. 
Since economic and social benefits cannot be guaranteed, I consider 
therefore that it is too tenuous a link to make such potential benefits sole 
reasons for providing for the able. 
4.3.2 Argument 3: Special provision for the highly able is valuable 
because it can lead to a rise in qeneral standards for all 
There is some empirical evidence to support the contention that highly 
able pupils have a positive effect on their peers both by acting as role 
models and by supporting a strong work ethic in the classroom (Hallam 
and Ireson, 2001; Renzulli, 2000; Freeman, 1998). This is countered, 
however, by suggestions that the able pupils benefit their less able 
classmates only when they are allowed the opportunity to be stretched 
through some tasks undertaken with peers of the same ability, even if this 
needs to be provided outside the classroom. Appropriate provision should 
help the able pupil to succeed and this raises the profile of the school 
generally, in these times of league tables and selective entry. 
From the point of view of protecting the interests of schools and their 
pupils, ensuring that children are allowed to excel and work to their high 
levels can help to prevent behaviour problems and disaffection that can 
result from boredom. Pupils are also encouraged to remain in the 
maintained sector rather than leave to take up bursaries in independent 
schools. This makes for a wider mix of pupils in schools. 
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Whether or not gifted provision can lead to a general rise in standards is 
an empirical question that should feature centrally in debates about the 
government strategy. It seems that specialist schools are currently 
favoured, but international research does not bear this recommendation 
out. 
4.3.3 Argument 4: All pupils are entitled to an education that takes 
them beyond the bare minimum 
If we consider the purpose of schooling to be about inculcating literacy 
and numeracy, guaranteeing that all pupils emerge from schooling as both 
literate and numerate would be sufficient to ensure that schools will have 
done their job and met their objectives. This would allow for acceptance of 
arguments about a minimal level of schooling such as James Tooley's 
notion that the state should only fund a 'minimum adequate education'. 
Further educative experiences would be privately funded and in all 
likelihood able pupils whose families could not pay would be eligible for 
some kind of sponsorship, something akin to the now defunct Assisted 
Places Scheme. In order to run cost effective schools, it would be sensible 
to get as many pupils to the required minimal levels as quickly as possible. 
Education Authorities would then have met targets and could slim down 
any other provision, or at least make a profit on further study. Perhaps our 
most able pupils would leave as soon as they had met their targets. 
White, among others, considers that numeracy and literacy are 
inadequate as exclusive goals for education, as there are many more 
valuable objectives for children to meet. Within his broader conception of 
education there also lies an emphasis on the role of autonomy, which 
develops as pupils are allowed to express themselves effectively. This can 
only be accomplished in the kind of environment that treats individuals 
with respect and understanding, and this must imply appropriate provision 
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for the able as part of the student body. (These ideas echo equality 
arguments in section 4.2.3. ) 
Tooley's view of education is impoverished. As well as the implied 
narrowness of an adequate minimum curriculum, there are obvious 
problems with perpetuation of the class system as families pick up 
provision where school leaves off. The inequalities that would result are 
criticised by Brighouse, who finds that resulting 'incentive-based 
inequalities' may be appropriate for adults but that 'these do not apply to 
the distribution of education among children' (2000: 149). It is also very 
difficult to identify the elements that would constitute an appropriate 
adequate minimum. Will this include social development through group 
activities, the development of dispositions and good work habits, and 
inspiration and enthusiasm for learning? This is also questioned in the 
Whites' paper (op cit: 243) in terms of how this would connect to notions of 
excellence. 
To refute this argument, I consider that providing a bare minimum will lead 
to potentially damaging inequality and would present an impoverished 
model of education. Able pupils are unlikely to be intellectually challenged 
by such a curriculum, especially where there are few extension tasks or 
very narrow teaching objectives. Teachers can also feel limited by a basic, 
restrictive curriculum. 
4.3.4 Argument 5: All pupils are entitled to an education based on 
their needs 
All pupils have the same entitlements and these include basic numeracy 
and literacy, a fair chance in the job market, to be treated with respect, to 
have support for problems, to develop socially, personally and 
intellectually and to be challenged, stimulated and engaged. There is also 
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a moral entitlement to ensure that any group is not unfairly disadvantaged 
by the distribution of goods. 
A needs-based argument would seem counterproductive when trying to 
advocate for the able pupil as they do not seem likely candidates for 
provision outside of the curriculum. As mentioned, there are able pupils 
with additional SEN, but this aspect of need is met (to a greater or lesser 
extent) by the school's legal obligation to provide support. High ability is 
not generally considered as a SEN and the statementing process and the 
development of Individual Education Plans in such cases is usually left up 
to schools and LEAs to use or ignore, with only rough guidelines from 
government. 
If it could be shown that a pupil's development would be badly affected by 
being held back in class, there could be a case for extra provision, 
meeting the emotional needs of a potentially disaffected pupil. This is 
usually only recognised when a child has begun to exhibit anti-social 
behaviour, the response to which is more likely to be punishment than a 
programme for high ability. 
Needs are difficult to define in education, but I have distinguished between 
instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of schooling in this chapter to 
try and make this easier. Instrumental or positional aspects of education 
tend to dominate discussions about what should and should not be 
provided. Brighouse, for example, focuses mainly on the positional 
aspects of education and, I think, does not place enough emphasis on 
other aspects (2000: 115). Certainly the positional goods (that help 
compete for other goods) are likely to be greater for the high achieving 
able person. It is possible, however, that they are relatively unchallenged 
throughout their schooldays, not really benefiting from the intrinsic value 
that schooling can bring. Able underachievers fare less well, losing out on 
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both fronts, being both bored in school, and mediocre (or failures) in the 
examination system. 
All pupils are entitled to spend their compulsory schooling engaged in 
worthwhile, positive and inspiring pursuits. They need to engage with their 
learning and with the school they attend, to develop positive social 
relationships and to acquire a healthy self-image. Ensuring this would 
certainly involve changes to the schooling system, effectively 
differentiating curriculum and activities, providing additional and alternative 
classes, vertical grouping, individual work plans, teacher training, learning 
support and enrichment programmes. 
It seems a reasonable view, as there is nothing in what I am defending 
that implies that the highly able deserve or get additional benefits. 
Efficiency related reasons may suggest this. I am remaining agnostic. But 
either way, there is a difficulty in the connectedness of non-competitive 
and competitive goods in education. I do not want to allow access to 
additional benefits that are bound to accrue as the able improve exam 
scores as a result of a more stimulating and exciting educational 
experience. The able already benefit from the value society places on their 
talent. I would wish for a fairer society, obviously, but I do not want this to 
sanction the experience of a soul destroying and enthusiasm numbing 
time in school. Provision for these children could be considered a way of 
equalising experience of personal challenge, allowing for flourishing 
through an enabling education. 
Pupils are entitled to needs-based provision and should derive both 
instrumental and non-instrumental benefits from their education. For the 
able pupil, this may mean activities that go beyond the National 
Curriculum to ensure intellectual engagement and social situations that 
allow for the honest expression of the self. Pupils need a school ethos that 
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encourages the bright pupil to shine rather than an ethos that forces them 
to hide their talents deliberately. 
4.3.5 Summarv of chapter so far 
I have explored some of the arguments for and against provision for the 
able. The 'intrinsic value of excellence' notion is too elitist, and there are 
only tenuous conclusions to be drawn from the contention that activities 
for the highly able will result in benefits for society through more and better 
economic and social goods. The effect of the able on other pupils is an 
empirical issue, requiring further investigation. The argument that all 
children need an education beyond the bare minimum is relevant, of 
course, to all pupils, not just the able, but it is unclear what should be put 
in and left out of this basic education, making it difficult to decide what 
counts as extra and what should be mandatory. 
I have argued that the quality of schooling or learning experience can be 
enhanced by narrowing the gap between potential and achievement 
through appropriate provision for the able. Lessening this gap is an aim of 
most schools, boldly asserted in mission statements. As well as meeting 
requirements for personal flourishing, in the long term, self-esteem built up 
during formative school years has an influence on how pupils perform as 
adults. Schools can open or close both personal and social doors and an 
encouraging, facilitating ethos can propel pupils to success. 
I have considered both instrumental and non-instrumental aspects of 
education, in terms of lifetime expected income and lifetime expected 
flourishing. That the instrumental benefits of schooling and education can 
be harnessed to help in the struggle to iron out social inequity seems to be 
a view held by Brighouse and as such schooling is predominantly viewed 
in instrumental terms. These goods are competitive 'in that whether they 
yield material advantages depends on whether they give you an edge in 
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the competition for high-income occupations' (2000: 121-2). He does not 
however, seem to account for potential underachievers (p140). 
A more broadly conceived model of education takes into account the 
experience of schooling and means more than leaving with a good clutch 
of examination results. Educational experience should involve positive 
social interaction, learning about one's strengths and weaknesses, and 
feeling part of a community, among other personal and social qualities. 
Success, in terms of school values, is implied, but not demanded; more 
important is a sense of useful activity and positive attitudes to learning. 
Personal flourishing and fulfilment through learning are individual matters 
and individuals are encouraged to do their best, mainly for themselves, but 
with the understanding that flourishing people are more likely to make a 
positive contribution to the system in which they find themselves. Concern 
about the experience of education shows a commitment to meeting 
children's educational needs. 
The quality of schooling or learning experience is linked to the potential- 
achievement gap in a way that is particularly pertinent for the highly able. 
In this model, pupils are not measured by their success, but by the 
relationship of this success to their potential achievement. There are 
difficulties associated with measuring potential, but it is sometimes clear 
that students are failing to be appropriately challenged by their 
schoolwork. It may be that Astrid is achieving higher grades than Carlos 
and the obvious response is to try and help raise Carlos' results. However, 
if Astrid is working well below her potential level of success, she may be 
bored and develop the associated problems of disaffection and frustration. 
In terms of flourishing, and closing the potential-achievement gap, 
resources and/or effort should also be directed towards helping Astrid to 
improve her performance. Of course, no one would want to take away 
from Carlos to ensure Astrid's flourishing, but the resource pot is unlikely 
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to be big enough to cope with both children's needs. Decisions need to be 
made about how best to apportion resources, especially when Carlos may 
never reach Astrid's level in terms of grades. It is perhaps possible that he 
is able to flourish fully at his current level of achievement. 
All children should be provided with an enabling education with sufficient 
resources to allow the development of their talents to a high level, 
particularly when there is a significant discrepancy between their potential 
and their performance. This is true even where potential achievement 
exceeds expected requirements. I think a clearer way of considering what 
it is fair to do for the able is to aim for some kind of equality of quality of 
learning, or equality of challenge. 
4.4 Equality of challenqe 
Providing equality of challenge, or equality of quality of learning, should be 
a key factor in schooling and able pupils are likely to need provision 
beyond the National Curriculum to ensure such stimulation. While there is 
a statutory requirement to attend school, there is a moral obligation for 
schools to ensure that pupils are not wasting their time. Pupils need to be 
engaged in their learning and this can truly only happen when tasks are 
challenging. Even the most determined of us can only sustain a certain 
amount of motivation for simple tasks that lack any intrinsic value. 
Deciding on a universally applicable definition of challenge is probably an 
impossible challenge in itself, but pitching activities and tasks at an 
appropriate level should be done for all pupils. Having fun all day every 
day and expecting school to be entertaining is not the proposal, but 
ensuring a better match between task and ability may well require 
increased resources, training and facilities. Pupils must move at their own 
intellectual pace, or as near to this as is practically possible, regardless of 
whether that pace is 'normal' for their age. 
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Of course it is the case that some people seem to have the potential to 
display excellence in a broad range of pursuits and it would seem unfair to 
provide for their development in all these fields, especially where those 
who have a narrower range of abilities are not provided with whatever 
tools for success they may need. It is not the case that a choice must be 
made between 'all for one' and 'none for some I, but it should be ensured 
that pupils are being stimulated and challenged. 
Brighouse states that there is no way of ensuring equality of experience as 
a principle for establishing education policy. We can only consider equality 
of opportunity, or even a minimising of inequality of educational 
opportunity (op cit: 149). I would suggest, though, that pupils are entitled to 
some kind of equality in their school experience; entitled to more than the 
minimising of inequality of educational opportunity. This can be ensured 
(at least we can try to ensure this) through careful consideration of the 
quality of teaching they receive and the level of challenge with which they 
are presented. 
4.5 The nature and importance of challenqe 
As noted, it is impossible to create a single prescription for challenge for 
all. Challenge is intimately bound up with motivation and this can be 
intrinsic or extrinsic. Superficial external rewards will not ensure continued 
interest in an area of study. Children need to derive genuine intrinsic 
motivation from the task in hand and this cannot always be ensured 
merely through the subject areas found in school curricula. Workshop 
sessions for the highly able tend to cover an enormous range of disparate 
issues, hoping to catch as many interests as possible. Open-minded 
children generally come away from sessions with a broader range of 
interests, having found that there are so many fascinating things to learn 
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and find out about. (See Appendix IV for some examples of workshops for 
children aged from five to eighteen years. ) 
Once it is clear that the subject in question is stimulating to the child, or 
potentially of interest, it is important to ensure the right balance in the set 
tasks. The level of difficulty should avoid frustration or boredom. When a 
task is too easy, children become bored, sometimes even refusing to 
undertake what they perceive as pointless. If a task is too complex, 
without obvious entry points, it is too frustrating even to begin. Children 
need to feel some level of competence in order to motivate them 'to 
exercise and elaborate their abilities' (Freeman, 2000: 577). 
Cognitive challenge was well described by Vygotsky, in terms of the Zone 
of Proximal Development, where challenge is defined by what can 
currently be achieved with support, moving toward what can be 
accomplished without help. The support recommended by Vygotsky was 
that of an adult or more capable peer, but support can be provided 
through written or recorded instruction. Many able pupils find computer 
technology ideal in terms of being able to control the amount of support 
they require. Piaget and other developmental ists use the term 'cognitive 
dissonance' to describe the sense of sufficient challenge to ensure 
optimum learning. 
Challenge must include a risk of failure. Generally children choose tasks 
just a little harder than previous successes, as the impulse to improve is 
intuitive where children have a good sense of their abilities. Watching 
children in an adventure playground demonstrates this. Children are rarely 
injured through attempting a task way beyond their capabilities. Injuries 
are usually caused by mundane errors. When striving to learn something 
new, children do not merely repeat the same task endlessly, at the same 
level, but only until they feel confident enough to move to the next stage. 
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Often, teachers know very well how to provide challenge through 
designing tasks that capture children's imagination. The palpable buzz 
that results from a busy class of children engaged in sustained 
concentration and interested enquiry is instantly recognisable. Teachers 
cannot always provide this level of engagement for a variety of reasons. 
Sometimes it is too time-consuming to plan activities, or too complex to 
provide appropriate resources, but often there are just too many 
competing issues in the classroom to allow for the kind of atmosphere that 
promotes excited learning. 
The dangers of too much time without challenge are noted by 
Montgomery: 
... boredom and 
lack of cognitive challenge in the daily 
curriculum is playing a more significant role in causing pupils 
across the ability range to become disaffected than was 
originally suspected. [ ... ] more pupils, 
including the highly 
able and the more creative, are rejecting such 'schooling' 
and are switching off. We now have the situation where the 
National Curriculum and the methods by which it is taught 
have especially not led to a stimulating and educative 
experience for the gifted and talented. 
2000: 130-131 
More pervasive problems can result from the able being habitually bored 
(Feldhusen and Jarwan, 2000). If they come to expect to be bored, this 
negative attitude can infect other areas of their lives, as they generalise 
the boredom to other experiences. They can also become disruptive: 
The gifted, like any others, need the enjoyable stimulation of 
variety, and the excitement of playing with ideas. So, when 
lessons are too easy, they lose the satisfaction of tackling 
and resolving problems. To compensate, they may 
deliberately provoke disturbance, either in their own minds or 
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among others in the classroom, just to taste the spice of 
stimulation. 
Freeman, 1997: 488 
Often, we are able to find our own level of challenge and the able child in 
the classroom is capable of this if the available materials match their 
needs. I am doubtful that any research could find the perfect formula for 
creating challenge, as it will, of course, vary across individuals. Some 
factors could be determined, however. I think some of the key ingredients 
could be: intrinsically interesting subjects; well-thought out, systematic 
development of ideas; and the real possibility of both failure and success. 
4.6 Conclusion 
I have defended provision for the able on the grounds that even though 
provision cannot (and need not) be the same for everyone, there must be 
equality of value in the education provided. There will be inequality of 
outcome and of resources and opportunities, but there must also be more 
than a minimum safety net. 
Provision for the able does not need to be elitist, although it is likely that 
the achievement gap between the most able without problems and the 
rest of the school population will increase. The alternatives of ignoring 
able underachievers and holding back able high achievers are 
unacceptable. Able pupils with learning problems and those who have 
become disaffected should be helped and this rising tide should elevate 
general achievement. It is possible that developed talent can be 
harnessed to the needs of the least advantaged through increased 
economic and social productivity. How best to do this has not been 
discussed and is a matter for research, as is the empirical question 
concerning the extent of the effect of provision for the able on other pupils 
in school. 
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We should not have to hamper the able pupil in order to equalise their 
prospects. That the societal playing field is uneven is not a good enough 
reason to make schooling a waste of time for the able advantaged child. 
That chances of success are dictated by forces outside of school does not 
mean that teachers should not provide for the able. Society must adapt to 
allow all participants to do their best. It is the distribution of income and 
wealth that is at fault, not the educational ideal of striving to meet 
children's needs. 
Pursuing excellence for its own sake constitutes insufficient grounds to 
provide for the able, but meeting individual needs is a compelling reason 
for doing so. I have argued that pupils should be presented with challenge 
every day and while I am an ardent advocate for the able and 
underachievers more specifically, my views are tempered with a realistic 
attitude to practical restrictions. 
It would be impossible to fund all the activities in which the able may excel 
and so choices need to be made, in which the most challenging or useful 
are selected. It may be that meeting children's needs results in some 
people costing the system more than others. If they are not able, fine. If 
they are able, fine. I expect the most and least able will be the most 
expensive users of any resources. 
It is fair to do something for highly able children. It is not fair to do nothing. 
' Rudnitski (2000) points out that if governments worldwide prioritised education in any 
way that could be considered close to the military budgeting, there would be sufficient 
funding for a huge range of programmes and no need for taking from one group to give to 
another. 
" The expression 'the Law of Jante' encapsulates this and was first used by the Danish 
novelist Aksel Sandmose in 1933 (Persson et al, 2000: 718). 
iii Estelle Morris, Secretary of State for Education, speaking at the Institute for 
Mechanical Engineering on 16 May 2002. The whole speech can be accessed at 
www. dfes. gov. uk/speeches. The speech is a little confusing concerning under-performing 
187 
pupils. Surely they are not suggesting that effort should no longer be put into helping 
these people? 
iv There have been recent news reports suggesting that university entrance could be 
decided by a lottery (4 September 2003, BBC Radio 4), to avoid subjectivity in 
admissions procedures. There have been calls to introduce North American-style 
Scholastic Aptitude Tests (12 October 2003, BBC Radio 4) and the serious political fall- 
out from the 'top-up fees debate' (still resounding in February 2004). 
' However, Blair has been attacked for'the rise of the parentocracy, and the fall of 
the meritocracy rather than its ascendancy' (Hellawell, 2002). 
Vi I call these children 'the marzipan layer' during Inset sessions and teachers have 
commented that it is a useful expression. These pupils are often forgotten, their needs 
superseded by the more obviously able pupils, or those with clearly observed difficulties. 
Vii Margaret Hodge, Minister for Higher Education, at the Social Market Foundation think- 
tank, London. 'The minister praised a scheme run by the history department at Bristol 
University where the average A-level score for the school was taken into account before 
a place was awarded. If a state school pupil had significantly outperformed their 
predecessors, they were awarded places even if they had 'far lower A-level qualifications' 
than Bristol had accepted in the past. The government was determined that more 
working-class youngsters should get the benefit of going into higher education. The target 
[ ... ] was not a matter of political correctness, but vital for the future of the economy. Cole, from Bristol University, denied suggestions that pupils from private schools were losing 
out under its selection scheme. ' (April 12 2002) 
Viii Patterned principles 'prescribe a particular state that must be realised (such that 
inequalities are benefiting the worst off) or require distributions in accordance with a 
particular pattern' (p34). 
` In the Philippines, there is difficulty encouraging children to take up programmes due to 
the sense of fairness across families; it is considered wrong to 'favour' one sibling over 
another. Open access programmes have therefore been set up, with no entry 
qualifications. Students were expected only to attend with regularity. The sessions were 
very popular and results demonstrated the raising of achievement for all pupils (Wu et al, 
2000). 
xI am not suggesting that teachers only 'like' conventional pupils, but that school 
structures work in favours of these pupils. Teachers sometimes emphasise behaviour 
and self-control as key factors for choice of provision and this may be practical, but lacks 
pedagogical validity. 
x' Differentiating again between social and school policy, while most teachers would 
agree with Swift about what matters, they would also want to take into account 
Kymlicka's notion of an 'egalitarian plateau'; the principle that 'members of a political 
community should be treated as equals, that the state should treat its citizens with equal 
concern and respect, cited in Swift, p93. 
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Part Three: 
What should we provide for the able? 
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Chapter 5 Provision for Highly Able Children 
5.0 Introduction 
Having established that highly able pupils merit provision, I now consider 
how this can best be realised in mainstream school settings. Early 
sections will focus on understanding the needs of the highly able 
underachiever more fully (5.1) and the usual responses in providing for the 
able (5.2). This includes an exploration of the role and qualities of the 
teacher, as well explaining aspects of differentiation, evaluated in order to 
draw conclusions about provision. Considering current and recommended 
provision and practice is useful in helping to define central principles. 
Arguments made in Chapter 4 suggest that meeting individual needs is 
the best reason for provision, but some of the other arguments are also 
discussed in this chapter, as they are often harnessed in the literature. 
The reality is that pupils in schools have different abilities, interests and 
motivations and it is difficult to cater for their diverse needs. The highly 
able are generally low on the list of priorities because of the assumption 
they can manage without help or support. This is not necessarily the case. 
Some research does suggest that higher expectations and achievement 
for the whole school population can possibly be achieved effectively by 
paying particular attention to the more able, such as the work of Renzulli 
and others. Investing in able pupils can possibly benefit the whole school, 
which is important in the current climate of accountability and evaluation. 
This is demonstrated through the research-based Schoolwide Enrichment 
Model: 
... a 
detailed blueprint for school improvement [ ... 
] its major 
goal is to promote both challenging and enjoyable high-end 
learning across a wide range of school types, levels and 
demographic differences. 
Renzulli and Reis, 2000: 369 
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Research demonstrates that having a mixed ability cohort has a positive 
effect on the less able, ' raising overall achievement significantly. I know of 
no research that makes a direct comparison between the cost and 
effectiveness of funding activities for the able and specifically aimed at 
raising general standards, in comparison with a focus on remediating 
weakness with the same overall aim. Recent government initiatives for 
'Gifted and Talented' and the London Challenge project are designed to 
keep the more able pupils in state maintained schools, with the aim of 
stemming the flow of achievers into the independent sector or specific star 
schools, while others sink. " 
As noted in Chapter 4, provision for the able is often dismissed as elitist 
and premised on notions of diversity, and this only becomes problematic 
where difference is interpreted as a kind of hierarchy of worth. There is 
nothing objectionable about the notion that we all have different strengths 
and abilities. What is objectionable is that people with certain abilities are 
entitled to more provision or higher status because they are considered 
somehow more valuable than others. Research supports the need for 
specific provision, not as icing-on-the-cake elitist indulgence, but as 
necessary for all schools. Able children are not very well understood and 
tasks are often inappropriate. 
Some educationalists have included able pupils in the 
category of newly disadvantaged groups. [ ... ]A typical 
sample of research findings is: In the case of the most able 
groups the work was considerably less well-matched than for 
average and less able groups (HIVII, 1978: 81). High attainers 
were underestimated on 40% of tasks assigned to them 
(Bennett et al, 1984: 215). In the majority of schools the 
expectations of very able pupils are not sufficiently high 
(HIVII, 1992: 28). 
Eyre 1997: 1 
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Studies concerning provision for the able have not often considered the 
difference between the underachiever and the high achiever, although 
there has been a focus on the disadvantaged child in some arenas. 
5.1 HiqhlV able underachievers: an inclusive approach 
The phrase'able misfit'was coined by Kellmer-Pringle in 1970, to 
describe pupils with an unusually large gap between potential and 
achievement. This is not considered appropriate in contemporary 
discussions, mainly because the stereotype of the underachieving able 
pupil has been discredited, but also because it is now read as an insulting 
and simplistic expression, taking no account of reasons for lack of 
achievement. 
Research has allowed for more comprehensive understanding of the able 
underachiever. Belle Wallace (2000), distinguishes between 'coasters', 
who achieve reasonably but expend little effort, and 'high fliers', who 
achieve highly and work hard. She also notes other effects such as 
disruption in classes and disaffection. Freeman (1996) presents two broad 
categories: the 'underachiever'; and the 'non-producer. The former 
involve themselves in classroom activities, participating, but with a lack of 
achievement reflecting a tangible difficulty. Non-producers, however, are 
not really invested in the classroom structure, nor do they share the group 
aims of individual success and collective accomplishment, in an 
atmosphere of compliant, shared industriousness. 
In my own research, I have encountered the'invisible able pupil'; children 
not at all outstanding to the casual eye or trouble-makers. They are expert 
at convincing teachers they are reasonable workers, achieving 
appropriately average grades for their pedestrian work. On closer 
inspection, however, it is clear that they are able to convince teachers of 
their average ability by completing set tasks to a reasonable standard, in 
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an exceptionally short time. The rest of the allocated time is spent in 
apparently fruitless tasks; over-sharpening pencils, gazing outside, trying 
to balance a ruler precariously on their desk, walking surreptitiously 
around the classroom by the longest route in a quest for'vital equipment', 
etc. Such pupils show up as highly able on conventional psychological 
intelligence and creativity tests (I used AH1, WISC-R and Urban), but 
were ranked as average or below average by teachers and self-identified 
as not enjoying school. Their work was not of a particularly high standard, 
because of the lack of time spent on-task. Teachers mistakenly, but 
understandably interpreted this average work as reflecting pupils' average 
ability. "' 
These pupils are particularly difficult to help. Ordinarily able pupils are 
generally sufficiently challenged by the normal curriculum and highly able 
pupils with no specific difficulties show themselves through excellent 
results and offer to partake in arranged activities. Students with problems 
are more complex to work with, but Special Educational Needs (SEN) staff 
are supported by legislation that compels schools and Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) to fund activities, ensuring attention is given to pupils' 
difficulties. Of course, such funding and programmes are not without 
problems of realisation, or controversy and conflict concerning principles 
and methods, but education professionals agree that pupils need special 
attention and support. The underachieving highly able pupil however, is 
especially demanding to support successfully. 
Legislation has not been very helpful. The introduction of the five- 
step Code of Practice (1994) included guidelines for helping 
children whose difficulties are not severe enough to warrant a 
'statement of need' but who still require support, and 'statementing' 
was finally clarified in the 1996 Education Act and is continually 
updated. However, the use of statements for enshrining the needs 
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of the able is still very rare as '... able pupil provision falls into the 
I guidance category I and is not legally binding' (Eyre, 1997: 110). 
The Code emphasises partnership support, involving outside 
agencies and parents, as well as requiring all schools to publish a 
whole-school special needs policy. Ofsted inspectors can use the 
Code of Practice to assess schools' approach to coping with 
children with complex needs. As a result of this attention, the needs 
of the able pupils are beginning to be highlighted, and the role of 
the Special Educational Needs Coordinator (Senco) reinforced and 
clarified. 
Defining SEN has always been rather difficult and parameters change as 
society shifts its interpretation of need and support. In 2003, Montgomery 
presented a broad range of 'dually exceptional' children, including children 
with Down's Syndrome, noting that high ability can accompany any of the 
areas identified in the SEN categorisation of 2001. The UK is moving 
towards inclusive practice, partly in response to assumptions of the 
Salamanca Statement, 'v 'that all children's educational needs can be 
satisfied, more or less, within the regular classroom in a mixed-ability 
setting' (Persson et al, 2000: 724). Whilst teachers may welcome less 
segregated provision, they need flexibility to be able to cope with a 
widening range of needs. Teachers see the National Curriculum as 
restrictive in this regard, as they are unable to adopt their own curriculum 
initiatives that might more readily address the needs of 'pupils with 
problems' (Garner 1990: 100). 
Considering what constitutes good practice for the able underachiever is 
useful. Helping able underachievers necessitates good understanding of 
the principles of practice in catering for all individual needs a teacher is 
likely to meet (except for very specialised education for people with severe 
physical disabilities and sensory impairments). Defining principles of good 
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practice in this way allows for pedagogy that helps not only pupils with 
Special Educational Needs (SEN), but all pupils, because individual needs 
are taken into consideration more explicitly. 
An example of this would be classroom management techniques, such as 
minimising disruption and distraction, essential for pupils with Attention 
Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD), but helpful to all pupils in 
increasing concentration. Pupils with visual dyslexia, for example, are well 
served by particular use of colour on whiteboards and on handouts, pupils 
with dyspraxia appreciate an uncluttered spatial layout and those with 
Asperger's Syndrome require absolute clarity and no ambiguity in 
receiving instructions. All of these techniques help other pupils to work 
more effectively, partly through the clarity they provide and partly through 
the calmer classroom environment promoted through preventing the 
behaviour problems sometimes implicit in children with learning difficulties. 
The same principles can be applied to the issue of high ability. 
This emphasises that good practice for the able need not be exclusive or 
elitist. Using broadly conceived support can help to uncover more abilities 
within pupils as well as helping nurture and develop those already 
recognised. 
5.2.0 How teachers cope with highly able children 
The highly able are a heterogeneous group and responses to their needs 
require a range of strategies. Some subject areas such as Music and 
Sport already have clearly defined models of support and apprenticeship, 
with private lessons, group coaching, opportunities to represent the class, 
school or district, leading to national and international competition. 
(Freeman, 1998, for example, recommends her own 'Sports Approach' 
based on this model. ) It is generally acceptable to miss class in order to 
pursue these types of activities, although core subjects are less likely to 
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be missed than others. In staff meetings at all the schools I have worked 
in, those teaching non-core subjects have always been expected to accept 
that pupils would miss their classes rather than English, Mathematics or 
Science. 
With subjects traditionally held in high esteem, such as Mathematics and 
Science, the battle is to win over pupils, who can find conventionally 
approved subject areas rather dull and unappealing, rejecting associated 
out-of-hours activities. Already valued with pupil prizes and highly rated 
examination success in most schools, these areas can be made more 
appealing through enriching curriculum material and out-of-school 
competitions. These are described as 'cost-effective, inexpensive ways to 
develop talent' with 'extra expenses, including transportation costs, 
willingly met by the parents' (Campbell, Wagner and Walhberg, 2000: 534- 
5). Although these competitions may be very useful, I am concerned that 
lower income families may not be in a position to be as supportive as 
some researchers suggest. They also state: 'Third World developing 
countries with limited financial resources for education should develop a 
wide range of competitions to nurture the indigenous talent that exists in 
these countries. ' I dislike the dated use of the term 'Third World' and 
wonder about the implication that more developed countries have a 
limitless supply of funding. 
The experience of learning can encompass so much more than the 
subjects covered in the National Curriculum, though this is not the place to 
discuss the broader issue of the pros and cons of the NC. Clubs and other 
extra-mural activities go some way to meeting the requirements of 
voraciously interested pupils, but with increasingly burdened teachers, 
expecting this to be the answer for able pupils is no more than wishful 
thinking. 
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5.2.1 Differentiation and teachers relinquishing control 
Teachers aim to recognise and cater for individual differences. They need 
to ensure that assignments are suitably differentiated by matching tasks to 
the abilities and interests of pupils. This is an essential teaching tactic, 
lying at the heart of effective classroom practice, but it can be difficult. 
Eyre describes true differentiation as an 'aspiration' but emphasises that 
this 'does not negate the need to strive for improvement' (1997: 38-9). 
In my experience of delivering 'gifted Inset', and from discussions on the 
internet and at conferences, the most pressing concern of teachers is 
failure to differentiate sufficiently. It can lead to pupil frustration and 
boredom, if tasks are respectively too difficult, or too easy and teachers 
would like to solve this problem with minimum preparation, yielding 
maximum results. Differentiation can be defined as: 
Teaching things differently according to observed differences 
among learners (Westwood, 2001: 5). Differentiation 
strategies can be applied to: 
teaching approach 
content of the curriculum 
assessment methods 
classroom organisation 
student grouping 
teachers' interactions with individual students. 
Westwood, 2003: 202 
This suggests that different variables can be used to match the needs of 
the group with resources, set tasks, management, content or outcomes 
being varied. For example, in learning about the water cycle, all children 
could complete a worksheet to show understanding, but could have 
gleaned the information from different sources. In this differentiation by 
resources, groups could be given information in diverse formats: pre- 
written, pictorial, video or audio, free access to the library or internet. 
Tasks would be different for each group; perhaps more effective and 
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directed differentiation than giving the whole group the same introduction 
and expecting written responses of varying depth and sophistication. 
From my experience delivering Inset and working with Sencos, who have 
access to a variety of teachers with different pedagogical tactics, it is 
possible to summarise shared understanding of differentiation as 
commonly catering for three levels. This often results in the 'three- 
worksheet phenomenon' in which each lesson is taught using three 
different worksheets: the one with lots of writing; the one with a larger font 
size and a graphic; and the one with lots of pictures. Pupils assess 
themselves by the worksheets they are given. Highly able children are 
expected to be capable readers and are thus given the first worksheet. 
Less able pupils are given the third worksheet - the one with all the 
pictures - and their tasks are likely to involve only the basic concepts. But 
what of the highly able pupil with reading problems? 
In recent years, the phrase 'maximising potential' has been introduced to 
replace 'differentiation'. Reframing differentiation in this way could help 
teachers focus on getting the best from each individual rather than trying 
to rank them according to difference. This is closer to the approach 
implied by using Individual Education Plans (IEPs) tailored to meet 
specific needs (Code of Practice, 1994). In cases where pupils have a 
SEN along with high ability, the focus for support is often the area of 
difficulty. In such cases, IEPs would be the optimum response, as group 
sessions make differentiation very complex. 
However, even in one-to-one consultations, the need for appropriate 
challenge can still be overshadowed by remediation. An example of this 
would be Billie, the child with dysgraphia (handwriting problems, noted in 
Appendix Iji) often required to copy out chunks of text to help rehearse 
letter formation. This is a fairly soul-destroying activity for any individual, 
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and with able pupils, dysgraphia is often caused by the need to write at 
speed to try and capture ideas, rather than a lack of understanding of 
letter formation. Rather than trying to slow down the mechanics of writing 
in order to help legibility, a far better tactic would be to help the pupil to 
find an alternative way of recording ideas, replacing pages of linear 
longhand with notes, diagrams, tape recording or shorthand. Teachers 
could then impress upon the pupil the importance of legibility in 
communicating ideas, and this can be accomplished by using the notes as 
a basis for the response to the set task. This allows the pupil to record 
their thoughts under less pressure and is a better way to demonstrate 
understanding of the child's needs, showing respect for their ideas and 
helping to build practical, transferable strategies. There is still a place for 
penmanship sessions, but these can be narrowly focused and will not 
interrupt a child's flow of ideas in the way that struggling with clear 
handwriting can prevent children from recording their thoughts. 
An obvious response to problems caused by differentiation would seem to 
be reducing the range of ability in any one class by streaming, setting or 
selective schooling. However, even in such classes there can be a broad 
range of abilities, motivations, strengths and difficulties and although 
variation is not as marked, it still exists and careful differentiation is still 
required. Flexibility is a key factor for teachers providing optimum 
conditions for learning and facilitating understanding. Teachers need to 
understand when to use particular methods and their expertise will come 
from a combination of factors including, most vitally, subject knowledge 
and a good understanding of pupil needs. This will pave the way for 
effective differentiation. 
Selecting the right kind of pedagogy can imply a shift in power in the 
teaching situation and different situations call for an adaptive role from 
teachers. Sometimes a firm lead and clearly established boundaries are 
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needed, but on other occasions pupils need freedom and a loose structure 
in order to flourish. Shifting the balance of power can be particularly 
important with more able pupils, as research indicates that highly able 
pupils spend much time in school feeling unchallenged and bored. At the 
same time, they have deep interests in valid areas that they could pursue 
in an independent study, or their curiosity could be re-ignited through a 
shift in the set task. v Teachers are often reluctant to negotiate with pupils 
as it would appear that they are losing control of the direction of learning, 
or unfairly favouring some pupils. This is not the case, in fact, if they are 
merely responding to pupils' needs by differentiating tasks based on 
collaborative assessment, in partnership with pupils. 
A simple example to illustrate this would be the battles over homework in 
Religious Education with Louis (Appendix IJ). Louis had failed to complete 
weekly homework for RE for three months and I was asked, in my 
capacity as Senco, to help iron out the problem of his lack of co-operation 
(not to ensure that he was being challenged). The teacher's plan was to 
consider differences within Christianity and there were a series of tasks to 
complete over several weeks, with the same task for the whole class. 
These tasks all had the same structure: research a denomination of 
Christianity, find a representative church and write a few paragraphs on 
the layout and architecture, demonstrating how this linked with the nature 
of the religion. Louis was horrified at the thought of having to complete 
four rather similar drawings over four weeks and described the task as 
'dull, dull... unbelievably dull'. I asked him what he was planning to do, 
since he was required to complete some homework and was already in 
serious trouble for general non-compliance. Avoiding the task was not an 
option, unless he wanted to push the school into considering exclusion, as 
he was already on report in several other subjects, mainly for'being 
cheeky'. (In my classroom observations I would have disputed this 
interpretation in a number of cases, but not all, however. ) 
200 
Louis made a suggestion for the RE homework. He would draw a basic 
church shape and then use transparent overlays to illustrate the features 
that would mark out the differences in belief, ritual and emphasis. He was 
rather excited about this original approach and got started immediately. 
The work he produced was of a high standard and his annotations were 
far more detailed and well-researched than the short paragraphs that even 
high achieving pupils produced. Louis had completed two of the overlays 
when the RE teacher said: 'No. I have to put my foot down. It's not about 
doing what you want, Louis. It's about doing as you are told. You've got 
away with a whole term just mucking about and now you've shown you 
can work, you must get on with the homework I set just like everyone else. 
You're nothing special. ' 
Louis stopped working and went back to avoidance tactics. He was 
particularly angry with me for letting him down. I had assured him the 
teacher was open to negotiations, but I had been wrong. She changed her 
mind and started seeing him as a threat to the smooth running of her 
classroom, fearing accusations of being 'soft'. Louis had been beginning 
to change his opinion of her, but he dropped back into accusing her of 
being unimaginative and narrow-minded. What Louis had suggested was 
a perfectly valid differentiated task, meeting the learning objectives of the 
curriculum and probably also suitable for other class members. 
Teacher-pupil relationships involve shifts in control, as trust builds and 
pupils demonstrate their motivation and work ethic. Negotiating homework 
will better allow children to see the value of what they are being asked to 
study, as aims and goals are made explicit. Most highly able pupils are 
capable of seeing work targets before a project is started and making 
suggestions and decisions about how best they can achieve set goals. 
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With pupils having control over their learning, teachers take on more of a 
supervisory role, helping, guiding and facilitating, rather than prescribing. 
It is difficult to allow a few pupils such freedom while the rest of the group 
are set more prescriptive tasks. Dealing with such complex management 
is possible only where there is trust and understanding between pupils 
and teacher and where it is understood that the teacher is motivated by 
pupils' needs and not by favouritism. Highly able children must be seen to 
be working hard and not'getting away with doing nothing'. If they are 
thought to be coasting while classmates are struggling, resentment may 
set in. 
Using able pupils as learning mentors is another possibility. The mentor 
pupil, if accelerated, will initially have to build friendships and a mentor 
system can help pupils communicate. Mentors who are not accelerated 
can get to know peers who may find them difficult to understand in 
ordinary class situations and the pupils they are helping have an 
opportunity to work with someone who can give them full attention and 
who is close in age. This method can work well if handled by a sensitive 
teacher making a thoughtful pairing, where both pupils benefit from 
meaningful personal discussions about work that can be so difficult in a 
whole class situation. Teachers' roles are altered, not lessened. 
Able pupils have clear views on preferred characteristics of their teachers 
and unsurprisingly prefer humour, creativity and curiosity. ' The 
preferences require a trusting teacher - pupil relationship which can 
require the teacher to relinquish some control, acceding to pupil 
suggestions of tasks. 
In general, pupils appreciate teachers who provide appropriately 
differentiated tasks and trust and respect pupils sufficiently to negotiate 
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work tasks within reason. Key approaches to meeting needs of the able 
are underpinned by the tricky notion of differentiation and generally fall 
into three categories. They are acceleration, enrichment and extension 
considered in the next three sections (5.2.2-5.2.4). 
5.2.2 Acceleration 
Acceleration involves placing a pupil in a different year group from his or 
her chronological peers. Most accelerations skip one or two years, but 
occasionally there are larger jumps, often dramatically covered by the 
media. Such sensationalism is partly responsible for the common knee- 
jerk response that acceleration is 'potentially harmful'. In the UK, every 
August when the examination results are made public, tabloid and local 
papers present pictures of primary pupils with clutches of GCSEs and 
sometimes W-levels to rival those achieved by 16 and 18-year-olds. This 
is presented as slightly freakish, and the article is often at pains to 
reassure readers that there is no need to worry about their own children's 
relative lack of achievement, as these pupils are clearly weird, with 
overbearing families. The timbre of such coverage suggests that the 
child's welfare may even be at stake, and praise for astounding 
achievement is sometimes overtaken by an emphasis on the abnormality 
of the child. Often, parents and schools are criticised for having forced the 
child into taking exams early, and along with admiration for the 
achievement, articles are often full of concern for the future. v" 
Acceleration is in danger of being a hot-housing showcase. Passing 
exams or achieving recognised qualifications at an early age is not 
uncommon and with schools increasingly expected to promote 
themselves, children can be made to jump through hoops for the glory of 
the school rather than for their own development. It may not necessarily 
be harmful to encourage children to sit such exams at an early age, but 
there is the possibility of developing burn-out, or boredom with consequent 
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learning. Pupils who have mastered an W-level at 14 are unlikely to have 
sufficient skills and maturity to make the most of a degree course. 
Benefits accrued from accelerating a pupil to experience intellectual 
challenge can be outweighed by social and emotional concerns and at 
different points in a school career an age gap of two years can have a 
more or less severe impact. Gross introduces the notion of 'radical 
acceleration , defined as 'several grade-skips spaced appropriately 
through the student's school career'. v"' She explains that nine of 58 
subjects have entered university at ages between 11-16 and that'all are 
experiencing high levels of academic success and full social lives' 
(2000: 189). 
It cannot be sufficiently emphasised, however, that the 
problems of social isolation, peer rejection, loneliness and 
alienation which afflict many extremely gifted children arise 
not out of their exceptional intellectual abilities but as a result 
of society's response to them. 
lbid: 188 
This may be so, but the issue is still real. Until societal changes allow for 
this problem to be solved, children will need to deal with the difficulties that 
acceleration can bring and for some this would be a counter-productive 
strategy. Gross, however, would consider overcoming these obstacles to 
be worthwhile and this is understandable given the following quotations 
from two of her subjects: 
'I'm sorry it was necessary to do something that was so 
unusual at the time, but I certainly don't regret doing it. The 
alternative - staying with age peers - would have been 
intolerable. ' 
... 
bleakly encapsulated his life in the heterogeneous 
classroom in a single word: 'Hell'. 
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Sometimes acceleration works very smoothly. If the pupil is mature 
enough to mix well with peers and the change to more challenging work 
has a positive effect on self-esteem, it can be the perfect response. Most 
theorists and teachers agree that each case should be considered on its 
own merits as an individual's reaction to any situation will determine 
success or otherwise. There are also good support strategies that can 
help ease the process. For some pupils, the social aspect of acceleration 
is entirely unproblematic. Often, able pupils befriend older children and 
adults, finding their peers have problems understanding ideas and 
language that they find natural. Sometimes an apparent outsider suddenly 
fits in when accelerated, and their quirky nature that seemed so off- 
putting, is properly contextualised and no problem at all. This can also 
happen when a child is moved to a school with a different ethos and 
emphasis. This happened with Stan (Appendix I vii), whose unusual 
rhyming and word play made it difficult for him to make friends. When 
moved to a different, and more academic, school he flourished, mainly as 
a result of beginning to study classics and languages such as Latin and 
Greek in which his word play was of great help. 
It is sometimes difficult to judge when to stop accelerating and it is hard to 
continue effective differentiation when the pupil is still well ahead of 
classmates. The practicalities of keeping pupils interested once they have 
completed the curriculum at an early stage can be insurmountable. If the 
acceleration is not coordinated with the next phase of provision, the whole 
project can be negated, resulting in pupils repeating work. Recent 
research has already suggested that much of Year 7 in secondary schools 
serves as little more than a repeat of the material covered in Year 6. 'x 
Sometimes there can be suspicion of the previous teacher's work and 
pupils are treated with some scepticism when they say they have covered 
certain course requirements. It would be sensible to ensure assessments 
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that allow pupils to show what they already know, allowing pupils 
exemption from work already completed. 
The main concern with acceleration is to ensure the development of 
positive social relationships. A valuable strategy is to allow the pupils to 
mix vertically in a variety of settings, including clubs and classes. The 
most common problem for the accelerated child is physical education, 
where a marked smallness in comparison to peers can make many 
sporting activities difficult. Miles (Appendix 1, iv) found this when 
accelerated. Other pupils who were threatened by his high achievements 
in Maths and English took advantage of his lack of ability in football. He 
was two years younger than classmates and also rather short. His unusual 
abilities, coupled with his small size, made him an obvious target for 
bullying. Miles' problems came from his height and despite the stereotype, 
most highly able children tend to be good all-rounders and are not as 
weak in sport as their nerdy portrayal would suggest. 
Another strategy would be to make a more radical move and abandon the 
idea of traditional class age-groupings. This would stop the able pupil 
being seen as the odd-one-out and may help promote more harmonious 
social integration. Acceleration is therefore the strategy most affected by 
the institutional framework. It is an exaggeration of setting and streaming, 
which if it is to work, requires considerable flexibility and teamwork. 
5.2.3 Enrichment 
Enrichment provides breadth of learning through exposing pupils to a wide 
range of different activities and ideas helping them to see connections, 
discover interests and talents and develop different skills, knowledge and 
understanding. x Schools may strive to offer pupils a range of activities 
that do not relate directly to the curriculum and provide opportunities they 
may not be afforded due to economic or other home background 
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situations. That is not to say that this is a kind of compensatory 
educational strategy as much as a way of allowing children opportunities 
to express their abilities. 
To avoid the danger of activities becoming a shallow or meaningless kind 
of 'pick and mix' of fun, lacking depth or coherence, a well-considered 
selection of activities should be ensured, with access as part of an explicit 
whole-school policy. Teachers need support in referring and 
recommending pupils to attend sessions and can only do this when they 
understand the provision available. For example, children with aptitudes in 
mathematics may be encouraged to learn strategic games, such as chess, 
or investigate astronomy while being encouraged to develop her academic 
mathematics through competitions and examination syllabi. 
The rise in organised out-of-school activities has been discernible, partly 
as a response to the perceived danger of letting children play 
unsupervised in public parks and streets and partly as a result of children 
needing to build curriculum vitae for entrance to competitive schools. The 
concept of the 'hyper-parent' has recently surfaced as a concern, x' where 
children are ferried from tap-class to T'ai Chi and then to private tutors and 
French classes, leaving little'down time'. Some commentators also worry 
that pupils are spending too much time with planned activities. This view 
could well be informed by a rose-tinted memory of the past. People 
commonly yearn for'simpler times', and whilst each era has its positive 
points, negatives can easily be forgotten. Whether this is a problem is 
affected, in part, by the nature and quality of the activities on offer. Some 
schools and workshops are activity-led, consisting of like-minded 
individuals with a shared interest, such as sewing, country-dancing or 
bridge. These offer intrinsic rewards rather than certificates or improved 
grades. Others are competitive, or designed to maximise classroom 
performance in Key Stages, including independent school Common 
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Entrance exam crammer courses for prestigious 13-plus entry to private 
upper schools as well as remediation for problems. The internet has also 
allowed people with shared interests to meet up 'virtually', which is of 
tremendous use to the able pupil wanting to research an area in detail. 
(Concerns about internet child safety are addressed by school 
gateways. )x" 
Activities designed specifically for the highly able pupil tend to be more 
child-led; outcomes and subject area are considered less important than 
the opportunity for challenge (see Appendix IV for examples of such 
activities). With out-of-school enrichment courses, a group of children 
attend either residential or day sessions, opting from a selection of 
planned workshops spanning a wide range of topics, with opportunities for 
social mixing and trying out new ideas and projects. As all pupils are 
selected for high ability, there is no need to wait for any of the group to 
catch up. Small group sizes allow staff to spend more time with each pupil 
and the relaxed atmosphere without the pressures of tests, targets and 
statutory activities helps develop a more open and creative response to 
set tasks. Pupil behaviour is rarely an issue and it is possible to allow a 
certain laxness in rules, as the group's motivation ensures on-task and 
focused work. The children police one another, and the strength of feeling 
that comes from working on a group task encourages a responsible 
attitude to working. 
School and family'activity days'to which the able are invited can help to 
introduce pupils to a broader range of topics than can be covered in 
school time. If these are family events, parents are present to share in 
their child's enthusiasms and to talk informally with teachers about their 
child's ability. In days planned for the family, activities should also be 
available for parents at their own level, to present a positive model of adult 
learning. The family that can appreciate one another's interests is likely to 
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offer a positive ethos encouraging children to pursue projects and ideas as 
they wish. x"' 
5.2.4 Extension 
Extension work is quite simply going beyond the basic prescribed tasks. 
This is usually explained as a model in which the teacher outlines (a) 
minimum tasks, (b) recommended further tasks, and (c) optional extension 
tasks that able pupils can undertake as extension of the basic class 
activity. This model is known as'must, could, should' and is designed for 
use at the planning stage, rather than adding extra activities to completed 
tasks as children finish work. This should ensure continuity and 
progression and is 'far *more valuable than bolt-on, one-off extension 
ideas' (Eyre, 1997: 40-1). 
Extending pupils beyond the level expected for their chronological age is 
more difficult than might first appear, however. It would seem logical that a 
pupil should continue working in a subject area at the level of their ability, 
and that teachers should differentiate tasks and resources accordingly. In 
reading, able infants have found themselves in the position of having read 
every book in the library. These 'hyperlexic' pupils are then directed to 
further texts that may have themes that are too advanced in terms of 
emotional maturity - material designed mainly for young teenagers. There 
are problems too, for the teachers. It is a complex business having to 
differentiate for pupils within a typical ability range, but someone who is 
very far advanced from their peers will present further demands. There 
may not be materials available for the next stage in the relevant subject. 
Next year's teacher will not thank their colleague for using up all the texts 
and plans intended for their next group. 
Some subject areas lend themselves to this approach far better than 
others. Literature, as noted, can introduce themes that children can find 
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awkward to discuss and difficult to understand despite the mechanics of 
literary criticism remaining well within their grasp. Similarly, musical 
performance often requires a sensitivity that a child cannot present as they 
have less experience upon which to draw. Mathematics and Modern 
Foreign Languages, however, are appropriate fields for such extension 
work. 
The mechanics of running a school and meeting curricular demands are 
affected by pupils inevitably demonstrating a wide range of abilities. It 
makes practical sense to minimise difference and roughly group children, 
teaching them with the same materials. Extension is only practically 
workable where there are very small classes and where teachers can be 
extremely flexible. 
5.3 Summa[y of strategies 
Of the strategies outlined, I would suggest that acceleration must be 
handled with great care and that extension is often too impractical to offer 
a real solution. Enrichment though, has many positive aspects and is 
appropriate for allowing all children to explore their interests and aptitudes. 
It can be fit easily into school structures and, whilst being aimed primarily 
at the able, other pupils can benefit. The following is a summary of how 
techniques may help all pupils, or just the able: 
Uniquely appropriate for gifted 
Acceleration 
Career education (girls) 
Ability grouping 
High level curriculum 
Differential programming 
Effective with gifted and general education 
Enrichment 
Inquiry, discovery, problem solving and creativity 
Professional end products as standards 
Microcomputers 
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Gallagher, 2000: 688 adapting Shore and Delcourt, 1996 
and echoed by Moon and Rosselli, 2000: 505 
This list seems to suggest that a flexible and open curriculum, 
providing discovery, problem solving and creativity is more 
important than the common response of ability grouping, if the 
needs of the whole school are taken into account. If provision can 
help the able as well as other pupils, it is obvious this method 
should be adopted if possible. 
Each strategy has its strengths and weaknesses and although I am 
broadly in favour of enrichment, I concede that rather than one 
strategy dominating, a range of factors should be taken into 
account. These include the general pedagogy, including 
consideration of classroom management issues such as grouping 
of children and overall organisation. As noted, curriculum content 
and assessment are important, but the key factor is likely to be how 
teachers interact with individual students. Many texts make 
recommendations for enrichment, acceleration and extension, but 
these are not always well implemented, if at all. 
More and more educators seem to be convinced that 
differentiating the standard curriculum is the key to the 
effective education of gifted students but examples of such 
differentiation are few and far between. [ ... ] Such modified 
content can represent acceleration, enrichment, 
sophistication or novelty. ' 
lbid: 689 
5.4 Conclusion 
Provision for the highly able pupil is undoubtedly complex. Highly able 
children need to spend time with age peers and with those who share the 
aptitudes, abilities and interests that constitute their high ability. 
Acceleration is appropriate for the socially mature individual where there 
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are structures in place to support the decision. Radical acceleration is only 
useful in a small minority of cases, but can sometimes be the perfect 
solution. Sometimes home schooling could provide a suitable response, or 
a specific specialist school for Music, for example. Extension, similarly 
requires a great deal of flexibility on the part of the school and general 
differentiation can be effective where training and support are provided. 
Enrichment emerges as the best all-inclusive strategy (if one strategy 
alone needs to be recommended) emerging as more workable and less 
problematic than acceleration and extension and with the potential to 
involve a wide range of pupils. 
The distinct way that the able think and work requires particular 
programmes and pedagogy failing outside the range of techniques and 
subject areas presented through traditional schooling and, more 
specifically, through the National Curriculum. Provision for the able is 
currently patchy and lacks coherence. Of particular concern is the lack of 
attention given to able underachievers, who miss out even where 
provision is available. To help overcome this, high ability could benefit 
from being reframed as a SEN but only if teachers are properly equipped 
to deal with high ability issues. Account also needs to be taken of how 
best to deal with children who have 'ordinary' SEN along with their high 
ability ('dually exceptional' children). 
Any approach will benefit from team-work, training and a committed work 
force. Dealing with high ability is about more than task-setting. On training 
courses and in providing information for teachers, issues of relinquishing 
power should be confronted and it must be acknowledged that teachers 
are likely to feel emotional effects when control for learning is shifted to 
pupils. Teachers need to be equipped with strategies to help cope with 
this unusual issue. Also, it must be emphasised that for any initiative to 
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have lasting impact the provision should become 'an integral part of the 
curriculum, not and add-on' (Goodhew, 2002: 26). 
Thinking skills programmes can be incorporated as part of an enrichment 
strategy, or as an element of extension or acceleration, depending on the 
structure and curricula of the school. Some critical thinking skills 
programmes are presented as strategies for raising standards throughout 
the school with a variety of ages and abilities and often with a focus on 
helping the highly able. This seems to fit with the suggestions in the 
literature and so the efficacy of this approach is considered in Chapter 6. 
' Hallam and Ireson argue that traditional notions of setting as positive for lower ability 
children is inaccurate and in fact the more able benefit most from setting, whilst mixed 
ability teaching is better for the majority of pupils (2001: 39). They recommend strategies 
that meet the needs of all pupils and emphasise that there is no 'quick fix solution' (p175). 
Porter cites Eyre who has found that 'Research tells us that when schools expand their 
provisions for more able children, overall provisions improve' (1997 in 1999: 11). 
" The 'London Challenge' aims to establish specialist schools and to improve standards 
across problem boroughs in London. It is a five-year project, with reasonable funding and 
significant high profile (although some funding has been recently clawed back, 
Jeopardising the project). 
Iii This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and 
submitted in part completion of a Master of Philosophy degree at Cambridge University in 
1990. Two classes of eight-year-olds (total of 74 children) took part in the study, along 
with their teachers. 
iv This statement was issued in 1994, building on the foundations of the 1989 UN 
Convention of the Rights of the Child, intending both to improve understanding of 
children's individual rights within education and welfare. 'The Salamanca Statement was 
arguably the most significant international document that has ever appeared in the 
special needs field' stating that '... regular schools with an inclusive orientation are 'the 
most effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, building an inclusive society 
and achieving education for all' (Garner, 1999: 52, citing Ainscow, 1997: 182). 
v Gallagher identifies 'sophistication' and 'novelty' as valuable for the able child, in terms 
of differentiated tasks (2000: 689). 
Vi Baldwin, Vialle and Clarke (2000: 570) report the following characteristics: 'Innovation' 
- teacher is looking for and trying new or different ways to approach learning ... 
focusing 
her creativity on helping students develop creativity and to become actively involved in 
learning. 'Gestalt'- well organised with a drive toward completing tasks even at a 
perfectionist level. This teacher works from where the student is. 'Rapport drive'- sees 
him or herself as a warm friendly person who students like, works purposefully to build a 
positive working relationship with the students, which the teacher perceived as beneficial 
for the students. 
Vii The well-publicised case of Ruth Lawrence is perhaps the first and most famous of 
these cases in the UK, which seem to have become increasingly common. Lawrence, a 
gifted mathematician, famously won a place at Oxford University in 1981, at the age of 14 
years. Her father accompanied her to university, attending lectures and looking out for 
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her welfare. The media would periodically focus on her, discussing the pros and cons of 
her situation and relationship with her father, like a shadow, the object of scorn and 
admiration, by turns. It is difficult to find data on these cases and unclear whether the 
incidence is increasing, decreasing or constant. 
v... Gross is the leading researcher in terms of radical acceleration. For other types of 
acceleration, see, for example, Duke, Purdue and the work undertaken at Johns Hopkins 
University (reported in Heller et al, 2000). 
ix Initial information from personal communication with the National Association of Gifted 
Children, July 2001, reinforced by journal. 
' Renzulli's Schoolwide Enrichment Model is the most significant empirically verified 
approach to enrichment, see Renzulli and Reis 2000 for a thorough exposition of this 
approach. 
x' Reference here is to 'Cutting Edge' television documentary March 2003 and a spate of 
newspaper articles in tabloids and broadsheets (Channel 4). 
Xii A radical restructure of schools using learning networks was proposed by Illich in his 
1971 seminal publication, 'Deschooling Society'. Some aspects of his vision for education 
would complement the ideas of this thesis. 
x"' I have experience of such days, having run series of workshops on a variety of 
themes. These were always open access and inclusive, but certain workshops were 
tailored toward the highly able who were invited specifically to attend. Activities for 
parents and families proved most successful and teachers reported learning more about 
their own and others' abilities. 
x'v In this instance, 'sophistication' is defined as work with more complexity, and 'novelty' 
as 'work which is unique to the regular curriculum, but which has some interest to gifted 
students (e. g. the study of the stock market and its operations)'. (Gallagher, 2000: 689) 
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Chapter 6 Critical Thinkinq Skills Proqrammes 
6.0 Introduction 
Following the definition in Chapter 2 emphasising intellectual aspects of 
high ability and concerns raised in the previous chapter (5, concerning 
provision) a review of critical thinking skills programmes is an obvious 
direction to take. This chapter considers thinking skill programmes as a 
possible approach to dealing with the highly able pupil in school, reviewing 
advantages and potential problems (6.1). 
Because the government supports the inclusion of 'teaching thinking' in 
the National Curriculum (NC), commentators rarely raise questions as to 
whether or not this is either achievable or worthwhile. Governmental 
endorsement is characterised by the key report authored by McGuinness 
(1999) and for this reason it is a central focus of this chapter, forming the 
structure for discussion of key issues within the teaching of thinking 
debate (6.3 and 6.4.0-6.4.2). 
In sections 6.5.0 to 6.5.4,1 describe the programmes and then conclude 
by exhorting policy-makers to be cautious in their recommendation of 
under-examined strategies. 
(Claims are considered in this chapter in sections dealing with each 
different programme. The whole of the next chapter is devoted to the 
Philosophy with Children programmes, with a section on their suitability for 
the able- 7.7. ) 
6.1 A perfect solution for the hiqhlv able? 
There are several possible reasons why critical thinking skills programmes 
could be the perfect solution for the highly able. Firstly, the programmes 
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can be conducted on a stand-alone basis and can be followed without 
interfering in usual lesson requirements. Secondly, some materials require 
little teacher input or monitoring, largely designed in a way that would lend 
them to independent study and sometimes even self-assessment. Lastly 
and most importantly for the highly able, the programmes are often made 
up of open-ended tasks. Their flexible structure, adaptability and open- 
endedness can engage pupils who often reach the ceiling in other tasks 
However, contrary to some claims, the programmes cannot be equally 
applicable to all abilities. ' (Claims are considered in this chapter in the 
sections dealing with each different programme and the whole of the next 
chapter is devoted to the Philosophy with Children programmes, with a 
section on their suitability for the able - 7.7. ) Also, programmes are of 
variable quality and it is difficult for teachers to assess their efficacy. For 
the programmes to be successful, practitioners will need training to 
understand the materials and processes of the programmes, even where 
they are eventually used independently by pupils. 
6.2 'From Thinkinq Skills to Thinkinq Classrooms' 
Thinking skills programmes have been well-received by teachers partly 
because they make use of pedagogy teachers would have chosen 
anyway, if not so weighed down by National Curriculum requirements. 
The enthusiasm for thinking skills as a solution to our 
difficulties with the curriculum stems partly from concern that 
what is offered in schools today fails to keep up with the 
current ideas about effective work practice, leisure pursuits 
and the desire for good-quality relationships. 
Haynes 2002: 39 
In addition to concerns that the current curriculum seems to fall short in 
meeting the needs of pupils, teachers can be frustrated by an emphasis 
on quantifiable targets and the associated raised status of curriculum 
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subjects perceived as objectively measurable. Practitioners know that 
some aspects of learning are not manifested immediately as a visible 
outcome. The nature of thinking makes it difficult and inappropriate to 
measure with standard methods. This, of course, lowers its status in the 
eyes of those who champion the drive for ticking boxes in checklists and 
meeting imposed targets. " Philosophy for Children is a critical thinking 
programme in which this issue is apparent: 
Some of the most important benefits of philosophy will not be 
quantifiable. During discussion there occur those magic 
moments whose value is beyond measure. How can you 
quantify that moment when a very articulate child sitting in 
the corner of the classroom thinking and not communicating 
very much suddenly has an idea and is able for the first time 
to articulate a very thoughtful contribution to a discussion? 
Fisher 1998: 245 
Lack of confidence in imaginative pedagogy coupled with an over-stuffed 
NC has led teachers to seek out new ways to provide challenge whilst not 
interfering with required subject teaching. They want pupils to become 
effective learners and sometimes turn to thinking skills programmes to 
meet this need, particularly when the focus is on challenge for the more 
able pupil. Some create their own schemes, but this practitioner-led 
research is difficult to maintain and disseminate without substantial 
funding. "' 
Teachers look to academic research and the government to maintain the 
quality of programmes that make their way on to the market. So, what are 
the academics and policy-makers saying about these programmes? 
Answering this question is important as it demonstrates how policy 
becomes enshrined and how we managed to arrive where we are in 
thinking skills, following recommendations that unfortunately seem to lack 
rigorous underpinning. 
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Advice is available on the DfES website, often the first resource accessed 
by a wide audience of teachers, where it is possible to see the 
government's outline and interpretation of thinking skills. In consulting the 
site, users would rightly expect to be presented with a careful exposition of 
the area, a wide-ranging and comprehensive taxonomy of skills supported 
by a rationale for the choices made. This is not what is encountered. The 
MIES website notes: 
The National Curriculum states that by using thinking skills, pupils 
can focus on 'knowing how' as well as'knowing what'- learning 
how to learn. The following thinking skills complement the key skills 
and are embedded in the National Curriculum: 
Information-processing skills / Reasoning skills 
Enquiry skills / Creative thinking skills / Evaluation skills. 
Nowhere on the website is there any explanation of how such a list was 
determined and when the ideas are further broken down into what is 
obscurely termed a 'metadata system', there seems to be a leaning 
towards certain curriculum subjects. Here, for example, is the set of sub- 
skills for Enquiry: 
Asking questions / defining problems / questions for enquiry 
choosing equipment / tools planning research / predicting 
outcomes / consequences carrying out research / drawing 
conclusions / testing conclusions / evaluating process 
improving ideas. 
There is no suggestion of philosophical concepts, or of co-operative work, 
no focus on listening and no mention of time for reflection and 
contemplation, implying that 'enquiry' is best suited to scientific, 
geographical or other empirical subject areas. Clearly, the National 
Curriculum is not going to be able to cover every type of thinking, but the 
website could at least nod in acknowledgment of inevitable gaps in the list. 
It would be acceptable to assert that what is being presented is not a 
definitive taxonomy, but the comprehensive result of careful choices made 
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for the curriculum by qualified researchers and practitioners in a complex 
and controversial area. (Scepticism is to be found in the philosophical 
literature, which continues to worry away at the conceptions so often taken 
for granted by the broader educational literature. ") 
Perhaps it would be more fruitful to seek advice from a pertinent 
government report published prior to the inclusion of thinking skills in the 
National Curriculum. This leads us to Carol McGuinness' influential review 
of thinking skills programmes, commissioned by the DfEE in 1998 
(published 1999) and described as 'excellent' by the School Standards 
Minister. v The report concludes that thinking is made up of a range of 
skills that can be taught, and that these are generalisable, and therefore 
transferable. This leads McGuinness to recommend the teaching of 
thinking skills in schools, with a particular emphasis on the 'infusion' 
method, which is the one she adopts for her own classroom materials. v' 
Unfortunately, the report seems like a wasted opportunity to confront the 
tricky questions plaguing thinking skills. Thorough exposition and analysis 
built on sturdy foundations with rigorous analysis of empirical and 
theoretical evidence could have resulted in a balanced proposal, with 
thinking skills presented as a useful addition to the classroom teacher's 
pedagogic toolkit, rather than a universal solution. 
Even a cursory glance at the report reveals some rather irritating errors 
that hint at a lack of rigour. v" More seriously, the report lacks critical 
analysis of basic premises and underpinning theory, somewhat 
undermining McGuinness' authority. There is no real discussion of the 
nature of thinking, a rejection of the importance of subject knowledge and 
a lack of clarity about whether the nature of thinking is an attitude, a 
disposition, a strategy or a mental ability and no attempt to tackle even the 
well-known criticisms of the concept of thinking skills by John McPeck. 
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First in a list of five aims, McGuinness asserts that one of the purposes of 
the review is to : 
... analyse what is currently understood by the term 'thinking 
skills' and their role in the learning process 
Para 1, p3 
The other four aims focus on practical applications and it is not clear that 
any of these aims is thoroughly accomplished in the report. The 
programmes examined in the report suppose the existence of thinking 
skills without question (for example, Sternberg 1984, and authors of 
practical resources such as Fisher 1998, Cam 1999, Lipman 1974 and 
Adey and Shayer, 1984). Without any foundation, McGuinness alleges: 
... the idea of thinking-as-a-skill continues to 
have both 
theoretical and instructional force. Firstly, it places thinking 
firmly on the side of 'knowing how' rather than 'knowing that' 
in the long standing philosophical debate about the nature of 
knowing. And secondly, much of what we know about skill 
learning can be usefully applied to developing thinking - 
being explicit about components of the skills, learning by 
observation and modelling, the importance of practice, 
feedback and transfer of learning. 
Para 2, p4-5 
These confused claims and simplistic presentation of complex ideas 
warrant further examination. The next sections of this chapter take the 
issues in turn, as they constitute key contentious aspects of the wider 
debate and are neatly encapsulated in the report, although inadequately 
tackled. They are as follows, with the section references noted in 
parentheses: 
1. Thinking-as-a-skill is uncontested and is to do with 'knowing how' 
rather than 'knowing that' (6.3). 
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2. Developing thinking is like other forms of skill learning: (a) it is 
made up of components (6.4.0); (b) learning is through observation 
and modelling, with practice and feedback (6.4.1); (c) there is 
transfer of learning (6.4.2). 
(Sections 6.3 to 6.4.2 concern general issues. Relevance for the highly 
able is considered in sections 6.5.0 to 6.5.4, concerning specific 
programmes. ) 
6.3 'Thinkinq-as-a-skill is uncontested and is to do with knowinq how 
rather than knowing that. ' 
McGuinness asserts the existence of thinking skills, claiming 
'theoretical and instructional force', for dichotornising 'knowing how' 
and knowing that'. She does not substantiate this statement and 
seems to be suggesting that thinking is an activity at which we are 
able to improve, and that knowledge is an unnecessary aspect of 
this development, since the skill of thinking can be taught 
independently. (In section 6.5.1, programmes that claim to teach 
'context-free thinking' are considered. ) 
However, theoretical and practical reasoning are intimately bound 
together. Steve Johnson for example, considers their separation 
4 educationally unhelpful I. 
It may, for instance, divorce beliefs from actions, and drive a 
wedge between mental processes, which are taken to be 
active, and knowledge, which is taken to be inert. 
2001: 6 
Advocates of thinking skills programmes do not always ignore the 
role of knowledge, however. Higgins and Baumfield (1998) 
specifically identify the importance of knowledge and 
understanding, particularly in their discussion of the expert and the 
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novice. They note that expertise is defined through subject 
knowledge and experience and maintain that novices need both 
knowledge and general skills in order to develop mastery. Some of 
the programmes however, do separate knowledge and skills as 
emphasised in the conclusion of the report, where McGuinness 
notes that teachers 'experience difficulty keeping the twin 
perspectives of thinking skills and topic content simultaneously in 
view' (para 10.11 p 29). This sounds a warning bell, suggesting that 
thinking skills programmes could encourage teachers to consider 
knowledge and action as independent of one another, which is not 
the case. They are closely connected: 
... practical reasoning depends on theoretical reasoning, because thinking out what is to be done relies upon thought 
about what is the case. 
White, 2002: 110 
In addition to this worry, Johnson considers that McGuinness' 
characterisation of thinking-as-a-skill, mistakenly reifies thinking, through: 
... the act of wrongly 
treating an act as if it were a thing. [ ... ] 
For example, because it is meaningful to talk of someone 
who thinks well as being a skilful thinker, we are tempted to 
believe that there is a skill to be identified, isolated and 
trained for. 
lbid: 14-5 
This is certainly how thinking skills are typified by some theorists, 
including de Bono (cited in Johnson, p15 and discussed here in 
section 6.5.1) and is a key aspect of the McGuinness report. 
Teachers and other theorists sometimes use 'skill talk' in a more 
thoughtful manner, however. Siegel and Bailin, for example, find 
the description of thinking-as-a-skill acceptable, 'as long as it is 
taken as referring to thinking that is skilled in the sense that it 
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meets relevant criteria' (2003: 182). These criteria include the 
application of theoretical reasoning to practical situations, avoiding 
the separation of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' implied in 
McGuinness' characterisation. Siegel and Bailin emphasise that 
merely 'fostering in students the ability to assess the probative 
strength of reasons' would be insufficient to meet their criteria, 
which specify both 'the ability to reason well and the disposition to 
do so' (op cit). They note thata given thinker may have the ability 
but not (or not systematically or routinely) use it' (op cit: 183). 
The development of positive dispositions is also emphasised by 
White, who explains why teachers use'skill talk': 
Thinking is an activity. It is something that goes on in the 
mind. It is an occurrent phenomenon. But it is something at 
which children can improve. The activity can get better with 
practice. This is why thinking is sometimes characterised as 
a skill. It has a continuant as well as occurrent side to it. Part 
of the educator's task is to build up children's thinking skills 
through engaging them in thinking activities. [ ... ] We want them to use their skills on a more regular basis, to get into 
the habit of thinking clearly about what they are to do and 
believe. We want to develop thinking dispositions in them. 
2002: 104 
Perhaps to avoid accusations of over-simplification, such as those 
of Johnson, recent literature moves away from 'skill-talk'. For 
example, Baumfield (2001) uses the phrase 'teaching for learning', 
which incorporates experience, social context and knowledge, 
rather than a simple polarisation of process versus content. This 
may be a more useful depiction, but would not escape Johnson's 
criticism of thinking skills as falling into the error of the 'naming 
fallacy'. This is when a category or label, such as 'analysis', is 
wrongly interpreted as evidence for the 'existence of a general skill 
or ability' (Johnson 2001: 16). The description 'analysis' can be 
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applied accurately to a variety of actions, but this should not be 
extended, into a stand-alone thinking skill called 'analysis'. The skill 
could never be exercised independently of a specific context and as 
such would be a different skill each time. Analysis of algebra is 
distinct from analysis of architecture, political argument or a dance 
step. A person can be reasonably described as thinking 
analytically, without the type of thinking being mistaken as a 
general skill. 
... references to skills, particularly in the adjectival and 
adverbial forms, can be understood as indicating, not inner 
entities or possessions, but rather thinking that meets 
relevant criteria. 
Siegel, 2002: 183 
However, the naming fallacy is certainly the case with the government 
taxonomy and the work of de Bono, where long lists of skills are presented 
with no basis for their inclusion other than the category for which they are 
named. McGuinness even states that 'what is included and excluded can 
be arbitrary' (para 3.3, p5). 
Further claims about the nature of thinking skills are now explored, based 
on McGuinness' statements that they are like other forms of learning as 
they are: 
(a) made up of components; 
(b) learnt through observation and modelling; and 
(c) transferable. 
6.4.0 Thinkinq skills are like other forms of skill learninq as thev are: 
(a) made up of components 
It is assumed that thinking skills can be taught by breaking 
processes down into discrete sub-skills. The temptation is thus to 
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develop lists of competences (such as the list provided by the DfES 
'information-processing skills, reasoning skills' etc), but this 
impoverished approach, ignores the context for the skills, the role of 
knowledge and the development of good habits and dispositions. 
Numerous attempts to identify and categorise different kinds 
of thinking have followed from the drive to expand and 
improve knowledge creation and to remove obstacles to 
learning. What is it that expert thinkers do? Perhaps if we 
knew what it is that expert thinkers do we could use the 
knowledge to help children further their skills. Can the 
essence of the experts be captured and taught? 
Haynes, 2002: 39 
This could perhaps be accomplished by breaking down thinking into 
composite parts. This is problematic, demonstrated by Johnson's 
criticism of McGuinness' tendency to reduce skills into a series of 
components, suggesting it may have a 
... baleful influence if 
it leads to unsuitable approaches to 
teaching' 'Come young master Einstein, enough of these 
flashes of insight, think things through stage by stage. ' 
2001: 6-7 
The light-hearted example is taken in the manner intended, but the 
point remains that some pupils' performance may well be enhanced 
by using strategies to consider steps that can be taken to make a 
choice, or present an analysis. It does not follow that able pupils 
would be forced along a particular fixed route and denied the 
opportunity to work in the way that best suits their needs. There 
would be very few teachers demanding that a pupil should abandon 
his excellent insights and instead use a stepwise approach. The 
example could be turned around. What if the rejection of the 
teaching of thinking skills resulted in a far more 'hands-off 
approach? Pupils drowning in knowledge need to organise what 
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they have been taught in order to answer an essay question. 'You 
know all the dates and events, now sit there and think. You're 
bound to have a flash of insight soon. ' 
Johnson also asserts that mastery of the parts of a task will not 
guarantee mastery of the whole task (ibid: 7), taking issue with 
those who find that 'teaching rules and principles is essential 
Whilst I agree that it would not be useful to over-emphasise sub- 
skills and take no account of broader issues, I do not think many 
practitioners would want to follow any particular method with 
unswerving dogmatism. In learning, there are times when breaking 
down components is indeed useful. No sensible practitioner would 
consider teaching the physics of cycling before the practice (as 
Johnson suggests on page 7), but there are many cases when 
rules and principles are valuable to know. For example, knowing 
the function of the clutch pedal in a car can help a novice driver 
understand how to change gear and make decisions about this until 
it starts to feel natural. Similarly, no-one would consider mechanical 
reproduction of the right notes in the right order to be the same 
thing as really playing music, but there are moments in learning a 
new piano piece or a difficult arpeggio when full attention must be 
paid to 'thinking what one is doing with one's fingers 
Even amongst those who advocate thinking skills, there is argument about 
a taxonomy of such skills and it is naTve to suggest that this is clear and 
uncontested. McGuinness refers to several 'taxonomies' but does not 
evaluate their worth (section 3.3, pp 5-6). Amongst the selection is the 
'framework' of multiple intelligences theory but it is not clear that this 
constitutes a taxonomy of thinking, in the same way that a list of 'sub- 
skills' counts as a taxonomy. There is also a list headed 'high quality 
thinking ', confusingly referred to as both a 'characterisation of thinking' 
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(p5) and as list of 'types of thinking' (p6). The reader is unsure as to 
whether the list is an explanation or description. 
She then notes: 
Developing thinking has created its own conceptions for 
learning and has shifted from the thinking-as-a-skill 
metaphor to ideas of a thinking curriculum, thinking 
classrooms and learning communities. 
Para 3.8, p7 
It is unclear what 'developing thinking' means here - is it a movement, or 
some kind of organisation? Is it an impetus that has come from research? 
And is a 'thinking curriculum' supposed to mean a curriculum designed to 
enhance thinking, perhaps a 'curriculum for thinking? Unfortunately, 
obfuscation such as this is easy to criticise, rendering any positive points 
the report might make rather hard to defend. 
It would seem that by failing to tackle sticky central concepts head on, the 
DfEE report has been left open to easy pot shots. 
6.4.1 Thinkinq skills are like other forms of skill learning as they are: 
(b) learnt through observation and modelling; 
McGuinness notes that learning to think is like other kinds of skill 
learning and can be accomplished through 'learning by observation 
and modelling, with practice and feedback' (p5). This is dismissed 
by Johnson as suitable for gardening and carpentry, but not for 
thinking: 'we cannot observe a thinker's thinking skills! ' (p8). Well, 
of course it is impossible to see thoughts, but it can definitely be 
valuable to observe expert thinkers in action. An essential part of 
my doctoral programme has been attendance at weekly philosophy 
seminars in which students are exposed to experienced 
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professionals discussing complex issues. They ask and field 
questions, make connections, clarify terminology, probe and worry 
at concepts and ideas and present constructive and destructive 
criticism. Students are also given a platform at these meetings and 
as confidence and knowledge grow, individual student participation 
increases. We are indeed observing the thinker's thinking skills and 
just because thoughts 'do not fit a common model' (p8), it is still a 
useful process. 
Johnson also disagrees with McGuinness' endorsement of 'the 
importance of practice' (p5). He uses de Bono's weak analogy of 
Imental muscles' and asserts that 'the arithmetical-circuit training of 
simple sums seems to prepare one only for simple sums' (p8) 
although he presents no evidence for this statement. He dismisses 
the use of practice in intellectual pursuits, saying that 'we can 
neither initiate nor control' understanding (p9). Practice in 
understanding is a difficult idea and very different from practising a 
tennis serve, drum roll or calligraphy stroke. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to improve certain aspects of understanding through 
practice. The seminars noted become increasingly meaningful for 
students who concentrate on form and structure of argument, which 
can only come with a sense of comfort and ease with the 
discussion format. This comes from practice, experience and 
feedback. 
6.4.2 Thinking skills are like other forms of skill learning as they are: 
(c) transferable. 
The seductive idea that thinking skills are transferable across domains has 
dominated discussion in the field for many years. If it could be 
demonstrated that a core group of skills relates to all key subjects, it would 
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be clear what should be taught in schools and even, possibly, how such 
teaching should occur. White reminds us that the vagaries of educational 
fashion have brought this old concern to current attention (op cit 113). 
The conceptual error that leads people to consider thinking skills as 
transferable is identified by Johnson as the 'generalising fallacy'which: 
... consists in putting a task competence under the heading 
of a wider, perhaps an extremely wide, task descriptor and 
assuming that if a person has mastered the task 
competence then, ipso facto, she can do whatever falls 
under the wider descriptor. 
ibid 
A teacher committing this error with a three-year-old, for example, could 
wrongly assume that their ability to classify shapes according to colour 
would transfer to an ability to classify shapes according to size. There are 
links between the two tasks, but there is no guarantee that a child with a 
well-developed concept of colour will have a similarly advanced concept of 
size. The specificity of thinking to different domains is also highlighted by 
White (2001: 99-114). He shows that effective philosophical argument for 
example, may not be relevant to economics or science. The most widely 
cited critic of the notion of general isabil ity of thinking skills is McPeck, who 
states that 'thinking is always thinking about something. To think about 
nothing is a conceptual impossibility' (1981: 3). McPeck is vague, however, 
in pinning down the kind of 'activities' that thinking could be about, but 
suggests more generally that a broadly based liberal education would 
provide children with what they need to become critical thinkers. 
It seems that thinking skills cannot be transferable as they must always be 
within a specific context and each context will differ, making the skill 
different each time. However, Higgins and Baumfield (1998) argue that 
domains of knowledge are closely related and that the onus is on their 
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detractors to prove that there are no connections between fields (e. g. 
McPeck, 1981; Barrow, 1987; Johnson and Gardner, 1999). Even though 
fields of learning are distinct, there are shared aspects that can be 
highlighted by teachers. Subject areas such as mathematics and physics, 
or biology and chemistry are closely connected with knowledge from the 
fields helping to inform one another, as well as sharing some similarities in 
methods used to approach tasks and problems. 
Paul Hirst's influential forms of knowledge theory for example, considers 
both the distinct nature and the similarities between fields. He argues that 
each form of knowledge has its own logic and can be distinguished by four 
key features: shared core concepts; distinct logical structure; distinctive 
expressions testable against experience; and particular techniques for 
exploring and testing its statements. He also notes though, that domains 
are related: 
It was no part of the thesis [ ... ] that the forms of 
knowledge 
are totally independent of each other, sharing no concepts or 
logical rules. That the forms are inter-related has been 
stressed from the start. 
1974: 89 
Elliott goes further identifying 'mental powers 
1, 
claiming they underlie the 
domains: 
... the 
Forms of Knowledge owe their origin, character and 
achievements to the nature and operations of mental 
powers, and this is a reason for understanding the mental 
powers as the most fundamental development of the mind. 
1975: 51 
The difficulty with this view is that some of the examples are not 
necessarily powers to be taught and learnt, but have more to do 
with basic conditions of living ('retention and anticipation' p48; 
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'involvement and ambition' p49). Although thinking skills are a 
logical possibility, Johnson and Gardner claim there is no evidence 
for their existence, although they do concede that they have never 
considered 'there is anything contradictory in the idea of general 
thinking skills' (1999: 436). 
Siegel and Bailin agree that thinking skills differ across domains, 
but emphasise that: 
... it simply does not follow that nothing general can be said 
about the activity of thinking, conceived as the general 
activity of which all particular episodes of thinking are 
instances. That particular episodes of thinking always have 
particular content is perfectly compatible with there being 
general thinking skills or abilities that are applicable to a 
wide range of domains, subjects, or contexts. 
2003: 184 
They identify arguments that are 'applicable across a range of 
reasoning contexts' (p184), suggesting similarities in different types 
of fallacies, for example. That they recognise the value of subject 
content contradicts Johnson's suggestion that supporters of 
thinking skills dismiss 'the importance of school subjects' (2001: 36). 
Siegel and Bailin present a specific definition of critical thinking, 
explaining how it can be set apart from other 'types of thinking' that 
may occur in a taxonomy. Critical thinking is to do with the quality of 
thinking, and this could therefore have some general currency 
across domains. v"' This is definitely a different understanding of 
general thinking skills from the confused definition in the 
McGuinness report and some of those presented in published 
programmes. 
The notion of transferable thinking skills as a list of competences is 
criticised by Johnson, but this conception is only presented in the 
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McGuinness report and theoretically weaker critical thinking skills 
programmes. In CoRT, for example, de Bono makes bold claims 
about transfer, but authors of FIE and CASE are far more cautious. 
Even if their premise of transferability is wrong, they have built the 
notion of 'bridging' into the programme, demonstrating that any 
transfer or broader applicability can only be made to work if it is 
made an explicit focus. They do not claim that children will 
spontaneously transfer learning. 
Johnson goes on criticising the teaching of thinking skills saying: 
By reducing thinking to a checklist of skills, a vital fact is 
ignored: that education should engage with the personality of 
both teacher and taught, and that teaching is not a 
technology but a moral activity involving complex 
relationships which are in principle irreducible and 
unpredictable. 
2001: 36 
Johnson is right to criticise McGuinness for failing to develop her 
point that 'developing higher order thinking may be as much to do 
with creating a disposition to be a good thinker as it has to do with 
acquiring specific skills' (para 3.7, p6). Other thinkers though, have 
focused on this area in detail, for example, Siegel and Bailin, who 
clearly recognise the complex relationships and moral context 
highlighted by Johnson. They consider helping children develop 
positive dispositions to be a generalisable aspect of teaching 
thinking, applicable across a range of academic domains. They 
identify the following dispositions: 
... valuing good reasoning and 
being disposed to seek 
reasons, to assess them, and to govern beliefs and actions 
on the basis of such assessment. [ ... ] open-mindedness, 
fair-mindedness, independent-mindedness, an enquiring 
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attitude, and respect for others in group inquiry and 
deliberation. 
2003: 183 
White also emphasises that the acquisition of skills should be 
accompanied by the development of dispositions for their regular and 
habitual use, although this is only one aspect of a fuller understanding of 
the nature of thinking (op cit, p104 and p99). 'x 
In sum, therefore, it is true that there are some generalisable aspects to 
thinking, but the importance of context, subject areas and dispositional 
aspects must be taken into account. In closely related fields skills can 
sometimes transfer, but this should be made explicit and children should 
not be expected to be taught skills in a vacuum and automatically apply 
them across subjects. 
6.5.0 The Thinkinq Skills Proqrammes 
The subsequent chapter (7) considers the thinking skills programme 
known as Philosophy with Children (PwC). It is examined in some detail, 
and contextualised here through a brief presentation of information about 
a range of different programmes, highlighting contrasting and 
contradictory understandings underpinning the teaching of thinking. There 
are numerous programmes available designed for a variety of users. 
Some emphasise the able child, whilst others implicitly include them; 
these aspects can be somewhat fuzzy, with differing interpretations of key 
concepts, for example, abstract thought. The programmes are often 
described as falling into three main categories: general; subject specific; 
and infusion (all quotations in the next three paragraphs taken from 
McGuinness, ibid: 7). 
a) The General Approach 
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Programmes under the 'general' heading use either context-free or 
context dependent techniques, but are always based on specifically 
designed materials. They are based on a concept of cognition as 'driven 
by a general central processor' and aim to intervene and ameliorate 
thinking through developing this processor. 
b) Subiect Specific 
The second method, 9 subject specific considers good thinking to be best 
developed through specific subject areas and is 'based on the view that 
high quality thinking is inextricably linked with the knowledge structures, 
the methods of enquiry and ways of thinking associated with different 
disciplines or domains. ' 
c) Infusion 
The third way of thinking about thinking is the 'infusion method' in which 
opportunities for developing different skills are identified through the 
existing curriculum. Every subject would be used as a vehicle for teaching 
thinking skills and the National Curriculum would be a 'curriculum for 
thinking' and lessons would be developed 'where thinking skills and topic 
understanding are explicitly and simultaneously pursued'. 
These three categories are not very clear and some programmes seem to 
overlap, however. For example, Cognitive Acceleration through Science 
Education (CASE) seems to fall into both (a) and (b), aiming to affect 
cognitive development (a), through concepts taught in science (b). In the 
report, Philosophy for Children is categorised as a 'general' programme 
(a), although Lipman never made claims that it would intend to achieve the 
cognitive changes central to Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment (FIE) 
and to de Bono's Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT). These can both be 
categorised as 'general' programmes, but Lipman emphasises the 
development of habits of thinking (Fisher, 1990: 156) rather than the 
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'structural changes' emphasised in FIE (cited in Coles and Robinson, 
1989: 87). Nowhere does McGuinness mention the development of habits 
in terms of the general approach. Philosophy for Children could also be 
considered a subject-based programme if the focus was learning about 
philosophy, or even an infusion programme, depending on its 
interpretation and realisation. 
The following three sections (6.5.1-6.5.3) outline programmes in each 
category and briefly review underpinning theory, bearing the needs of the 
able in mind. 
6.5.1 The general approach: 'Feuerstein's Instrumental 
Enrichment' (FIE) and the'Coqnitive Research Trust' (CoRT) 
FIE was designed primarily for children with severe learning 
difficulties, including retarded performers deemed unteachable by 
mainstream schooling and is focused on structural cognitive 
modifiability. The programme is premised on the belief that'the 
cognitive structure of the brain can be changed by enabling people 
to learn how to learn' (Coles and Robinson, op cit: 87) and 'more 
than 100 studies' confirm claims for its efficacy (p. 92). Amongst 
students and teachers it has been 'generally well received' 
(Maclure and Davies, 1991: 46). 
It presents as well grounded in Vygotskian and Brunerian theory, as well 
as Feuerstein's own views, and is clearly constructed. The materials have 
been adapted for wider use, including the highly able (such as Blagg et 
al's, 1988 'Somerset Thinking Skills Course'). The open-ended nature of 
the tasks makes them appealing to teachers looking for activities with high 
ceilings for able pupils, but I have yet to see any specific data on FIE or 
STSC and the highly able. x 
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FIE does not make use of subject knowledge, but this is not because 
Feuerstein thinks it is irrelevant, but because he considers his target 
children initially need to master some basic strategies to help them think. 
De Bono, however deliberately eschews subject learning, with disdain. 'i 
His Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT, 1973) is a 'context-free' programme, 
mentioned in McGuinness' report (although inexplicably not examined in 
any further detail beyond being listed on page 7). This programme has 
become a lucrative global business through its apparent applicability to a 
wide general audience of business and corporate clients as well as 
educational establishments and high sales for novelty books, such as 
'Mind-bending Puzzles' (1994). x" 
The programme consists of a series of strategies designed to develop a 
toolkit of skills for use with problem solving and investigative tasks. Tools 
can be taught easily to children or adults and sessions are diverting and 
enjoyable, based around tasks such as'PMI'which entails weighing up 
the 'Plus, Minus and Interesting' aspects of fictional thought-games such 
as 'What if all cars were yellow? ' or'What if everyone wore a badge to 
indicate their mood? 'The theoretical underpinning of the CoRT 
programme is very shaky, however, and there is little empirical support for 
de Bono's claims. Positive claims made by Edwards, for example, are 
lacking in appropriate rigour in examining the research tools used to 
evaluate the outcomes. "" De Bono seems confused about his own 
concept of thinking, using a range of muddled metaphors: 
Intelligence is like the horsepower of a car. Thinking is like 
the skill of the car driver. (1995: iii) 
Thinking is defined as the operating skill with which 
intelligence acts upon experience. (1992: iv) 
... thinking will 
be regarded as a kind of internal vision which 
we direct at experience in order to explore, understand and 
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enlarge it. it is the deliberate exploration of experience for a 
purpose. (1976: 32) 
The brain is like a car engine. (1970: vi) 
What happens in the brain is information. And the way it 
happens is thinking. (1969: 18) 
An obvious criticism of CoRT concerns the lack of evidence of automatic 
application of the thinking tools in different contexts; it is insufficient merely 
to assume that building a repertoire of sub-skills will lead to better thinking. 
Although de Bono argues that following CoRT rigorously will result in this 
transfer, no supporting evidence exists. There is little provision for learning 
how to apply the skills to real problems, and no substantiation either, of 
how the activities benefit the able, although the website claims that CoRT 
can be used successfully by'any age, any type of thinker' (2002, from 
website), despite lacking differentiation within the tasks. In earlier writing 
he is quite rigid about the pace and length of sessions (1976), and it is 
unclear how this would take account of a range of abilities. I have found 
the materials quite useful with groups of children of similar abilities, less so 
in mixed groups. 
McPeck finds de Bono's work unexamined by academics, which is 
surprising, considering the nature of his claims, but at the same time 
unsurprising, considering the non-academic nature of his writings 
(unsubstantiated claims, no references, rejection of 'the verbal tradition in 
education', etc., from various references, including 1976: 97. ) He notes a 
I curious mix of explication and rhetorical persuasion that de Bono uses to 
promote his ideas' (1981: 120), and also finds much to criticise in de 
Bono's mind models, some of which I have noted above. 
There are simply too many types of thinking, mani est in 
diverse skills, to permit us to infer a single generalized ability 
for their respective achievement. This is not to deny the 
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inherent merit or usefulness of de Bono's educational 
prescriptions but merely to point out that his model of the 
mind is at cross purposes with his prescriptions and cannot 
serve as a foundation for them. 
I bid: 104 
Ultimately, Mc Peck suggests that the methods only really foster the 
development of divergent thinking and creativity, rather than 'thinking' 
(ibid: 105). 
6.5.2 The sublect specific approach: Cognitive Acceleration 
throuqh Science Education (CASE) 
This method seems to have impressed the government, with widely 
reported success as demonstrated by the CASE project (Adey and 
Shayer, 1989), in which children's cognitive development is accelerated 
through specific methods of teaching secondary school Science. CASE 
was originally intended to help pupils with average or below average 
ability, but has since been taken up by a range of schools. The most 
recent claim for its success has been Shayer stating that where there is 'a 
relatively able intake, schools might expect that between 70 and 80 per 
cent of their students would achieve grades A-C at GCSE' (Times 
Educational Supplement, 23 Feb 2001). Similar programmes in geography 
('Thinking Through Geography' Leat 1998) have been established 
independently, but CASE and allied programmes dominate the subject 
specific field. x'v 
Authors Adey and Shayer are the only researchers who have undertaken 
empirical studies of the effectiveness of CASE and unsurprisingly they 
have found the programme valuable. The McGuinness Report describes 
CASE as 'one of the most successful and well-evaluated programmes' 
(Para 6.2: 17) citing the authors' self-recom mend ation as evidence for 
adoption of CASE. " 
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Case is based on 'pillars of cognitive acceleration' (originally three pillars, 
now six, 2001: 40), and the materials are designed to accelerate the 
process of moving through Piaget's stages of cognitive development, from 
concrete to formal operations. This is considered as a natural maturational 
process that can be speeded up through directed tasks. There are 
problems with the underpinning stage theory (briefly considered in the 
following Chapter, section 7.3), but even if this is accepted, it seems that 
the aims of CASE are unlikely to help the able child. The premiss of the 
programme is that children can be cognitively accelerated and the highest 
level to attain is formal operation thought. Able children are already 
functioning at this level if they are in advance of their average peers. 
There is an emphasis on meta-cognition though, which could be helpful to 
the able child (Freeman, 2000), and specifically the able underachiever, 
whose performance-ability gap is marked. 
Adey and Shayer echo the aims of programmes described as 'general' in 
the section above (6.5.1) in their definitions of 'good' thinking and 
explanations of how thinking develops. They accept a notion of general 
intelligence but do not mind how it is framed or defended. 
... the process in which people are engaged when 
they are 
able to solve a difficult of challenging problem and which 
results in an improvement in a person's intellectual power. 
(op cit: 36) 
... empirical 
data supports the hypothesis of a general 
cognitive processor which can be positively influenced by 
appropriate intervention strategies. (op cit: 103) 
Whether we model the underlying general intellectual 
function in terms of IQ, working memory capacity or on 
Piaget's structures densemble is a matter of fine-tuning. 
(2001: 3) 
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Obviously CASE uses Science, and CAME Mathematics, but exactly how 
important is subject matter in developing the cognitive powers described 
above? Adey and Shayer value subject knowledge, but'reject the notion 
that science might claim a unique position for the development of thinking 
skills' (1994: 79). This, coupled with the proliferation of programmes in 
other subject areas, both demonstrates the importance of subject 
knowledge and raises questions about the validity of any assumption that 
thinking skills can be generalised. In earlier editions of CASE, generalising 
skills explicitly across subjects was not a priority as evidence for general 
acceleration was considered sufficient (1994: 91). The 2001 version, 
however, incorporates 'bridging' (a term used by Feuerstein in the 1980s) 
as a 'pillar of cognitive acceleration. 
In general, the efficacy of cognitive acceleration programmes seems to lie 
in the motivation and increased interest resulting from innovative 
pedagogy. This implies teachers reviewing their teaching methods, 
encouraging children to talk about areas of misunderstanding and specific 
matching of tasks to abilities. For the more able pupil, advanced tasks 
within the subject area are useful, although probably no more effective 
than well executed differentiation. 
6.5.3 Infusion 
Infusion 'exploits naturally occurring opportunities for developing thinking 
within the ordinary curriculum' (McGuinness, ibid: para 7, p19) and is the 
method underlying McGuinness' own programme, Activating Children's 
Thinking Skills, (ACTS, 1997). xv' With infusion, every subject area is used 
as a vehicle for teaching thinking skills, as recognised on the National 
Curriculum website. At the time of writing (2003) there is still a message 
promising 'From May 2001, you will be able to use National Curriculum 
online to search for opportunities to promote thinking skills' and some 
material promoting the ACTS programme. 
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The ACTS programme was undertaken with only seventeen teachers and 
research findings are based on a review of their experience of 
texperimenting in their own classrooms' over an eight month period and 
after two days of training (McGuinness, op cit: para 7.1, p20). No indication 
is given about the level of ability targeted by ACTS, but one of the findings 
is that'children expected to be pushed more' (op cit). This benefit was 
identified through teachers' evaluations, although 'children's learning gains 
were not monitored' (op cit). Other findings are presented without 
explanation of the terms used. The researchers (the author et al) note 
that: 
Content instruction is invigorated thus leading to deeper 
understanding; teaching for thoughtfulness is supported 
across the curriculum; transfer of learning can be more 
easily promoted and reinforced at other stages. 
ibid: 19 
Anecdotal evidence is presented as confirmation of these conclusions and 
teachers' comments are quoted to verify the findings. I do not doubt the 
teachers' views, but find this data insufficient to warrant the promotion of 
the programme by the government. This is particularly the case when 
recommendations are not made for other programmes that have more 
compelling empirical evidence and equally valid teacher testimony. 
If this method is indeed effective, the advantages are clear. All that is 
required is a shift in pedagogy and adaptation of methods and materials, 
rather than a radical rethink of the curriculum. These changes can be 
accomplished by teachers, although time and resources for training must 
be allocated, and attention paid to the effects of radical pedagogical 
changes. This may include some kind of modification of power, towards 
the teacher as facilitator and co-enquirer. McGuinness recognises this, 
noting that: 
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... classrooms need to have an open-minded attitude about the nature of knowledge and thinking and to create an 
educational atmosphere where talking about thinking - questioning, predicting, contradicting, doubting - is not only tolerated but actively pursued. 
Op cit: 15 
She also acknowledges the need for teacher development and attending 
to the 'ethos of schools as learning communities', although how such 
guidance and support would be provided is unclear. "" 
As with the other programmes, the key discernible positive factor appears 
to be the way teachers focus on their pedagogy as a result of following 
recommendations. 
6.5.4 New kids on the block 
New additions to the catalogue of available programmes were obviously 
not available to be reviewed by McGuinness, but they introduce additional 
issues and demonstrate the diversity of methods for teaching thinking. The 
new additions have not yet been subject to empirical examination of their 
effectiveness, but are advertised at government sponsored conferences""' 
and form the subject matter of journal articles in both theoretical and 
practice-based circles, including web-chat and information for Inset 
providers. There are several that now need discussion and these include 
the World Class Arena (WCA) and Accelerated Learning / Neurolinguistic 
Programming (NLP). 
WCA is a recent innovation and forms part of the Gifted and Talented 
strategy, as the materials are ostensibly aimed at the highly able (see 6.1 
above for discussion of this confusion). There is substantial funding from 
the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) and an explicit focus on 
testing, through the World Class Tests (WCT). So far, around 12,000 
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children have undertaken tests, in mathematics and / or problem solving. " 
The tests are contextualised in a web-based scenario called the World 
Class Arena (WCA), which provides support for teachers, parents and 
pupils. The tests are available worldwide (at least in the countries that 
have joined the scheme). This notion of a global arena for high ability 
implies that cross-cultural core aspects of giftedness must clearly exist 
and be measurable, which is a contested notion, although no exploration 
of this is undertaken in the Arena. 
Pupils are entered for the tests by their parents and there is a fee to cover 
administration. The test must be carried out at a registered centre, usually 
a school. The tests are completed on a computer and all practice 
materials are distributed on CD-ROM. Pupils without access to computers 
are unable to participate at this time. Practice tests, support materials and 
the test fee are only available to those who can pay, benefiting the affluent 
able and those with motivated parents or teachers. xx Whilst the materials 
are good (if narrow), the issue of access remains a major problem. 
Potentially positive aspects of WCT and WCA have yet to take hold 
significantly, unlike the US competitions such as the Olympiad and the 
Odyssey of the Mind, both of which are reported to be useful for the able 
(Reed et al, 2000). 
NLIP is at the opposite end of the thinking skills spectrum. Where WCTs 
are predominantly about test performance, NLIP is about changing the way 
people approach life; the way they think and act in all domains. It is 
designed for all abilities, but like some of the other programmes 
mentioned, the open-ended, somewhat unusual tasks, are attractive to 
teachers struggling to meet a broad range of needs. Many of the tasks are 
also self-explanatory, requiring the minimum of teacher supervision and 
allowing pupil autonomy, satisfying the hunger of the curious learner. The 
tasks can also help with the demands of the underachiever as they tap 
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into unconventional ways of learning, possibly unlocking a suitable 
technique for a pupil with a learning difficulty. NLP is a cluster of strategies 
that purport to increase efficiency in thought, problem solving and 
approach to learning. They include dietary supplements, use of music, 
motivational methods and paying attention to the physical environment. 
Concept maps, or'mind maps' serve for note taking (such as those 
created by Buzan") and memory hooks and games can improve memory 
competence and promote good organisation of ideas and activities. 
Some able children find the techniques free them to work in ways they find 
more appropriate to their'thinking style', but this can cause difficulties 
when they need to re-adapt to school learning. Able underachievers 
benefit from what amount to study skills strategies and have reported that 
sessions are less patronising than school-based SEN, which makes them 
more likely to attend with a positive attitude. 
The WCT and WCA do have on-going research by independent 
consultants"', as the QCA is undertaking continuous evaluation of their 
efficacy, which is appropriate, since they are providing funding. NLP is 
more of a 'movement'that has its roots in business efficiency ideas and 
has spread branches into the educational world. Techniques are 
harnessed by SEN teachers, as they tend to use unusual methods such 
as pictures and colour, which can help students with learning difficulties or 
unusual approaches to work such as children with dyslexia and / or 
Asperger's Syndrome. Neither of these newer programmes has yet 
engaged formally with debates about issues such as transferability. If they 
are to be recommended, this needs to be taken up. 
6.6 The impact on teachers 
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The most valuable changes that thinking skills programmes seem to effect 
concern pedagogy. The following comments about FIE are typical for a 
range of programmes: 
The children were consciously thinking problems through ... the teacher wondered whether working with the materials had alerted her to the nature of the problems and changed 
the way she worked. 
Maclure and Davies, 1991: 46 
Blagg's findings also emphasised improved teacher skills above anything 
else (1989), a contention supported by Fisher (1990: 154). Sharron shows 
the direct link between this and teachers supporting children of different 
abilities: 
Traditionally they have catered for the middle ability corps 
and allowed those with learning difficulties and high abilities 
to cope under inexpertly defined and managed 
'differentiated' regimes. 
2001: 37 
ACTS and CASE research findings echo these notions and McGuinness 
recognises that success of these programmes isdue in no small measure 
to the well developed teacher training and support' (op cit: para 9, p 27). 
Overall, it is clear that the programmes help teachers reconsider their 
classroom performance and think carefully about how children learn. 
Subsequent pedagogical changes have far-reaching consequences and it 
may be that this is the key positive factor of the programmes, regardless 
of method, aims or structure. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Thinking skills programmes have become increasingly important on 
the national and international scene and need close examination of 
methods, aims and underpinning theories. For the able, they hold 
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more promise t an they deliver. Aspects such as an emphasis on 
the meta-cognitive and on study skills can be of practical value, but 
these are normally not central aims of the programmes. Most useful 
is the way teachers adjust their pedagogy to account for the shift in 
role that accompanies teaching thinking skills and this is not tied to 
any single programme. 
Conceptualising thinking as a skill, or range of sub-skills that can be 
taught individually and divorced from subject matter, is far too 
simplistic an approach. Some skills form part of what we call 
'thinking' and these can be developed and fostered in school. They 
must be accompanied by the development of dispositions and 
taught within the context of appropriate subject knowledge if they 
are to be valuable. Some aspects of learning thinking are related 
across disciplines, and where this is the case, it should be made 
explicit. The importance of individual contexts should not be 
underplayed. 
Much of the support for thinking skills programmes is driven by 
passion for a successful pedagogy that may not be replicated by 
different practitioners or in different situations. There is also a 
lucrative business in designing and selling programmes, but a lack 
of open debate about underpinning issues and quality of research. 
It is, instead, one programme's fan club versus another's, and the 
loudest voice generally wins. 
i An example of this would be the re-release of Edward de Bono's materials from the 
1970s and some of Tony Buzan's study skills work from the 1980s, now available for 
everyone'. Such adaptations differ from, for example, Blagg's adaptation of Feuerstein's 
work, in which the entire programme is rethought and recast, rather than merely 
repackaged. 
For an interesting extension of this argument see Best, 2000. 
Government agendas determine how funds are distributed for research and this does 
not favour the practitioner. For example, the influential McGuinness Report (1999), notes 
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the vital need for translating research into practice, but makes no mention of a reversed 
relationship where ideas for research are born out of practice. A similar research-practice 
divide is developing in Higher Education. Academics who wish to publish in practitioners' 
journals are encouraged not to do so, focusing instead on peer-reviewed publications that 
count towards measures used to determine budgets (currently the Research Assessment 
Exercise, or RAE). Peer-reviewed journals are mostly read by academics and 
professionals actively engaged in further study, whilst the less renowned publications 
typically have a wider audience, if not an audience in closer contact with children and 
classrooms. Vital new research therefore fails to reach the audiences who most need to 
engage with fresh ideas. Similarly, academics fail to keep up to date with the needs of 
practitioners and practice-based research continues to decline in status and value. An 
interesting new initiative has been introduced by the Gifted and Talented strategy unit at 
the WES (2002) that may help to address this issue. Key stage 1 teachers have been 
funded for research projects with able pupils. A network has been established to allow for 
dissemination of this work that has been completed to a high standard and overseen by a 
steering committee co-ordinated by Brunel University. Funding for continuation of the 
project is uncertain. 
'v Steve Johnson is described as a 'gadfly' in the journal Teaching Thinking (Summer 
2001) with reference to 
th 
his article in the previous edition. 
v Press release from 4 May 1999 where it was noted that 'findings will be fed into the 
NC Review'This report can be read at www. nc. uk. net/learn think accessed in April 
2001. No data was available as to the number of teachers accessing the site, but in a 
personal communication I was told that teachers find the report 'very useful when they 
are choosing which programme would be best for their school' (May 2001). 
v' McGuinness opts for the ACTS project the Activating Children's Thinking Skills project 
(ACTS), whose title seems to imply that thinking skills are somehow innate and dormant, 
awaiting the stimulation of a planned programme to galvanise them into action. 
" Such as calling Matthew Lipman 'Martin Lipman' (5.4, p13), misinterpreting Murris' 
work with story books as 'a pictorial version of philosophy' (5.4, p14) and using the 
disparaging term 'cottage industry' to describe academic research on children's 
understanding of scientific concepts (6.2, p17). 
v Siegel advances four justifications that underline the importance of this area: 
Respect for persons; Self-sufficiency and self-direction; Role of critical thinking in 
rational academic traditions; Role of critical thinking in democratic life (1988). 
'x The fuller understanding entails distinguishes between thinking as an occurrence and 
as a continuant, i. e. as an activity and a belief. It also understands thinking as intentional, 
as an activity, as involving concepts and as a skill (2002: 99). 
x Some critics note that the serialistic and analytical approach could be counter- 
productive for some careful, able workers. The method is appropriate for those who need 
support in building these strategies, 'but not good for those pupils who were already over 
reflective, perfectionist and anxious about making mistakes' (Jones and Jones, 1992: 2). 
High task ceilings make some activities eminently suitable for the able, however. 
x' He considers that subject content offers 'comparatively little scope for thinking except 
of the hindsight variety' (1976: 104). 
x" For a list of companies etc using his work, see his website at www. edwDeBono. com- 
x"' Edwards' work (1991) for example, lacks rigour in examining the research tools used 
to evaluate outcomes of CoRT activities (cited in Maclure and Davies, eds). 
x'v Parallel programmes are run in Mathematics and Technology (CAME, 1998 and 
CATE, 2001) underway as well as the development of materials for younger children at 
Key Stage 1 (CASE(cD-KS1,2001) amongst others. This is partly due to the government 
funded Centre for the Advancement of Thinking, based at King's College and directed by 
Phillip Adey, from which research can be undertaken and programmes developed. 
xv In their 2001 publication, amongst eight pages of references, there is no mention of 
any study evaluating their programme that is not soley or co-authored by Adey, 
Shayer or 
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both (ppl96-203). This seems unusual for a well-funded programme running for more 
than a decade. 
Whether this can be correctly termed 'infusion' is questioned by Johnson, who points 
out that 'to infuse' is defined as to'introduce into one thing a second which gives it extra 
life, vigour and a new significance' (2001: ibid: 4). This is not necessarily demonstrated by 
the ACTS methodology using the existing curriculum. 
"' The Schools' Standards Minister announced that training would be available for 
teachers in the area of thinking skills. 'The government will ensure thinking skills are 
addressed in the curriculum and in the guidance on teaching. We will give teachers 
access to appropriate training in the teaching of thinking skills. ' (Morris, 4 May 1999). 
Such training has yet to be delivered as a coherent national strategy. 
xv They are often marketed at the WES termly Standing Conference and other 
conferences such as the annual National Association of Able Children in Education 
(NACE) meeting and the biennial 'Thinking' conference. 
Ax At the time of writing, the examinations and assessment board AQA had just decided 
to terminate its work with the WCTs and it is unclear who will take over the lead research 
of the WCT. Smaller partners are still involved. 
xx Developers of materials have suggested that success in the tests could be a 
contributing factor in schoolchildren's Curriculum Vitae, now a vital component in the fight 
for a place in a selective school. This would disadvantage those without access to the 
test. At the aforementioned thinking skills conference in Harrogate, delegates were split 
as to their views of the WCTs. There were those who had been looking for exactly the 
kind of activities and testing structure that was on offer, but just as many were hostile to 
the very idea of testing, for a variety of reasons. Overriding concerns were for how testing 
can stifle imagination, channelling pupils into yet more Mathematics, while others worried 
about issues of payment and pressure both on and from parents. In my view, all of the 
old arguments about support for the gifted being a factor in the perpetuation of elitism are 
fuelled through the development of such texts. (Information gleaned from conference 
sessions and talking to people on the stand. ) 
xx' Tony Buzan's latest publication is 'Mind Maps for Kids' (2003) which takes his concept 
map ideas from the 1980s and updates them for children. These are popularly used by 
N. LP practitioners, but were not designed for these programmes. 
xx" At the time of writing, the examinations and assessment board AQA had just decided 
to terminate its work with the WCTs and it is unclear who will take over the lead research 
of the WCT. Smaller partners are still involved. 
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Chapter 7 Philosophy with Children 
7.0 Introduction 
Of all the critical thinking skills programmes, I have chosen to look at 
Philosophy for / with Children (P4C / PwC) in detail as it seems the most 
useful for children of high ability, a view based not only on theory and 
literature, but also on classroom practice. I have adopted the following 
definitions: 
The abbreviation PwC is used [ ... ] to refer to the practitioners of philosophy with children. The term 'P4C' is 
used as an abbreviation for the proponents of the 
'Philosophy for Children' programme developed by Matthew 
Lipman and colleagues from the Institute for the 
Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) in the USA. 
'PwC' stands for a larger group of people than 'P4C' 
because not all children's philosophy teachers believe the 
IAPC material is the best educational material with which to 
introduce young children to philosophy. 
Murris, 2000: 277 
PwC is often presented alongside Critical Thinking Skills programmes, 
and evaluated using the same criteria. A variety of different programmes 
and pedagogies fall under the umbrella heading, and since they have 
been gaining momentum worldwide Philosophy for / with Children has 
become known as a 'movement, implying a shared ideology and a sense 
of organised group action, perhaps imbued with a sense of evangelism. 
PwC has many supporters, mainly in the USA, UK, Australia and Latin 
America, ' but also numerous detractors, whose critiques are presented 
here (7.2 to 7.6). 
7.1 What is PwC? 
The birth of the P4C movement is uncontroversially attributed to Matthew 
Lipman, who created materials for children and teenagers in order to help 
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them develop the dispositions of reasoning required for later study of 
philosophy at university level. He established a training centre for teachers 
(IAPC) and teacher education is a key focus of the programme. Lipman 
cites Dewey as a major influence on his work, particularly in interpreting 
education as reasoning, encouraging the 'fostering of thinking, and 
rejecting a model of teaching that is little more than transmission of 
knowledge (Lipman, summarised in Whalley 1987: 69). The P4C 
programme consists of a series of novels and teachers, notes, while PwC 
can include a range of materials with stimuli such as news stories, picture 
books and art. 
Many practitioners are now interested in PwC but have departed from 
some of Lipman's tenets, creating their own interpretations and materials. " 
Some principles are upheld, however, by advocates of both PwC and 
P4C. These principles include the aim of effective moral development, as 
there is a strong sense that PwC is about making children become better 
people in general, but this is difficult to evidence through empirical 
research. Some aspects of learning are impossible to quantify and the 
focus is usually on what can be measured and tested. Improved literacy 
and numeracy through PwC have been demonstrated in research, but this 
was never part of Lipman's original agenda. 
Another key feature in all types of PwC/P4C programmes is the 
'Community of Enquiry'. This is a democratic discussion in which the 
children set the agenda and the teacher's role is to facilitate a group 
enquiry. Children are encouraged to think 'logically, critically and 
creatively, to reason and reflect, and to deliberate with an open-minded 
disposition' (Haynes, 2002: 12). 
As a 'movement' some activities on the fringe of PwC carry with them a 
sense of evangelism, lacking rigorous examination of key principles and 
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incorporating rather unusual activities. Whilst there is nothing wrong with 
being unconventional, rationales are needed for all proposals, outlandish 
or ordinary, but they are seldom provided in PwC. Medical and other 
evidence suggests that dietary recommendations, meditation and 
visualisation exercises can be helpful, but to confuse this with an 
emphasis on critical thinking and reasoning would be a mistake. Critics of 
PwC have an easy target if they want to discredit the 'requirement' to have 
children seated on bean-bags and drinking a cup of water every 20 
minutes. Certainly, paying heed to the learning environment can be 
helpful, and must be recognised as relevant, but as incidental rather than 
as the substance of a programme for teaching thinking. 
PwC has practitioners all over the world, with the UK, USA and Australia 
as leading countries in the developed world. Countries in South and 
Central America have embraced PwC (particularly Brazil and Mexico), and 
less developed European countries are also attracted to the pedagogies 
because of the underpinning notion of developing autonomous thinkers. In 
order to create a democracy, or to help rebuild a country after a revolution, 
education must reflect major societal changes, by allowing pupils to learn 
how to express themselves effectively and this is where PwC can play an 
important role. "' 
There are a variety of claims against the efficacy of PwC, from different 
sources and here I consider the more commonly expressed objections. 
7.2 Objection 1: PwC is no more than standard classroom discussion 
work 
Teachers employ a variety of techniques to encourage discussion in the 
classroom, such as Circle Time. Philosophy programmes are very specific 
about the way in which their discussion differs from these standard 
classroom techniques. The key difference is the creation of a 'Community 
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of Enquiry', with specific conventions and guidelines. Techniques overlap 
significantly with good teaching practice, including: helping the children 
create their own group rules; sitting in such a way that group members 
can see one another; talking in turns; respecting other people's views, etc. 
But with the Community of Enquiry, pupils are also invited to set the 
agenda, which is less often found in classroom discussion, where 
teachers hold debates designed to emphasise a predetermined teaching 
point. 
In the Community of Enquiry, the teacher provides a stimulus to 
encourage pupils to think about what they would like to investigate, 
agreeing on a specific focus. Then, using a democratic process, the group 
decides what they will investigate, devolving power and choice to the 
children. In PwC, once the enquiry is underway, children are encouraged 
to make their disagreements the focus of the discussion, in a respectful 
way. Specific techniques help ease this process with guidelines for pupils 
to be assertive, but not aggressive. An example would be beginning each 
sentence with 'I dis/agree with x because... '. This makes it acceptable to 
disagree or agree with anyone in the class, whether they are established 
friends or just fellow classmates. 
This is not always the case in class work, where there is often peer 
pressure to agree with friends. Here though, the group is working together, 
pursuing a line of enquiry where children are encouraged to say what they 
really think, even if they hold an unpopular view. Children are allowed to 
disagree with one another, but have to show logic and reasoning in their 
thinking and their contribution should be relevant to the group task of 
striving to find answers to the questions under investigation. 
... the very goal of 
'critical thinking' and the goal of the 
community of inquiry is that of progression forward in the 
comprehension of an idea that assumes that there is indeed 
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something to be grasped and that it is more or less 
graspable. When we sketch out the role of the facilitator. In 
the inquiry we explicitly detail qualities of thinking that are desirable and worthy of promoting and those that are not. Turgeon, 1998: 19 
In ordinary Circle Time, the teacher usually encourages pupils to join 
together, tacitly agreeing that the dominant set of values should be used 
to help create a common moral code. Children are expected to find 
examples that agree with the teacher's suggestions (why we should share, 
not drop litter, allow people to join in our games, etc) and pupils are aware 
that the sessions are about signing up to common ideals, not explaining 
how they really feel about issues. In PwC, pupils are encouraged to have 
their own views, whether these agree with or differ from an obvious or 
commonly expressed set of values. The ideas expressed by the children 
should be supported with reasoning and argument. Whalley explains: 
It is only by the most careful listening that the teacher will 
become aware of the range of opinions on a given topic, and 
be able to devise questions to promote dialogue between the 
protagonists. [ ... ] The teacher does not so much lead a discussion as facilitate its being led by the group. There is 
more. It is the teacher's job to notice mistakes in the 
reasoning that are overlooked by the group, and devise 
ways of drawing attention to them; to insist that those doing 
the most talking are also prepared to listen, and to make 
sure that those who prefer to talk less have the opportunity 
to express themselves when they wish. 
1987, op cit: 70 
The PwC process is certainly different from ordinary classroom discussion 
work. " 
7.3 Ob*ection 2: Children cannot cope with abstraction 
This claim assumes philosophy and philosophical problems to have a 
significant degree of abstraction and that children are unable to engage 
with this way of thinking. Effective philosophising must involve the ability to 
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hold concepts in mind and manipulate them with the aim of building logical 
argument. Issues under discussion can be framed in more or less 
accessible ways, but will almost always involve a higher degree of 
abstraction than the usual tasks undertaken in the classroom. 
The notion of children being unable to think abstractly stems from Piaget's 
influential developmental ist ideas, to which there have been objections. 
Sternberg reports this: 
In sum, Piaget's theory asserted that there is a single route 
of intellectual development that all humans follow, regardless 
of individual differences, although their progression along 
this route may be at different rates and they may stop off on 
the way rather than follow the route to completion. Studies 
contest the invariant sequence of the individual 
psychological operations within a stage (Dasen 1977) 
there may be more than one developmental route to the 
acquisition of some constructs. 
Lack of attention to individual differences points to the limited 
usefulness of the theory in explaining and predicating many 
aspects of performance. 
1990: 180-181 and 190 
The replicability of Piaget's tests has been widely discussed, with well- 
documented criticisms, in particular with the work of Donaldson (1978). 
More fundamental criticisms of developmental theory can be found in the 
philosophical work of David Hamlyn, John White and Chris Winch. White 
rehearses the objections to development as unfolding, by citing Hamlyn 
(1992: 78-9), and Winch notes: 
There are two massive problems associated with most 
developmental theories; the first is that they seek to show 
what children cannot learn at certain ages. The second is 
that, rooted squarely in the metaphor of organic growth, they 
find it difficult to account for motivation. 
1998: 38 
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Gazzard surnmarises the usual responses to Piagetian charges as 
follows: 
1. Attempting to find weaknesses in Piaget's theory 
(Gareth Matthews); 
2. Interpreting Piaget in such a way that theory can be 
made to accommodate the possibility of philosophy 
for children (Hope J. Haas); 
3. Ignoring the discrepancy between practising 
philosophy for children on the one hand and thinking 
in Piagetian terms on the other. 
1985: 11 
She concludes that it is not as much a refutation of Piaget that is needed, 
but rather a reinterpretation that allows developmental ism to be only one 
possible explanation. Freeing an understanding of cognitive development 
from the developmentalist stage theory allows for the view that'cognitive 
growth is predominantly a function of learning' (p13). 
... insofar as children are no longer limited in terms of their 
cognitive capacities by maturation, there is no reason to 
suspect that given the appropriate information they might not 
manifest and be proficient in abstract thinking at young ages. 
lbid 
This is certainly a useful framework for thinking about the able child and 
generously allows for wide individual difference. It is not altogether clear 
how useful it would be to reinterpret Piaget in order to accommodate this 
way of thinking about cognitive development, however. Such a rethink 
would incorporate looser understandings of the ages assigned to stages 
and an acceptance of a more gradual and messier transition through the 
stages, for example. I am not sure it is necessary to shoe-horn Gazzard's 
ideas into a developmental ist framework, but she insists that the Piagetian 
viewpoint could be 'extended eventually to accommodate this role of 
education and the consequent viability of philosophy for children' (op cit). I 
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would prefer, perhaps, to continue to challenge developmenta list 
understandings of cognitive development. 
Many theorists and practitioners agree that Piagetian stage theory 
underestimates children's ability to abstract ideas. Barbara Tizard and 
Martin Hughes support this, particularly through their careful examination 
of children's use of language and the quality of their participation in 
conversation: 
Young children are much less egocentric and illogical than 
Piaget believed. We found many examples [ ... ] of their awareness of, and interest in, other people's viewpoints. By 
the age of three or four, we would argue that dialogue is as 
important as physical exploration. 
1990: 19 
Richard Kitchener, however, argues that children are capable of only 
I concrete' but not 'abstract' philosophy as they are unable to make 
inferences about underlying principles and White wonders if children can 
really manage higher order thinking. If the developmental theories are 
abandoned, it would be a case of taking each child on their merits and this 
may allow for some people to be capable of reasoning at high levels at an 
early age. Even with the developmentalist theory intact, it could be argued 
that highly able pupils just move through the stages at a greater speed 
than most children. This being so, they would be capable of abstract 
thought and thus benefit from undertaking PwC activities in development 
of this aspect of their learning. 
Some children do seem to demonstrate firm abilities in abstract thinking. 
These issues arise again (in section 7.5) as they impact on the concept of 
'real philosophy' as involving abstraction. 
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7.4 Ob*ection 3: Empirical evidence to support PwC is inadequate 
Most of the empirical evidence available considers the efficacy of P4C 
schemes, having been collated by IAPC. Systematically constructed 
research programmes have not been commonly undertaken in the broader 
PwC arena and while there is anecdotal evidence and practitioner action 
research that supports the programmes, little other substantiation can be 
presented. Where there is evidence, it focuses mainly on general 
improvements in reading, comprehension and mathematics, and not on 
reasoning. Pupils have not been tested specifically for philosophical 
understanding or reasoning, either before or after a PwC programme. 
Empirical evidence seems, therefore, to be looking just for transferability, 
an aspect not really claimed as an aim of the programme. Checking 
improvements in mathematics and English is not a method used to justify 
the value of other areas of the curriculum, such as history or art. Why 
must it be assumed that this is relevant for philosophy? 
PwC does tend to spring up where a specific practitioner demonstrates 
enthusiasm for this particular way of working. Whilst not exclusive to PwC, 
it is certainly symptomatic, resulting in patchy provision where success is 
doubtless due partly to the commitment of participants. 
Empirical evidence has always been a sticky issue for PwC programmes, 
as its claims are difficult to verify. A parallel can be drawn with the 
development of Sesame Street, the hugely successful and popular 
television show of the late 1960s and 1970s, and still thriving today. v The 
show was established to help compensate for language deficits among 
poor and immigrant children, who were disadvantaged in starting school. 
Original claims that the show would help children learn about sharing, 
caring, harmonious multi-cultural living and present different racial groups 
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with positive role models had to be played down through lack of reliable 
tests for such wide-ranging goals. What could be examined, however, was 
children's recognition of numbers and letters and their basic conceptual 
understanding of positional words such as'above and below', some 
simple processes, like baking and melting, and of language associated 
with typical pre-school curricula, such as the weather, items of clothing, 
shapes, colours and transport. Sesame Street excelled in meeting these 
concrete objectives, but the research results represent an impoverished 
notion of the purpose of the programme. 
Adults influenced by the programme cite the role models and remember 
specifically the people from different ethnic groups presented as 
successful entrepreneurs, and as friends across social and racial divides. 
In these days of accountability, testing and quantification, more nebulous 
and complex aspects of interaction and development are difficult to prove. 
The danger is that things that can't be definitively proved are then 
discounted as lacking value. PwC and Sesame Street have the same 
problems in this sense, but Sesame Street has, of course, reached a far 
broader audience. In a sense the programme makers have been 
vindicated in their aims, as anecdotal evidence continues to affirm the 
success of what was dropped due to the impossibility of definitive testing. 
It is still unclear, however, how it is possible to check qualitative learning 
such as moral reasoning, accurately. 
Perhaps transcripts of dialogues could be used. Kitchener suggests that it 
would count as evidence if children: 
... questioned on a one-to-one 
basis about their comments 
[could] elaborate on their views and rationally defend them. 
1990: 426-7 
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Murris suggests that this would be more convincing than the 'one time 
performances or philosophical one-liners' that Kitchener would not accept 
as evidence, but also notes that this discounts the value of collaborative 
thinking ('thinking together like one big head') and that the role of the 
Community of Enquiry is so important in PwC that it should play a part in 
assessment (2000: 264). Quality of anecdotal evidence and reported 
dialogues must also be assured, if this is to serve as proof of learning. 
Another difficulty with empirical evidence in this area is the impossibility of 
knowing how well the materials have been both taught and learnt. With 
such a small number of teachers working in the field and the materials 
relatively un-tested, there are real possibilities of weak teaching and 
mistakes arising through misunderstanding of materials, which could be 
misrepresented as difficulties with ideas. 
Issues to do with evidence resurface in the next section (7-5). 
There are inherent difficulties with assessing children's progress in 
philosophy and empirical evidence has concentrated instead on more 
commonly measured subjects with no direct relation to the programmes 
being reviewed. Until use of programmes is more widespread and 
systematic, and independent large-scale studies are undertaken, empirical 
questions will remain unanswered. 
7.5 Obiection 4: PwC is not real philosophy 
It is difficult to provide a single, clear definition of philosophy, as the field 
covers a range of activities and material. Gazzard is particularly interested 
in Lipman's work and presents the following three definitions of philosophy 
which capture some commonly expressed views: 
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1. Philosophy as a type of striving associated with 
seeking to know how to live a better life; 
2. A view which renders it a specific body of problems 
and/or the history of the ideas of past and present 
philosophers; 
3. Philosophy as a particular way of thinking most often 
cast as reflective thinking and critical appraisal. 
1996: 9 
The first conception of philosophy as a type of striving was a focus of 
earlier writings of Lipman, but as Gazzard notes: 
... the relationship between reasons for belief and knowledge is controversial [ ... ] the search for meaning is, therefore, not 
as straightforward as the earlier writings of Lipman and his 
co-workers suggest. 
Op cit: 15 
There is clearly a dispositional aspect to this interpretation of philosophy 
and the IAPC training courses require intensive training that would ensure, 
as far as possible, that teachers had the right attitude to their work in order 
to encourage and foster these dispositions. 
The second conception of philosophy involves learning about and 
understanding an important body of work that is generally reserved for 
degree level work. The accusation of PwC as diluted philosophy is 
reasonable if this reduced conception is acceptable as a definition. 
However, PwC is considered as more to do with active participation, with 
the ideas of great philosophers used as stimulus for developing children's 
own reasoning. Critics such as Kitchener consider that children should do 
philosophy in the same way as academic philosophers, although this 
argument is not used for other curriculum subjects. v' Murris suggests it 
could be fair to consider children's progress alongside novice adult 
philosophers, but not against qualified academics (2000: 262-3). 
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Matthews considers that children should not be assessed with adult 
criteria, viewing PwC as different from adult philosophy (1978: 71-2) and 
that philosophical questions 'should not be considered the exclusive 
province of professional philosophers' (1984: 3). This is supported by 
Walter Kohan: 
To impose our creations and our manner of creating them is 
to impose our experience of the world, and thereby to 
impede them from reflection on their own experience. 
Op cit: 8 
Murris rejects this argument as not going far enough to combat the critics 
whom she accuses of failing to offer sufficient arguments for their notions 
of 'real philosophy' (2000: 266-7). 
With reference to the third of Gazzard's conceptions, PwC meets the 
criteria for reflective and critical thinking. Again, this is as much to do with 
inculcating dispositions as introducing new subject knowledge. PwC 
differs pedagogically from other curriculum subjects and is 'real 
philosophy' in that children are encouraged to develop skills and attitudes 
that help them reason and that the work 'reflects the dialogic character of 
philosophical thinking' (1996: 276). As there are no definitive answers, the 
enquiry is genuine, and if teachers use recommended methods, they will 
facilitate development of discussion. Through being a co-enquirer they 
help children probe and deepen ideas, not blindly accepting all 
contributions, but pointing out errors of logic and lack of reasoning and 
working with the group to aim for finding the truth. 
This issue resurfaces below in Objection 5 (7.6) in considering the 
relationship between enjoyment, motivation and the reality of philosophy. 
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7.6 Obection 5: Children lack the concentration and focus 
necessa[y for Philosophy and are not sufficiently 
_i 
nte rested in the research 
and enquiry needed to r)ursue philosophical questions 
For all children, if the task is motivating, increased time will be spent 
pursuing relevant information in search of an in-depth answer. That this 
would happen in philosophy is really an empirical question that has little 
evidence, as the subject is not on the curriculum for young children. The 
issue is particularly pertinent for highly able pupils, where research 
demonstrates an unusually high level of concentration and task 
commitment for their age (e. g. Renzulli, Freeman, Montgomery). For some 
theorists (e. g. Tannenbaum), intellectual stamina is a defining factor of 
their high ability and for ordinarily able pupils research continues to affirm 
that motivation is a key factor in learning. 
Some people will find philosophy intrinsically motivating, but it can be 
made more accessible in the first instance through carefully planned 
pedagogy. Lipman aimed to make the experience of P4C 'acceptable and 
enticing' and this resulted in an enthusiastic response. The popularity of 
sessions is noted in the literature (e. g. Haynes 2002: 58-9; Fisher 1998: 7; 
Sapere website, etc) and echoed here by Costello: 
[Yet] one of the reasons why the children to whom I have 
taught philosophy over the years looked forward to our 
sessions so much is precisely that they enjoyed themselves 
so much. 
2000: 37 
This is likely to increase commitment to completing set tasks and pursuing 
ideas beyond the classroom, but is it really representative of the process 
of doing philosophy? White does not think so: 
Philosophy often brings bewilderment, despair, painful 
struggles for understanding. [ ... 
] presenting philosophy to 
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children as a fun activity may impede rather than promote 
any understanding they may come to have of what 
philosophy is all about. 
1992: 77 
Many school activities are designed to be enjoyable for children and it is 
hoped that the cognitive dissonance they experience when learning 
provides the sort of challenge that keeps them interested in exploring 
ideas and finding out about their world. Any number of things in a school 
day will cause frustration and upset: completing a painting, climbing a 
rope, solving an equation, writing a letter. Hard and interesting tasks are 
often popular with children and their definition of fun may well include a 
certain amount of struggle. Naturally, we all have different strengths, and 
the appeal of philosophy may be no more widespread than that of other 
activities such as chemistry, sprinting or singing in the choir. Teachers do 
not necessarily worry about whether their laboratories, starting blocks or 
conducting techniques are a real representation of the professional 
version of their activity. It is certain that plenty of children do enjoy PwC, 
but whether they have a true sense of 'real philosophy', or professional 
philosophy, is a question yet to be addressed by research. 
Some pupils, particularly the highly able, show a remarkable level of 
sustained interest. Certainly, projects in philosophy can be harder to 
undertake than in some other disciplines, where a clear end is perhaps 
more obvious. This however, would not disallow highly able pupils from 
demonstrating the ability and drive to explore and try and answer difficult 
questions. Helping hands may be needed to ensure useful investigation. 
When a child has a humanities project to complete, for example, they are 
encouraged to persist in questioning, helped to structure their argument, 
and directed to gather pertinent information. Children are rarely given this 
kind of help when they raise philosophical questions as teachers and 
parents know much better how to help pupils with more familiar enquiries. 
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Without helping pupils to follow through initial interests, it is unclear 
whether or not they would demonstrate commitment and ability in finding, 
or moving towards, useful and well-considered answers. 
7.7 Philosophy and highly able children 
As well as being popular with ordinarily able pupils, PwC has a great deal 
to offer highly able children. Of the objections raised, those concerning 
children's ability to think abstractly (objection 2; 7.3) and display 
intellectual stamina (objection 5; 7.6) are irrelevant to the highly able. 
Objections 1 and 3 (the nature of philosophy and evidence for PwC; 7.2 
and 7.4) are empirical issues, and the question as to how PwC compares 
to 'real philosophy' (objection 4; 7.5) is affected by the pedagogies and 
systems used, and by the ability of the pupils in question. 
Key features of PwC make it suitable for the highly able. They are noted 
below along with examples from practice: 
a) There are no ceilinqs or limits 
As there are no absolute answers in philosophical enquiry, the depth of 
enquiry depends on the abilities of the children. The common cry of 'I've 
finished already' does not apply. The questions and ideas under 
investigation are involved and complex, allowing children to develop a 
better sense of how to follow through an in-depth, challenging enquiry. 
A discussion of 'war' with six able nine-year-olds is a typical illustration of 
this. Having read a newspaper article brought in by a pupil, we considered 
some issues it raised, as a Community of Enquiry. The children decided 
on a central question: 'Should you care about war if it doesn't touch your 
life? ' and proceeded to debate and argue, backing up ideas with reason 
and challenging one another. During the week, half the group sought me 
out to show me some extra unbidden work they had started (a concept 
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map on 'war in school' considering what'war' meant to them in terms of 
daily friendship battles, playground 'turf wars' and arguments with 
teachers). The project lasted for a whole term, with the three girls 
researching and discussing, writing and presenting ideas informally. They 
said that it was an exciting project because there was no end and they 
could keep going forever. They were motivated and enjoyed the work. 
b) PwC provides opportunities to explore abstract ideas 
PwC allows the able to explore complex notions, engaging them in ideas 
that they may have been discouraged from considering. This lack of 
encouragement is often due to the constraints of the curriculum forcing 
teachers to steer away from issues that do not match set targets. 
However, abstract ideas often tap into particular interests of the highly 
able, such as questions about the nature of life and death and the 
existence of God. 
Even younger able pupils seem interested in questions that are not easily 
answered through empirical evidence. I have witnessed and facilitated 
many Communities of Enquiry where children tackle abstract ideas and 
respond with good quality answers that demonstrate their appreciation of 
the complexities of the topics. I have met children interested, for example, 
in ideas of infinity and the mind-body issue. Merely raising questions such 
as 'If I have a soul, where is it? ' or'What's the most important thing in the 
entire world? ' may not indicate abstract understanding, but following it up 
and investigating the idea demonstrates something more substantial. The 
soul question was raised by Stan (Appendix I vii) and our discussions on 
the topic lasted the whole year we were together in school, mainly 
conducted when I was on playground duty, following up research he 
undertook unbidden in his own time. He started his investigations with 
the 
etymology of the word and found out a range of meanings for'soul' and 
'sole'. He was particularly interested in the different spellings for'sole, a 
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part of the body you can see, and soul, a part of you that you can't see'. 
Looking carefully at language and its use is a common starting point for 
philosophical investigations of some concepts and Stan had come to this 
through his own interests. With encouragement he went on to explore 
related uses of words such as'soulful' and 'soul music', and then found 
himself in the realms of 'spirituality and the soul'. Through reading and 
discussing he demonstrated an extended investigation of an abstract 
issue. 
c) PwC is particularly useful for underachieving able pupils 
As it need not involve writing, PwC can be a great opportunity for children 
with learning difficulties to express their ability. Success in sessions does 
not depend upon the usual factors; factors at which these pupils often fail. 
Creating a Community of Enquiry is a different pedagogy from usual 
teaching approaches and can prove appealing for pupils who are finding 
ordinary classes frustrating. Success positively affects self-esteem and 
this can have a good all-round impact. 
One underachieving pupil, Dave, was nervous of admitting his unusual 
ideas in class. He would always preface his stranger contributions with 'I 
heard on the radio... ' or'l read in a Sunday magazine... 'to avoid being 
teased. He later confessed that the ideas were his own, but that he was 
embarrassed to express them as he had been laughed at for their 
outlandish nature. In the PwC sessions, Dave's weirder ideas were 
embraced and he began to take credit for his own thoughts in ordinary 
class sessions, qualifying them with statements such as 'You might think 
I'm making a silly comment, but hear the whole thing first. I can explain 
how I thought of it . 
It is through such discussion that many children show flashes of ability that 
eventually lead to their identification as highly able. Children (such as 
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those in the appendix) have positively looked forward to sessions, which is 
untypical (except for Andr6 and Doris) and teachers have remarked on the 
effect of sessions on their ordinary classwork. Recommendations for the 
underachieving able made by key writers (Freeman, Montgomery, 
Wallace) match well with the pedagogy of PwC. These include aspects 
such as meta-cognitive work, an emphasis on unusual ideas, open-ended 
tasks and engaging with difficult notions. 
From the examples in the appendix, Billie (ii) and Charlie (vi) particularly 
benefited from being able to express their ideas in discussion without the 
ubiquitous 'write it all up' request that accompanies many tasks in school. 
Another underachieving able pupil was a talented cartoonist and took to 
recording some aspects of the discussion in cartoon form. His humour and 
understanding were clearly visible in the work produced in his own time, 
without any prompting. His teacher was amazed at the sophistication of 
his drawing and his ideas that were far more impressive than his typically 
below average written work. 
d) PwC challenges pupils who alreadv achieve hiqhlv 
In this instance, PwC is useful in two ways; by providing challenge for 
children who are in danger of being bored by easy tasks, and also by 
forcing teachers and able achievers to rethink their understanding of 
successful responses to set tasks. Philosophy challenges the 'one right 
answer' culture of high-achievers and allows different pupils to excel. The 
complacent able pupil can be unsettled by the achievement of others 
around them, and by the challenge of having to adapt the way they 
respond to tasks. 
Interestingly, the few dissenting voices often come from 
those children who are clever in the traditional academic 
sense. They are puzzled and resentful when they realise that 
philosophical questions are not amenable to simple, 
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straightforward answers - even from the teacher! Such 
children have unfortunately been trained to perceive 
educational value only in what can be examined and tested. 
Whalley, 1987: 73 
The aim is not to perturb pupils, but it is surely better to experience this 
confusion while still at school, in an environment in which anxieties can be 
expressed and tackled. Knowing that learning and understanding is about 
more than merely uncovering a predetermined correct answer is a useful 
lesson and more closely related to 'real life' scenarios. 
Presenting a PwC picture book session is particularly interesting, as high 
achievers consider it to be far too easy when they are introduced to the 
session. As the community takes off, they begin to see the potential depth 
of the activity and are drawn into the discussion. The most puzzled looks 
and furrowed brows are often on the faces of the able high achievers. I 
have had some anger from such children who felt threatened by the freer 
form of sessions. With practice and experience, however, they did begin to 
participate more readily and all those who expressed dislike eventually 
grew to enjoy the work. 
e) PwC is flexible 
Practical aspects of PwC allow for its inclusion into the school day with 
reasonable ease. It can be taught in or out of class, as specific sessions 
for the able, or with a mixed ability group. Providing extension work for the 
more adept is simple and need not affect the school curriculum, being run, 
for example, as clubs or extra classes. As it can make use of a range of 
stimuli, PwC can be taught virtually without materials or resources. 
Sessions always reflect the children's interests and can be adapted by 
them, to take into account issues of the day, such as addressing 
international news items as well as local, school and personal issues. As a 
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Senco, I have had to teach many last minute, fill-in sessions, or run 
sessions with far fewer, or more pupils than originally anticipated and 
philosophy can be easily adapted for these situations. 
I am not suggesting any particular pedagogy or approach to using 
philosophy with children as I wish to emphasise its flexibility. Being taught 
as a stand alone subject is different from being 'infused', teased out of, or 
connected to other curriculum areas. All of these can be appropriate in 
different scenarios and I would not wish to favour one method over 
another. Bearing in mind the criticism of other provision (e. g by Ofsted, 
2001) as disconnected and 'bolt-on', it would seem preferable to integrate 
the work into the school week, but there may be a place for more 
particular provision. 
7.8 Conclusion 
I remain uncomfortable with the concept of P4C as a 'movement' and feel 
that the proponents of P4C and PwC will have to take criticisms more 
seriously if they are to have their ideas accepted in the mainstream. From 
the early work of Lipman to current available activities there have been 
significant changes, some of which would definitely count as 
improvements, but the lack of empirical research is holding back further 
development. As with any good programme, some aspects are excellent, 
but some reasonable reservations remain. 
I find that PwC is a potentially useful practical contribution to dealing with 
the highly able. It can enrich the curriculum, or provide extra, out-of-school 
provision, allowing pupils to remain in mixed classes where appropriate 
and yet be challenged and encouraged through stimulating activities. 
'in Brazil alone more than 30,000 children are involved in P4C programmes that are 
helping to raise the standards of literacy' (Fisher, 2003: 33,34 and 37). 
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The Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education 
(Sapere) was established by Roger Sutcliffe and Steve Williams and is the largest PwC 
organisation in the UK; Karin Murris authored 'Storywise' using picture books-, Antidote 
(the national organisation for Emotional Literacy) advocate PwC; Robert Fisher writes 
very teacher-friendly books with accessible PwC ideas; LEAs such as Northumberland 
have a strong network of PwC teachers and specialists; the International Council of 
Philosophic Inquiry with Children (ICPIC) has members worldwide; Philip Cam in 
Australia and numerous organisations in Latin America and Eastern European countries 
in particular. 
"' The organisation IAHE (International Association for the Humanisation of Education) is 
an example of this. Members are committed to helping post-communist countries use 
education to build democracy. 
'v For a thorough explanation of the difference between Circle Time and creating a 
Community of Enquiry, see Haynes, 2002 and Fisher, 1998. 
v Produced by the Children's Television Workshop. 
v' As with other academic subjects, this does not mean that teachers should not have 
appropriate backgrounds. The IAPC materials require the study of philosophy for 
teachers. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.0 General introduction 
Able children are an anomaly. They do not fit traditional models of 
ability and intelligence and they do not fit standard educational 
provision in schools. Being clear about what is meant by high ability is 
difficult. Deciding what resources they require and the level of support 
they are entitled to receive is also complex, partly because this 
involves separating the political from the educational. The research 
field 'is more or less fragmented, with results that cannot be easily 
compared to one another' (Ziegler and Raul, 2000). 
I have made a series of key points in this interdisciplinary thesis, 
contributing to the debate about what it is fair to do for able children. 
Gifted education research is predominantly written from psychological 
perspectives and I made use of these, as well as aspects of practice 
and analysis of underpinning premises, considering them from a 
philosophical angle. This has allowed for clarification of commonly 
used but rarely examined ideas and the connection of theory and 
research to practice. This concluding chapter summarises the main 
ideas. 
8.1 Part One: who are the highly able? 
Firstly, I demonstrated the background to the field, showing how the 
concerns about describing and explaining who the highly able are have 
significance in a wide range of contexts. Sticky problems to do with 
excellence, equity and the nature of ability are contested in different 
countries and have relevance for all children in education, not just the 
highly able. I have demonstrated my specific interest in the 
underachieving able child, with reference to some examples of children 
in school that illustrate the general concerns raised. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the nature of high ability and intelligence, 
using dominant psychological references in the field to endeavour to 
describe high ability. Some philosophical notions were incorporated in 
an attempt to clarify language that is often confusing in the literature. It 
was clearly demonstrated that it is too simplistic merely to equate high 
ability with high achievement. People with learning problems, 
disabilities and difficulties arising from cultural difference have often 
been ignored by researchers of high ability due to the over-reliance on 
the achievement model. 
I criticised a variety of different definitions, highlighting contradictions 
and confusions and then, focusing on intellectual high ability for the 
purposes of this thesis, presented my own positive account of high 
ability along with some potential criticisms. I consider a highly able 
child to be someone who has significantly greater aptitude for some 
aspect of intellectual learning than would be considered typical for their 
age and background. Aptitude for learning is demonstrated through 
some form of achievement, conventional or unconventional, including 
notable, isolated incidences that serve as evidence of special ability, 
but are otherwise difficult to categorise. Such a definition of high ability 
allows for underachieving pupils to be recognised. 
As my definition of high ability focuses on intellectual aspects, in the 
third chapter I considered the related concept of intelligence, critically 
reviewing both traditional and contemporary understandings, typically 
single and multiple-ability viewpoints. After considering common uses 
of the term 'intelligence' I discussed a series of claims concerning 
intelligence. I argued that some elements of intelligence could be 
described as aptitudes, or capacities, but that dispositional elements 
are just as important. I considered the claim that intelligence is innate 
to be irrelevant to this thesis and to the question of provision. 
Intelligence does not seem to be fixed, and although aspects of 
intelligent performance can be measured, this does not provide a 
sufficient account of what intelligence could be. I rejected 
the traditional 
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concept of 'g', but accept that there are some intellectual abilities and 
dispositions that can be grouped loosely together under the heading 
'intelligence', and this is what most teachers seem to understand by the 
word. 
8.2 Part Two: what it is fair to do for able children 
Having established the concept of high ability, it became clearer which 
children were under discussion and the next task was to consider what 
it would be fair to do for such children in education. I made a morally 
defensible argument for supporting the highly able through educational 
provision. 
I considered arguments both for and against provision for the highly 
able. Common arguments against provision suggest it is elitist, and so I 
considered the notion of elitism, revealing its complexities and 
concluding that it should not be dismissed as always negative, as in 
some contexts it can refer merely to high quality. I then considered the 
concept that provision for the able will increase the gap between rich 
and poor, concluding that it is possible, but that this issue is beyond the 
scope of schooling. Ideas of equality were then reviewed, particularly 
equality of resources, outcome and opportunity. All three were rejected: 
equality of resources as impractical; equality of outcome as 
unworkable; and equality of opportunity an unclear idea and therefore 
too complex to apply. 
then considered five commonly expressed arguments in favour of 
provision for the able. The idea of providing for the pursuit of intrinsic 
excellence was dismissed as elitist in the most negative sense of the 
concept, and only tenuous conclusions can be drawn from the second 
notion of considering that activities for the highly able will result in 
benefits for society through more and better economic and social 
goods. The third contention concerned the effect of the able on other 
pupils and needed further examination as it is an empirical 
issue. The 
fourth idea, that all pupils are entitled to an education beyond the 
bare 
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minimum, is a woolly notion, and it is difficult to decide what counts as 
extra and what should be mandatory. The last of the claims was 
considered the most reasonable, suggesting that pupils are entitled to 
an education based on their needs, although it is unclear exactly what 
is meant by'needs 
I then presented my contribution to the equality debate, the idea of 
providing equality of quality of learning, or equality of challenge, which 
is applicable to all children. Whilst there is a statutory requirement to 
attend school, pupils should be allowed to make good use of their time 
in school. They need to be engaged in their learning and this can only 
happen when tasks are challenging. For most pupils, the curriculum 
can satisfy this need for challenge, but the able pupil is often left bored 
and unstimulated. Pupils must move at their own intellectual pace, or 
as near to this as is practically possible, regardless of whether that 
pace is 'normal' for their age. This can be ensured, or at least we can 
try to ensure this, through careful consideration of the quality of 
teaching they receive and the level of challenge with which they are 
presented. 
I conclude that the able are entitled to this equality of quality of 
learning, or equality of challenge. I did not find that provision for the 
able is elitist, or that arguments for equality of outcome, resources or 
opportunity imply that provision for the able is unfair. Arguments 
exhorting the able to have extra resources due to intrinsic academic 
excellence or for social or economic benefits are interesting, but are 
not compelling enough to lend support to provision. Some empirical 
matters could not be decided in this arena, such as whether or not 
provision for the able could benefit all pupils. Despite the fact that 
provision will probably be inegalitarian, I decided that pupils should 
be 
allowed an education based on their needs and that this would 
incorporate appropriate challenge. 
8.3 Part Three: what should we provide for the able? 
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I then contemplated the nature of provision for the able, firstly through 
a review of what is typically found in schools, with an emphasis on 
adopting an inclusive approach to provide for able underachievers also. 
I explained the common methods of differentiation, through 
acceleration, extension, and enrichment. Consideration was given to 
the effects of the provision on the pupils, teachers and the wider school 
community. Schools need a flexible approach and should ensure pupils 
are appropriately challenged. 
Since programmes of critical thinking skills could possibly fill this 
requirement they were examined in Chapter 6, as a potential practical 
solution to the needs of the able. The programmes were contextualised 
through a critical review of current trends in the thinking skills 
'movement I, with particular reference to the 1999 McGuinness/DfEE 
report'From thinking skills to thinking classrooms'. Some specific 
programmes were examined and the concept of critical thinking skills 
as a potential solution in meeting the needs of the highly able was 
evaluated. I showed how some of the programmes are based on rather 
shaky theoretical foundations. 
I also considered issues raised through the concept of thinking as a 
skill, through reviewing specific claims made about the development of 
thinking being like other forms of skill learning, in that it is made up of 
components, uses observation and modelling and can be transferred. I 
also briefly referred to some of the newer programmes. In conclusion to 
Chapter 6,1 suggested that the most promising programme for the 
highly able child is likely to be Philosophy with Children (PwC) and so 
this is the focus of Chapter 7. In this chapter, I reviewed the major 
objections to PwC, showing that they are not relevant problems for 
using PwC with the highly able. 
People objecting to PwC have suggested that it is no more than 
standard classroom discussion work. This I refuted, as well as 
explaining something of the difficulties of empirical evidence for the 
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efficacy of the programme. I also showed that highly able children can 
cope with abstraction and that the charge that PwC is not 'real 
philosophy' is irrelevant. The last objection was that children lack the 
concentration and focus necessary for philosophy and are not 
sufficiently interested in the research and enquiry needed to pursue 
philosophical questions, which is patently not the case for the highly 
able. 
Having discussed the particular case of philosophy and highly able 
children, I have not presented PwC as a panacea. I do not consider it 
the only appropriate provision for the able child, but I do think it is a 
viable option, with sufficient flexibility and challenge to meet many of 
the requirements for a workable, practical response to the issue of 
provision for the able. 
8.4 Further Research 
Before considering how to take this study further, I will outline some of 
its limitations. Being interdisciplinary, it has been frustrating not to be 
able to pursue some aspects in sufficient depth. I could have expanded 
each of the three parts into three separate theses, but would not have 
been able to draw ideas together with much clarity. All through working 
on this thesis, I have been keeping the practitioner in mind, trying to 
see what would be relevant for the classroom. Without undertaking 
major empirical studies, it may be that I cannot make claims about 
practice, which is, perhaps, a limitation of the study. I say perhaps 
because it is not certain that empirical studies necessarily result in 
improved practice and it is entirely possible that theoretical work, such 
as this, may provide a better basis for change. I am not claiming, 
however, to have answered many questions. I have, I hope, clarified 
some key issues and raised further debate. 
As this is an interdisciplinary thesis, there are particularly wide 
implications for further research and areas for investigation emanate 
from each of the three key themes. For example, questions concerning 
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the nature of high ability and intelligence merit pursuing, as well as 
empirical work on the efficacy of PwC and further conceptual work on 
the notions underpinning thinking skills. In my view, the key area for 
research is how to ensure challenge for the able. 
As shown in section 4.4, understanding and defining challenge is 
complex, as it necessarily has to take personal interests and abilities 
into account. A review of different conceptions of challenge may well 
reveal some common factors though, and it would not be surprising if 
these relate to Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) and 
Piagetian understandings of cognitive dissonance. Traditionally, these 
ideas are presented as differing considerably in terms of the role of 
interaction between novice and experienced learners. Cognitive 
dissonance is often described in terms of task-setting for individuals (or 
less often, groups), while ZPD tasks relate more to the development of 
independent abilities that currently need the scaffolding of an 
experienced peer or adult. This immediately provides at least two 
models for challenge: activities to be pursued without support, and 
those that require mentor help. This is, perhaps a simplification, or a 
false dichotomy, as learning support can be provided in the form of 
written instructions, of course, and the ZPD requirements do not have 
to be filled by individual 'live' oral instruction, just as cognitive 
dissonance can often be best provided by interaction with a 
questioning teacher. 
However, the different concepts of learning provide a basis for 
contrasting approaches to classroom activities that could be useful in 
research that will necessarily entail some imposition of, to a degree, 
false structures, for the purposes of investigation. There is likely to be a 
place for both styles of challenge, but it would be interesting to see if 
one is more satisfying than the other. This will depend on both the task 
and the individual, but there may be a preference for one over the other 
in terms of depth of challenge. From knowledge and experience of 
working with the highly able, I would expect children to demonstrate a 
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slight preference for working alone, not for anti-social reasons, but to 
allow complete control over pace of learning. Many able pupils spend a 
great deal of time adjusting their rate of work to fit in with other class 
members and testify that it is a relief on the occasions when they are 
permitted to control their own learning. 
Detailed research into 'learning styles' is also a possible area for 
consideration. It is already a common subject for psychological 
research and focusing more specifically on the highly able may result in 
helping teachers to tailor tasks to pupil preferences more effectively. 
For example, some of the workshop activities noted in Appendix IV 
move at a tremendous pace, providing an overview of a subject and 
introducing a wealth of new ideas. Others provide opportunities for in- 
depth study of a single complex idea and whilst some pupils are happy 
with both approaches, some firmly prefer either depth or breadth. It 
would be illuminating to find out if this is more to do with different 
subject areas, age groups, stage of schooling, or individual learning 
preferences. It is currently unclear whether one or other style is 
inherently more challenging for the able pupil. 
The role of the teacher is possibly of equal importance to the subject 
matter and nature of task. I have cited several reports into pupils' 
preferred characteristics for their teachers, and this work could be 
expanded. Most studies have been undertaken in the USA and cultural 
difference could be evident if such an enquiry were replicated in the 
UK. Implications for learning assistants, parent helpers and mentor 
schemes could also be explored, perhaps leading to suggestions for 
restructuring some subjects in school more around ability than age. 
This would impact on differentiation. If, for example, core subjects were 
taught entirely through flexible ability groups, teachers could minimise 
the potential social difficulties that can accompany acceleration, whilst 
providing pupils with activities at appropriate cognitive levels. 
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Another question raised by this is to do with quantity of challenge. 
Perhaps it is sufficient to ensure merely that some activities are 
accurately matched to ensure optimum challenge. Children currently 
experiencing dissatisfaction, which is becoming disaffection, may be 
satisfied with the minimum of attention to even just one area of study. 
This may be enough. Without investigation however, it is an important 
unanswered question; with direct implications for the cost of provision. 
Why some subject areas appeal to the highly able is also an area worth 
reviewing. A suitable starting point could be an evaluation of 
enrichment activities, possibly with an audit of provision that has the 
explicit aim of challenge. It is likely that fields of study with underlying 
complexities and baffling questions would be popular as they have 
potential for genuine research. Controversial issues are also a rich 
source of engaging activities. Investigative and problem solving tasks 
are obviously popular with the highly able and most subjects can lend 
themselves to these approaches through careful activity planning. The 
framing of questions is more important than the subject material itself 
and elaborate investigations can be undertaken with minimal 
resources. 
Having stated that investigative and problem solving tasks are enjoyed 
by the able, I should express a caveat with reference to the highly able 
achiever. Sometimes pupils who achieve consistently high grades in 
traditionally taught subjects find open-ended tasks disconcerting. 
Embarking on a project with very little structure or no clear end-point 
can be distressing to those who like clearly defined boundaries and this 
also merits exploration. 
Similarly, the needs of the underachieving able merit more 
consideration, particularly in terms of the focus of provision. The dual 
aims of supporting children with problems and providing challenge are 
complex to satisfy. For many teachers, the first impulse would be to 
focus on remediating weakness and helping strengthen areas of 
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difficulty, but it is possible that a different tactic may be far more 
effective. Research should consider what would happen if children are 
afforded the opportunity to pursue a challenging project of their own 
choosing, perhaps provided with minimal support. In my experience, 
the learning problem becomes almost irrelevant as the pupil finds 
alternative ways to express their findings, fuelled by enthusiasm. 
Research could confirm whether this is a generalisable phenomenon 
and whether the answer is positive or negative, implications for SEN 
support follow. 
Genuine potential for both success or failure is an essential aspect of 
challenge. It is inevitably disheartening to set off on a journey doomed 
to fail and just as empty to merely go through the motions of a simple 
task with an unimaginative and obvious conclusion. These ideas need 
significant investigation and clarification if the entitlement of the highly 
able to equality of challenge is to be taken seriously. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated the complexities of the field of 
gifted education, through an interdisciplinary consideration of the 
nature of high ability and the type of provision that would best serve the 
highly able. I have shown the entitlement of highly able children to a 
challenging educational experience, without resorting to elitist or 
exclusive standpoints, even when this demands provision outside the 
statutory curriculum. 
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Appendix I 
Examples of highly able children 
The sketches demonstrate the difference between the pupils, highlighting 
something of the range of strengths and weaknesses that a teacher could 
have to face in working with the able child. Their similarities are more 
difficult to express. As this thesis is not an empirical study, these 
examples serve only to illustrate the nature of the highly able child in 
school. All children were assessed and shown to be able through a 
combination of teacher nomination and verification through educational 
psychologists, except for Doris and Nina who had no formal measures. 
Their abilities were extremely visible in the classroom and they were not 
tested, Doris, due to lack of necessity and Nina because neither school 
nor family could access the service within their budget allocation. 
I have noted the child's age when I first met them. The direct quotations 
presented are the answers to the question 'Do you think you're good at 
learning? ', which they answered at the age noted in brackets. 
A child with challen-qinq behaviour: Louis, Aqe 13, Year 8 
Louis was most often described as 'cheeky'. He rarely completed 
homework tasks, skipped some lessons and always had a witty riposte for 
any comment from teachers about his lack of compliance. As he 
progressed through school, the humour wore increasingly thin. His 
obvious ability was undermined by his very low achievement. He 
frustrated teachers by under performing and although his peers still found 
him diverting and amusing, he stayed away more and more, angering his 
parents and causing problems. Louis'flashes of ability were undeniable, 
but inconsistent. 
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'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'Yeah, but I can't be bothered. I can do lots of this work without learning it, 
but they don't believe me. I could pass the tests, but they won't let you do 
them until you've done the practice in class, but I don't need it really. 
[Accurately mimicking his least favoured teacher] "Do number one. Do 
number two. Look I don't care if you can do number three, do the others 
first! " It's annoying. ' (13 years) 
ii) A child with learning problems: Billie, Age 8, Year 4 
With some learning and organisational problems, Billie was not working to 
her potential. Her mother was an older single parent, over anxious and 
desperate to do the right thing for her only child. Once identified as having 
both dyslexia and dyspraxia by a private psychologist, teachers in school 
set about planning provision to help Billie cope. 
The psychologist had used the standard Weschler test (WISC-R) to 
measure IQ and found an erratic 'spiky score'. This type of test result is 
typical of able underachievers, but was unfamiliar to the school's special 
needs teachers, as they had mainly worked with pupils who had these 
problems with a more regular, low-scoring WISC-R test result. The one-to- 
one sessions focused on the difficulties and failed to take into account 
Billie's high abilities. Her reading was excellent, but despite this she was 
required to undertake extra reading, as her weak spelling was wrongly 
diagnosed as a visual problem, when, in fact, problems were to do with 
the haste of trying to get her many ideas on paper. No visual problems 
were recorded on her test score, but the teachers were too busy to create 
new strategies and tasks. 
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Billie exhibited low self-esteem and an unusual cluster of difficulties, 
punctuated by sparks of exceptional understanding and bursts of great 
ideas. Her particular constellation of characteristics proved too complex to 
be really helped in just one 40 minute weekly session. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'No. I have ideas, but I don't learn in the right way. My ideas get in the way 
of the learning because they put me off and I don't do the learning like I 
have to do it all. I can learn ideas. But not writing ideas. ' (8 years) 
iii) Ideal children: Andre, Doris, both Aqe 8, both Year 4 
Both of these children were all-rounders; good at pretty much every 
subject, and able to demonstrate outstanding achievement in some. Both 
excelled in maths and English, humanities and general science. Doris was 
an accomplished musician and dancer and Andre was a great cricketer 
and the computing expert who teachers called on when the lab crashed. 
Doris was the most out going, but both had many firm friends and were 
liked by teachers, auxiliary staff and parents. They were both star pupils, 
but had not let success go to their heads. Unlike the stereotype, they were 
sociable, capable, helpful, humble and friendly. In short, they were model 
pupils. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
Andre: 'Not at everything like English and French. I am at maths, though 
think it's hard work too. People say I'm a lucky beggar, but I do have to 
work as well. I like to do as well as I can. ' (9 years) 
Doris: 'I can learn dances really quickly. it's my talent and so I have to use 
it everyday. I can't learn maths so well because it's too hard to bother with. 
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I prefer other things. I think I'm good at learning things I like. Maybe I like 
things I'm good at learning. I've never really thought about it. That's a 
good one. I'll think about this later. ' (9 years) 
iv) An exceptional child: Miles, Age 4, Year 1 
Already having a daughter, Miles' parents could see their younger son's 
giftedness immediately. He could speak at eight months, read before he 
was two and his school-based achievement outstripped his peers by 
around three to four years. At the age of nine he passed his GCSE maths 
and was working with Year 11 pupils when he was still Year 4 age 
(although accelerated into Year 6). The only way to interest him was to 
keep him on the Internet, communicating with international chess masters 
and NASA scientists and to take him to museums, art galleries and special 
exhibitions as often as possible. His parents received bursaries and 
charity funds to enable him to attend a school that could meet his needs, 
but this precociously talented boy was deeply demanding. 
There was no subject in which he did not excel, although as he 
progressed through school he began to be dismissive of some of the more 
mundane tasks requested of him. Despite a slowing down in completion of 
tasks, all staff agreed that his startling abilities were exceptional, in 
particular his mature and knowledgeable responses in oral tasks. Miles 
had friends and was well liked in general, but his ability was off-putting for 
some of his peers. This is easy to see from the extract below in which he 
is being matter-of-fact and honest, but which could equally be read as 
arrogant. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'I'm a really good learner. I can learn anything, and quickly. Of course, 
there are lots of things I haven't tried to learn and things I'll never get a go 
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at learning, but the ones I've tried are quite easy, mainly. Lucky for me 
they're the ones that people think are good. It would be annoying to be 
really good at learning something like remembering the words to adverts 
or all the numbers on a page of the phone book, because that's no use 
because computers will do it for you if you like. I could do that too, by the 
way. But why would I bother? ' (6 years) 
V) A frustratinq pupil: Nat, Aqe 14, Year 9 
'Lazy'was the word most often used to describe Nat. He would not 
participate in anything much but pulled it out of the bag for his exams. 
Teachers would berate him for failing to attend class, emphasising the 
need to follow the curriculum and complete homework. He would defy 
them and then excel in tests, proving them wrong, reinforcing his contempt 
for school and irritating his less able and hard working peers, while 
infuriating teachers. When compiling the school register for the able, staff 
argued about the merits of Nat's inclusion. His erratic performance was 
considered negative, but more than this, even though teachers agreed he 
made some startling contributions, his lack of effort made him 'unworthy' 
of inclusion alongside hardworking peers. 
When Nat undertook his GCSEs the problems intensified. He refused to 
complete coursework until the last possible moment and then submitted 
weak and sketchy responses to set tasks, well below his obvious 
capabilities. Nat seemed to delight in annoying staff and seemed 
unperturbed at the prospect of leaving school with qualifications that did 
not reflect his ability. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'[In a mock teacher tone] Well, what do you mean by learning? ... 
I know 
lots of things but I've known them for ages, I kind of 
"got" the learning 
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rather than doing it. You know, you read something roughly, but the details 
aren't helpful and you know what it's about without reading it all, anyway. 
Is that what you mean? You know what the teachers here think of me. 
That's why I'm here with you doing special needs; because I'm crap at 
learning. We all know I can't be bothered; I get out of lessons, you write in 
your folder or tape it all and there's no other ideas to make me care 
anyway. [As an aside] Is that the kind of thing you need for your folder, or 
do you want a bit more? You know, the peer pressure or home arguing- 
with-my-sister-stress or teenage hormone stuff. I could do an eating 
disorder for you if you want something more dramatic, but no psychology 
"do these puzzle tests", OK? ' (16 years) 
A An impulsive child: Charlie, Aqe 5, Year 3 
On day one of school, the first activity was to be given a named pencil. 
This was to be the responsibility of the pupil. In the previous class, pencils 
were pooled and shared and learning to look after one's own things was 
part of the process of moving up to the 'big school'. The children were 
attentive in their pristine, just-too-big uniforms, taking on board the 
symbolic significance of this new responsibility. Charlie was sitting at the 
first table of children to receive shiny new pencils. By the time I had 
reached the second table, there was a loud crack and a collective gasp. 
Charlie wriggled. He had managed to snap his pencil clean in half. 
And so it continued. For a full year, this very bright and capable child 
demonstrated time and again that personal control was beyond his ability 
at this age and stage. Even our informal and relaxed classroom was too 
restrictive and rule bound, making every day a struggle and every set task 
a battle of wills. Charlie's written work never lived up to his obvious 
promise and he continued to produce great ideas and unusual top quality 
oral responses, but little evidence for a portfolio and no learning problems 
to explain his lack of writing. 
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'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'Only electronics [not taught at school] and maths and not reading. Also 
you can learn from TV and books and the Internet and teachers don't have 
all the answers. I am not good at cursive (writing). I like games, but I am a 
butterfingers and Mr Coltrane said I am a curate's egg, which is good in 
bits. Are you good at learning? ' (5 years) 
vii) An unusual child: Stan, Age 4, Year Reception 
Stan would infuriate his mother and teachers by speaking in rhyme, or 
saying the last word of each sentence backwards. He would play with 
words all the time and his peers would find it hard to understand him, 
describing him as ( odd' or 'funny'. He was particularly fascinated by the 
etymology of words and would tell people whether words had Greek, Latin 
or Anglo-Saxon roots. He was also a mine of information, spouting 
obscure general knowledge facts constantly and making word play jokes 
that only adults would understand. He found it hard to make friends of his 
own age. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'Learning is learning and earning is earning. I have learnt some good 
things over the years, but there's a lot I haven't put to memorisation yet. 
Can I go back to class now? ' (4 years) 
viii) A defeated child: Nina, Aqe 5, Year 2 
Nina seemed unusually serious and sad. She had a happy home life and 
good relationships with siblings, parents and friends. Nina's parents were 
aware of her unusual abilities and did their best to keep her stimulated 
by 
providing books and learning experiences, but at the same time, not 
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making a huge fuss of her so she would develop a healthy social circle 
and self-concept. Nina initially enjoyed the experience of her Nursery 
class, but soon grew frustrated at the need to wait for her peers to catch 
her up all the time. At least in the Nursery she was able to play once she 
had completed set tasks. 
As Nina moved to Reception, she continued to complete tasks well but 
was interacting less and less with classmates and teachers. The school 
suspected some kind of problem, but the psychologist they called in 
diagnosed her with 'boredom' and charged the teachers with the 
responsibility of keeping her busy with meaningful stimulating tasks. 
She skipped Year One and once separated from her friends became even 
more despondent. Nina coped with the work easily and was soon the first 
to finish both set tasks and extra work. Her parents noted her increasing 
quiet at home and at school she became withdrawn and stopped 
communicating with teachers and children except for responding politely 
to direct questions. 
'Do you think you're good at learning? ' 
'I don't know. (Long pause. ) I am quick at work. Then I sit on the book 
cushion and think about why I am quick at work.; 
'Why do you do that? ' 
'I have to do that because that 's what you must do if you have read all the 
books. ' (5 years) 
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Appendix 11 
Checklists for high ability 
1. Enjoys schoolwork 
2. Keen to answer in class 
3. Demonstrates wide general knowledge 
4. Enthusiastic 
5. Excellent memory 
6. Good self-regulation (able to monitor own learnii 
7. Speed of thought and work better than peers 
8. Able to solve problems effectively 
9. Prefers complex tasks 
10. Can concentrate at will for long periods of time 
11. May read, write and speak very early 
12. Prefers the company of adults 
Louis would only present positively for numbers: 5,7,9,10,11 (five out of 
twelve, usually insufficient for a positive identification). 
List compiled from a combination of typical factors found in Eyre (1997), 
Freeman (1998), George (1992), Koshy and Casey (1996). 
On the following page is the Nebraska Starry Night, completed for Louis. 
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Appendix III 
Issues raised by IQ testing 
These are very well documented, but mainly concern the following, all 
issues that affect performance: 
Familiarity or unfamiliarity with test structure and components 
Performance on the day (both emotional effects such as 
nervousness, and physical aspects, for example lack of sleep or 
food) 
e Cultural bias: the test uses vocabulary, images or references that 
the child cannot recognise (see following page) 
e Test in second or third language 
9 Confusing instructions or badly constructed test items 
Particular issues for the highly able: 
Reading too much into the test question 
Falsifying answers to cheat the test and avoid change to provision 
Deliberately ignoring instructions to find a more interesting way to 
do test 
9 Completing quickly and going back over answers, changing 
them 
unnecessarily 
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Consider these items taken from the 'Black intelligence test of cultural 
homogeneity' (Williams 1975, cited in Wallace 2000, p42) 
1. Alley Apple means: 
a) brick 
b) piece of fruit 
c) dog 
d) horse 
2. Black Draught means: 
a) winter's cold wind 
b) laxative 
c) black soldier 
d) dark beer 
3. Blood means: 
a) vampire 
b) dependent individual 
c) injured person 
d) brother of colour 
4. Boogie Jugie means': 
a) tired 
b) worthless 
c) old 
d) well put togther 
The answers are: 1 a, 2b, 3d, 4b. 
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Appýjndix IV 
Workshop programmes provided by GIFT Ltd 
Examples of courses popular with Y3-4 (7-9 year olds) 
Early Castles -A Challenge 
Using information supplied, position, plan and design an early mediaeval 
castle. The information will include workforce details and costs, as well as 
prevailing physical conditions. There will be a time limit for the castle's 
completion. 
Rational Games 
What unites Monopoly, football, and a round of poker? And what does it 
have to do with international arms treaties? We'll look at games' 
underlying principles which also apply to human interactions and can 
explain why people sometimes co-operate and sometimes compete. By 
the end of the day you'll have created your own game and tried your hand 
at predicting internatio nal relations. 
Here to Eternity 
The earliest maps go back to at least 450 B. C. From Elizabethan 
explorers to modern road builders, from astronomers to brain surgeons, all 
of them use specialist maps to navigate their way in different situations. 
This is your chance to learn about surveying and mapmaking, what to 
include (and what not to), how to read and use maps and how to navigate 
by them. Bring a calculator. 
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Body-Building 
Is the heart the best form of apparatus for pumping blood round the body? 
Are the lungs the best respiration system? Is the skeleton the best 
protective framework? Can you emulate Mother Nature? You will be 
required to design and build an organism from first principles using 
everyday materials. Access to reference sources and discussion will 
determine the nature of your design. 
Examples of courses popular with Y5-7 (10-13 year olds) 
Illuminated Manuscripts 
In mediaeval times manuscripts were produced by monks spending hours 
in the scriptoriurn of a monastery copying the scriptures. To make the 
work more interesting they developed their own styles of writing and 
began to illustrate their work with pictures, borders and fancy letters. By 
the end of the day you will have learnt how to write in Celtic script, made 
your own calligraphy pen, designed an illuminated letter and put all this 
together to produce a page from an illuminated book. (If you have an italic 
pen, bring it with you). 
The Alchemist's Cauldron 
Or Muddle and Mendeleev .... People 
believe that modern chemistry is 
derived from ancient alchemy - is this true? The alchemists were trying 
to 
turn base metals into gold. Did they ever succeed or is it a myth? Modern 
chemists search for patterns based on the elements around us. If 
alchemists had the knowledge we have today, could they have produced 
gold? Is it theoretically possible to produce gold? Your chance to make a 
fortune! 
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Freshwater Ecology 
This project shows you how to observe objectively living organisms in their 
natural surroundings and how to begin to work out their relationships with 
one another and with their environment using field techniques and 
methods. Wellington boots will be a necessity (and a towel)! 
The Secret Magic 
This course will look at extension work based on polyorninoes and their 
practical application, numerical palindromicality, some alternative and 
speed systems for basic mathematics, the infinacy or not of prime 
numbers, the magic in magic squares and, if there is time, we shall look at 
time itself. 
Mutiny on the Bounty 
In 1797 the crew of a Royal Navy ship, the Bounty, mutinied against its 
Captain. Was Captain Bligh a hero or a tyrant? We'll look at what life was 
like at sea in the late 1700s and follow the journey of the Bounty. What 
were the events that led up to the Mutiny? Why did it happen? You 
decide which side you would have been on - would you have mutinied or 
stayed loyal to your Captain? It's your decision. 
Dinosaurs, Fossils, and Time 
You'll be looking, in terms of post-fossil evidence, at what happened at the 
end of the reign of the dinosaurs. Recently theories and 'proofs' have 
abounded (ozone depletion, an asteroid collision, etc. ) but they leave 
some tantalising questions unanswered. We'll look at the problem from a 
different angle to find some surprising and unexpected results. "For time 
is the longest distance between two places. " Tennessee Williams. 
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Revolting Peasants 
The Year is 1381. The Peasants' Revolt is in full swing. How was it that 
ordinary mediaeval people could dare to rebel when all of the weight of 
Religion and Custom was in favour of conforming? And why were the 
counties of Kent and Essex so prominently revolting? We'll be examining 
primary sources dealing with mediaeval places and people from Lay 
Subsidy Returns to Manor Court Rolls to The Wilton Diptych. 
Examples of courses popular with Y7-13 (11-18 year olds) 
Will Power 
Was Richard III really a hunchback? Did Henry V really look like Kenneth 
Branagh? Who murdered the Princes in the Tower? Find out for 
yourselves the mix of propaganda and history in Shakespeare's plays. 
Carry out your own investigations from authentic sources and find out just 
how much of Shakespeare's 'history' plays is based on fact. 
The Empty Space 
Return to the imaginative core of pure theatre, away from make-up boxes 
and fancy costumes. Transfer an empty space into a source of powerful, 
original drama. This will be a day for those who love to improvise and 
imagine. 
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World in Action 
The ground beneath your feet seems pretty firm and solid (unless you've 
ever been in an earthquake), but it isn't! The continents are involved in a 
lunatic Demolition Derby, forever colliding with each other and being 
responsible for most of the world (and its seismic troubles) as we know it 
as they appear and disappear. You will reconstruct the arguments used 
by the people who discovered this, and maybe end up proving that they 
got bits of the story wrong ........ Where are we really heading? 
Essexmen 
You are a university postgraduate researching tenth-century Anglo-Saxon 
charters to discover the identity and succession of the ealdormen of 
Essex. To do this you have to order, date and verify the authenticity of the 
charters all within your annual budget. Fame gives you the chance to earn 
large sums of money - research reaping its own reward! If time and 
money permit, you may be asked to track down the erstwhile frontiers of 
the Kingdom and ealdormen of Essex... 
Murder Most Foul 
Explore a fictional murder scenario, building up character, evidence, 
solutions through role-play and discussion. Examine and attempt to solve 
two actual murder cases (Charlotte Dymond and Maria Marten) using 
primary and secondary evidence, including documents, prosecution and 
defence statements, newspapers of the time, court transcripts, 
criminologists' reports, etc. 
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Dadaism 
"What is Dada? Is it art? Philosophy? A fire insurance? Or a state 
religion? Is Dada real energy? Or is it nothing which means everything? 
This project will examine the Dadaist Movement, its different forms, its 
ideas, philosophy, art, and exhibitions. We'll aim to develop a conception 
of a Dadaist newspaper, a Dadaist house or anything else you are 
inspired to produce during the day. 
Labyrinths 
For millennia people have been fascinated by the idea of a construction in 
the complicated and bewildering corridor system of which everyone gets 
hopelessly lost. We'll look closer at different types of labyrinth, their 
function, fascination, fabrication and manifestations. What secrets do they 
hide and are you ready to discover them? Stand by for a very practical a- 
maze-ing day! 
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